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ABSTRACT
Before the mid 1970s African business development was 
severely limited by Government legislation. This restriction 
resulted in a dependent African entrepreneurial class unable 
to compete with White business.
The National African Chamber of Commerce (NACOC) formed in 
1964 and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(NAFCOC), which evolved from this organisation in 1969, were 
established by Black businessmen who united to fight this 
restrictive legislation. By the mid 1970s they were in a 
position, as a strong, united, national commercial body, to 
press for changes and to initiate business ventures which 
gained them a place in the South African economy.
Nevertheless, despite the co-operation and financial backina 
of White business, they were unable to bring about any 
effective changes in Government policy until after the 
Soweto riots of 1976.
The concessions granted to Black businessmen after that 
time, together with the important role played by the National 
African Federated Chamber of Commerce, stimulated Black 
business development in the late 1970s although Black 
businessmen continued to fight for the removal of all 
discriminatory legislation affecting Black business.
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PREFACE
Black entrepreneurial activity in South Africa remained 
stunted by Government legislation until the mid 1970s.
The effects of a wide range of restrictive legislation 
resulted in most Black businesses remaining small and 
isolated since they were confined to certain areas, 
limited by the types of businesses and range of 
commodities sold and lacked capital and expertise. These 
limitations created a dependent Black business community 
which was unable and unprepared to compete with White 
business.
At the same time these legal restrictions kept White 
business out of Black areas. As a result, all business 
which evolved in Black areas, in spite of the constraints, 
remained in the hands of undercapitalized Black 
entrepreneurs with little expertise.
It was against this background that the National African 
Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter NACOC) was established 
in 1964 to promote unity and self-help among Black businessmen 
and to fight for their interests in South Africa. But, 
this Black commercial organisation, which advocated 
co-operauion amongst its members and contact and 
negotiation with the Government, was unable to achieve 
any significant results until major changes in the 
Government's economic and political policy began to occur 
in the mid 70s.
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Major changes began when many groups, including the 
Government, expressed the need to develop a strong 
African middle class. The hope was that this middle 
class would be a stabilising factor in South Africa's 
political situation. Additionally, it would create a 
demand for services and consumer goods. Businessmen, 
who were an integral part of this group, would in turn 
provide those services and goods and create more jobs, 
which would act as a stimulant to further economic 
growth.
.’his new thinking in Government circles arose from steady 
and continual pressures for change. These pressures 
came from Black businessmen led by the National African 
Federated Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter NAFCOC), which 
evolved from NACCC in 1969, and from White business which 
called for a more equitaole participation by Blacks in 
South Africa's economic sphere. These pressures were 
capped by upheavals and widespread rioting in Black 
townships in 1976.
The changes in legislation made after 1976, which granted 
concessions to Black businessmen, opened the door to 
Black business development, for the Government, in its 
efforts to encourage this Black entrepreneurial class, 
appeared to be more willing to compromise in this area 
than anywhere else.
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The concessions, particularly to urban Black businessmen, 
together with the efforts of NAFCOC, played a significant 
role in the development of Black business. By the mid 
70s NAFCOC was able to act as the sole Black commercial 
negotiating body through which the Government could 
channel its changes. Consequently, the Government was 
forced to accept NAFCOC1S leadership and position in 
order to discuss and negotiate appropriate changes in the 
restrictive legislation which applied to Black business.
The noted increase in Black buying power and the changes 
in legislation also led to White business wanting to trade 
in Black areas and with Black partners. Again, NAFCOC 
was one of the few responsible negotiating bodies available 
for the many White business proposals which were made in 
the late 70s, although it continued to press for Black 
controlling influence in urban Black business.
Consequently, the presence of NAFCOC in the 70s was vital 
to all those concerned with the development of Black business 
since it was an established Black commercial organisation 
with which they could communicate and negotiate. This study, 
in order to explain and describe Black business development 
in the 1970s, focuses on the role played by NAFCOC during 
those years.
Despite the central role of NAFCOC in African entrepreneurship 
there has been little analysis of the Movement. Many 
authors, like D.S. Pearson, T. Geiger and W. Armstrong, 
who have discussed African commercial progress, have done so 
in the wider context of Africa generally and rarely refer
to South African Black business development. Others, 
such as Dr. G.P. Hart and R.B. S a v a g e , h a v e  tended 
to concentrate on the implications of Government policy 
and to play down or ignore the contributions of African 
businessmen themselves.
A few investigations like that of L. Reyburn's(3  ^ have 
indicated the problems of African businessmen without 
explaining how they went about alleviating these problems. 
While many authors, such as T.E. Nyquist and N. Mkele,(4) 
have stressed the evolution of a Black entrepreneurial 
class in South Africa, only a few, like L. Kuper and
G. Mar6 ,(5) have mentioned the African Chamber of Commerce 
in this regard. Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset ^ ^ 
have attempted to explain the attitudes which shaped 
African entrepreneurial activity but have not referred to 
South African Blacks.
Those who have discussed Black commercial co-operation,
for example, P. Walshe,  ^  ^ have usually referred to the
early Black business associations which evolved in the
1930s and 1950s. Where mention of the African Chamber
of Commerce was made it was invariably brief, for example,
in the works of L. Kuper and L. Reyburn. (8) References to
the Chamber of Commerce Movement were either confined to
a few paragraphs in commercial practice works ^  or
publications of the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Geneva.
Consequently, very little has oeen documented about the 
African Chamber of Commerce and there seems to be a dearth
°f material on the Chamber of Commerce Movement worldwide. (11)
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A recent article by Roger Southall(12) which was published 
while this dissertation was in progress and, hence, has 
not been referred to in the text, does discuss briefly 
some of the major NAFCOC initiatives. While Southall 
mentions some ambiguities in NAFCOC'S relationships with 
the Central Government and the Homeland Governments, he 
sees NAFCOC1S 1 favoured status' arising from its
espousal of free enterprise and its pragmatic acceptance 
of separate development, which 1 indicate that it heads a
i (14)
stratum willing to collaborate with the apartheid regime.'
. wever, my study, by discussing the internal organisation 
and development of NAFCOC, finds that, by working within 
Government policy NAFCOC was able to build a strong 
organisation with which Government was forced to negotiate 
the removal of discriminatory legislation. At the same 
time, economic strength, NAFCOC believed, was a prerequisite 
of political freedom.
Two important specific areas of weakness in Southall s 
article are in his analysis of the African Bank. Since these 
points have not been taken up explicitly in Chapter 4 (v) (a)
they are briefly mentioned here. Firstly, Southall states 
that the Homeland Governments failed to make any contribution 
to the African Bank, whereas, two of these Governments
did take up their option to buy shares; and secondly, that 
NAFCOC itself purchased R250 000 worth of shares,^
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when it was NAFCOC members who purchased shares as individuals, 
totalling R238 044,00 by September 1974.
The purpose of this dissertation is to document the 
central role of NAFCOC in Black entrepreneurial activity 
in the 70s and to explain why, in contrast with other 
Chambers of Commerce, it assumed so central a role. It 
explains the contradictory evolution of an independently 
oriented Black business organisation striving to retain 
if- autonomy in the context of a highly developed White 
capitalist sector and an ambivalent White governing class 
and Homeland authorities.
In its existing form NAFCOC comprises three distinct 
sectors, commerce, industry and farming. Although for 
the greater part of the 70s commerce was the sole sector, 
all three sectors followed similar development and goals 
and each had its own executive under the common umbrella 
of the central NAFCOC executive. The study of the 
organisation revealed certain distinct features about 
NAFCOC which differed from the traditional Western Chamber 
of Commerce Movement.
First, NAFCOC relied on its executive for achieving its 
objectives. It established an administrative system 
to meet its commercial needs and, at the same time, to 
safeguard its own support and survival as an autonomous
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body. Second, NAFCOC depended on the various autonomous 
regional organisations and affiliated associations 
having access to the national executive and sharing in 
its deliberations, so that the interests of their members 
were advanced and their oganisational interests were 
safeguarded. Third, NAFCOC was a creator of ideas and 
projects for an inexperienced group. NAFCOC itself dealt 
with the various business proposals and business ventures 
for its members, unlike Western Chambers of Commerce which 
stimulate individual members to do the dealing.
Despite these distinct features, which clearly indicate 
its autonomous position as a Black business organisation, 
NAFCOC remained contradictory in nature. In the e a n y  70s, 
although an established Black organisation with its own 
administration catering entirely for Black businessmen, 
with a strong 'Blacks only' identity, it was unable to 
operate efficiently and effectively without relying on 
White finance to establish its own Secretariat. Additionally, 
it was forced to introduce Whites into its organisation, 
in the form of Associate Members, partly to obtain finance 
for the running of its operation. Yet, reliance on White 
finance and membership did not destroy its autonomous 
nature and it remained entirely Black controlled and operated.
Huwever, reliance on White capital did guide its choice 
of projects since it proved to be more expedient to choose 
those with a specific purpose, like education and training, 
which White business was prepared to support. Even so, 
once they were established, NAFCOC retained control over
xlii
them.
NAFCOC was also the initiator of several major business 
ventures for Black businessmen in the fields of banking, 
insurance, retailing, construction and publishing. The 
policy behind this move was to harness Black spending power 
and increase Black involvement in the South African economy. 
Although Black businessmen retained the major shareholding 
in these companies and Black control remained a longterm 
objective, they were still forced to accept a certain degree 
of White finance, shareholding and expertise to establish 
these ventures.
Again, with the many business deals which were offered to 
NAFCOC by White companies after 1976, NAFCOC was the 
decision maker on proposals involving Black/White partnerships. 
It prescribed only those which it considered were in its 
members best interests and refused to accept or authorise 
those which it considered to be detrimental to their interests.
NAFCOC1S relations with the Government were also contradictory. 
After 1969 it was forced, by the Government, to ethnicise 
its organisation. This was a move which might have divided 
the countrywide Chamber, but, instead, it united it more 
strongly and gave it greater efficiency. While the Government 
chose to ignore it at this stage NAFCOC was able to develop 
into a viable national organisation. Then, after the pressures 
of 1976,
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when the Government granted concessions to Black businessmen, 
it recognised and consulted with NAFCOC as the negotiating 
body for Black businessmens needs. Yet, although the 
Government dealt with NAFCOC, NAFCOC was backed up by 
pressure from White business which had been calling for 
changes to legislation restricting Black business 
development.
NAFCOC1S links with White institutions like the Urban 
Foundation, also resulted in co-operation and finance 
for some of its business initiatives, but it continued to 
declare that it could not go along with everything these 
institutions stood for.
In the Homelands and Black States NAFCOC remained an 
autonomous national organisation, with regional Chambers 
in those areas affiliated to the national body, despite 
pressures from the Homeland Governments in several of 
those regions to separate their Chambers from NAFCOC.
It continued to negotiate and co-operate with all regional 
Governments, in the fields of commerce, industry and 
farming, as the national Chamber in South Africa.
Material for a study of this kind was not readily available. 
I was fortunate enough to gain access to NAFCOC'S archive 
documents and to the White Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, 
African Affairs archive documents (since 1971).
I obtained the co-operation of many African businessmen 
and NAFCOC leaders. Mr. M.J. Lefoka, Managing Director of
the Ikaheng (Zakheni) Finance Corporation and an 
executive member of the African Chamber of Commerce, 
kindly provided documents relating to the Ikaheng 
Finance Corporation and the African Chamber of Commerce 
before 1964. Mr. S.J.J. Lesolang, a founder member of 
ACOC and treasurer of NAFCOC until 1979, kindly provided 
information and newspaper reports relating to the 
Chamber s activities in the 50s and 60s.
Interviews conducted with African businessmen, some dating
back several years, revealed much new information about 
their problems, needs and activities. Important contributors 
included Mr. S.M. Motsuenyane, NAFCOC President, Mr. s. Kutumela,
NAFCOC Treasurer and Mr. m . Maubane of the African Bank 
and formerly Executive Director of NAFCOC.
Mr. J.W. Keeble, founder publisher of African Business 
magazine provided comprehensive information on the 
development of NAFCOC. in addition, he made available 
personal documents and volumes of African Business magazine
which were a vital source of information for NAFCOC1s 
activities since 1972.
Interviews were also conducted with White company 
executives connected with the Black market to gain an 
insight into their attitudes and actions when dealing 
with African entrepreneurs. Mr. s. Matus, Managing Director 
of the Spar Group and President of the White Johannesburg 
Chamber of Commerce, was particularly helpful. Interviews
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with officials of institutions and organisations, such 
as the Urban Foundation, the Human Awareness Programme 
and ASSOCOM, revealed how their activities were linked 
to African business development.
The IBM computer at the University of the Witwatersrand 
was used to analyse information on the shareholding in 
NAFCOC initiated companies which was kindly provided by 
the African Bank. A great deal of useful information 
was gathered from attendance at NAFCOC1S annual 
conferences between 1975 and 1980.
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CHAPTER 1
THE AFRICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE 19
INTRODUCTION : THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MOVEMENT
Close co-operation in all matters of common concern is 
characteristic of commerce. Consequently, with the 
evolution ot commerce, in Europe in the sixteenth Century, 
this social aspect of commerce revealed a need to form 
associations amongst businessmen, in particular regions, 
for the purposes of developing trade within the areas, 
and to protect the interests of their members.
The first time that the title Chamber of Commerce was 
used was in trance in 1599 when the town council of 
Marseilles, unable to cope with looking after both the 
commercial and municipal functions of the region, established 
an association, which it called the 1 chamber of commerce1, 
to take over the commercial interests of the town. ^
Chambers of Commerce promote their aims by:
1. Maintaining a high standard of integrity and commercial 
conduct amongst their members.
2. Providing information - by holding meetings and 
collecting and issuing bulletins on current economic 
conditions and relevant legislation affecting commerce.
3. Provision of advice:
(i) On general business methods and overseas markets.
(ii) On trade statistics, foreign tariffs and regulations, 
wage levels, taxes etc.
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INTRODUCTION : THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MOVEMENT
Close co-operation in all matters of common concern is 
characteristic of commerce. Consequently, with the 
evolution of commerce, in Europe in the sixteenth Century, 
this social aspect of commerce revealed a need to form 
associations amongst businessmen, in particular regions, 
for the purposes of developing trade within the areas, 
and to protect the interests of their members.
The first time that the title Chamber of Commerce was 
used was in France in 1599 when the town council of 
Marseilles, unable to cope with looking after both the 
commercial and municipal functions of the region, established 
an association, which it called the 1 chamber of commerce1, 
to take over the commercial interests of the town.(1)
Chambers of Commerce promote their aims by:
1. Maintaining a high standard of integrity and commercial 
conduct amongst their members.
2. Providing information - by holding meetings and 
collecting and issuing bulletins on current economic 
conditions and relevant legislation affecting commerce.
3. Provision of advice:
(i) On general business methods and overseas markets.
(ii) On trade statistics, foreign tariffs and regulations, 
wage levels, taxes etc.
2(iii) Legal, e.g. shipment of goods and contract 
conditions, various government controls.
They may provide services,e.g. certification of invoices 
and other foreign trade documents, arbitration and 
settlement of disputes.
5. Making representations to Government In regard to:
(1) domestic legislation affecting commerce 
(11J foreign tariffs and regulations.
They also perform two valuable functions in the commercial 
sphere. The first is that they establish and expand overseas 
trade connections and the second is that they police the 
free enterprise system so as to guard against over-zealous 
interference by government departments. Undoubtedly, certain 
controls are necessary, but it is the function of chambers 
of Commerce to ensure that such controls are kept within 
limits so that the free market system is not eroded by 
government regulations.
Nevertheless, the democratic nature of Chambers of Commerce 
varies in different countries. In France and the United 
Kingdom the Chambers of Commerce are voluntary public 
organisations. The United States of America brought in a 
voluntary, representative federation with autonomous 
Chambers of Commerce countrywide, while in the Federal 
Republic of Germany all are corporations under public law 
and membership is compulsory for industrial and commercial 
firms. But, in these countries the associations are independent
of Government. In Italy, the Chambers were initially 
voluntary public bodies but, with the advent of fascism, 
the old system gave way to full government control, 
instituted in 1926. In 1944 , after the fall of fascism, 
freely-elected boards were established but provincial offices 
of commerce and industry, dependent on the Ministry of 
Commerce and industry, were retained and the President of 
the Chamber of Commerce is appointed by the Minister.
The various Chambers of Commerce in South Africa were 
constituted along the lines of the United Kingdom bodies 
and are voluntary public organisations. The work of the 
autonomous Chambers is co-ordinated in one of three 
national bodies, The Association of Chambers of Commerce of 
South Africa (hereinafter ASSOCOM) Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut 
and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(hereinafter NAFCOC). These are members of the South African 
National Committee and of the International Chamber of Commerce.
The earliest Chamber of Commerce in South Africa was founded 
in 1804 as the Commercial Exchange of Cape Town, changed 
in 1861 to the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, to settle by 
arbitration disputes between foreign ships and Cape merchants.
The Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa (ASSOCOM) 
was formed in 1892.(2) By 1977 there were 100 Chambers in 
the Association in South Africa.
The Chamber of Commerce Movement in 'Black' South Africa started 
in February 1955 with the formation of the African Chamber of 
Commerce, although most of its founder members had belonged to 
the Orlando Traders association formed as early as 1945.
4By 1979 the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce, 
formed in 1969, comprised 17 regions with 181 affiliated 
branches. NAFCOC is not affiliated to ASSOCOM, being, 
as it is, a similar umbrella organisation for its own 
'Black' Chambers throughout South Africa.
1.(D The Early Black Business Associations
The initial struggle by Africans to promote business 
enterprises among their own people began in the early 
thirties. Much of the enthusiasm for economic self-help 
was generated by calls from the African National Congress 
(hereinafter ANC), with its realization that African 
economic strength was a prerequisite for political 
influence.
In 1932, a Bantu Business League was formed in Natal, 
with the Rev. John Dube as President and N. Lithuli as 
Secretary.(3) This was followed, in 1938, by the African 
Business League,^ formed by Selope Thema with the intention 
of setting up a wholesale co-operative. The Union's Co­
operative Societies Act No. 29 of 1939 led to numerous 
Inquiries in connection with the establishment of African 
co-operative trading shops and African savings banks 
societies, as well as Selope Thema's scheme. By 1940 
there were three African co-operative shops established 
under the Act.
Although the enthusiasm was present, very little came of 
these co-operatives. To a large extent the Irksome formalitiea
5were to blame yet two societies, situated on the Reef, 
showed that the biggest problems were insufficient working 
capital and lack of expertise. ^
The African Business League, though it proved unsuccessful 
as a business venture, did voice its opinion about the
plight of the African businessman. A letter from the
League, published in The Forum in May 1941,^^ protested 
against the difficulties placed in the way of Africans 
trying to obtain trading licences. The editorial in the 
same paper agreed that their protest was 'wholly justified' 
since
the principle that Bantu should
be encouraged to develop trades
and industries in their own 
reserves, locations and townships 
has been clearly laid down by 
Parliament.
It added that the delay of many months experienced by 
licence applicants was
grossly unfair and contrary to the 
declared Native policy of the Union. 
Johannesburg, with its tradition of 
liberalism, should know better. (8)
Frustrated by these restrictions, the League appears to
have tried to enlist the support of political parties.
The League submitted the following resolution to the Annual
Conference of the African National Congress in December 1942.
That in view of the growing importance 
of the Trading and Business movement 
among Africans, Congress should take 
steps to create within its Secretariate, 
a Secretary for Trade and Business 
Activities.(9)
This Resolution was passed at the conference but, a year 
later, the Secretary of the League wrote to the ANC that they
6had been waiting a year for the ANC to Implement the 
Resolution, without results. While not giving up all hope 
of ANC co-operation, the League further planned a 'Union wide 
conference of Business Africans' to synchronise with the 
sittings of Congress, to take place in Bloemfontein in 1944.(10) 
However, these plans to unite businessmen and politicians came 
to nothing.
The Second World War brought about industrial expansion, and 
the resultant economic growth consolidated the dominance of 
the White community. This upturn in the economy also 
provided more job opportunities for Blacks thereby attracting 
vast numbers from their rural homes to the towns.
Black businessmen began to take advantage of this new purchasing 
power of their people and during the war and into the 50's, 
there was an increase in Black business activity, albeit much 
of it was Illegal - undertaken by people without 
the stipulated licences and premises.
Details of wage rates during this period reveal that, in the 
twenty five years from 1935 to 1960, real Black wages in the 
industrial sector (manufacturing and construction) increased 
by 82.5 par cent or 2.4 per cent per year. But, wages stagnated 
in many sectors of urban areas during the recessionary period of 
the 50's, and there was evidence of a widening Black/White 
Income ratio in the 5Q's.^12^
Despite the increased Black business activity, figures given
7by the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic
Development of the Bantu Areas in the Union of South Africa,
1954-1956, Indicated the low state of African retail trade
at the end of the war. Of a total of 33 065 retail businesses
in 1945-46, 891 were in African hands. These were almost all
one-man businesses such as small-hawkers, peddlers, butchers,
(13)grocers and 'Native Trading Stores.1
Nevertheless there was an increase in the number of businesses, 
including hawkers and speculators, in the Johannesburg township 
between 1938 and 1955 from 192 to 820 or 327,08 per cent with 
an average rate of growth per annum of nineteen per cent. A 
further increase from 820 to 1683 or 105 ,24 per cent with an 
average of thirty five per cent per annum was experienced 
between 1955 and 1958.
The earlier efforts at African commercial co-operation were 
geared towards business ventures which proved to be largely 
unsuccessful. Therefore, in 1945 African businessmen seized 
the opportunity to organise themselves in order to acquire 
a greater understanding of business techniques and generally 
to develop business acumen. Thus, African co-operation looked 
to African trader's organisations to further their aims.
The 'Orlando Traders Association1 headed by Jeremiah Mofokeng, 
with J. Mophiring as Secretary, and seven other businessmen, 
took the lead. It was this Association which laid the 
foundation on which the National African Federated Chamber
8of Commerce stands toda%. Members of that Association, like
S.J.J. Lesolang and David Pooe, are still active in the 
Chamber.
Lesolang took over the Chairmanship of the Association in
1946 and was instrumental in making representations to 
the Local Authorities for, among other things, the right to 
erect bigger and improved shops; this Included the right 
for those traders with the means to design, plan and erect 
their own business premises, Representatives were also sent 
to the Railway authorities f r permission for Africans to 
lease railway coal sites at all stations serving African 
townships.  ^  ^ Lesolang was a coal merchant and was
particularly opposed to White competition and threats of 
their infiltration into the townships.
Much of the motivation behind these Orlando businessmen came 
from the example set in Natal, where the Natal Bantu Co-operative 
Society had been formed with W.J. Mseleku as Director.(16)
In 1949 this Society formed and registered a bank, for Africans, 
with assets of R7 000 and 1 051 shareholder.^?) Although it 
was unsuccessful it did provide inspiration for African 
businessmen in other parts of the country.
The Orlando traders, aware of the new urban townships 
springing up all over the country and the increasing number 
of African traders which these townships would require, set 
themselves the task of helping to finance, wherever possible
1
9those people who were unable to establish themselves in
business. They did this by financing the erection of shop
premises. Rantol Company, owned by Lesolang, financed
four shops in this way during 1948/9.(18) in 1952, they
broadened their activities. Worried about the lack of adequate
housing in the townships, and particularly freehold rights,
the Association sought the help of the White Chamber of
Commerce who negotiated with the Johannesburg City Council to
get them to pass a resolution to accede to freehold rights in 
Orlando.
1* (ID African Chamber of Commerce formed in 1955
During 1954, J.C.P. Mavimbela, J.M. Mohlala and S.J.J. Lesolang, 
all members of the Orlanco Traders Association, attended a 
Moral Re-armament Conference in Salisbury, while in Rhodesia 
they took the opportunity to visit a Chamber organised by 
Rhodesian African traders. They were introduced to, among 
others, Mr. Samario, proprietor of a large Bus service company, 
and Mr. Moamoka, owner of a large general dealer concern.
These men showed the visitors their Chamber offices and
businesses. The South Africans were so impressed that they 
decided, on their return home, to change their traders 
association into one powerful Chamber.
'J.P.' Mavimbela took it upon himself to organise the traders. 
With his efforts P.R. Mosaka, W.S. Pela and S.J.J. Lesolang
convened a general meeting of all African trader, on the reef
in February 1955.(19)
This meeting at George Goch, where Mavimbela conducted his 
business,was well attended and an organisation was established, 
known as the African Chamber of Commerce ("hereinafter ACOC) . I u. 
constitution, model-^d on the African Chamber in Rhodesia, 
provided that it should promote and protect the interests 
of African traders in South Africa, act as agents for and give 
advice to its members and co-operate with similar organisations 
The constitution also provided for the eventual sub-division 
into Territorial Chambers of Commerce . 1 the establishment of
a Federation of African Chambers of C ' • rce.
Another provision envisaged the / ablishment of a wholesale 
organisation supplying the needs of members. This provision, 
proved to be a 'bone of contention' within the Chamber.
First, it was fext that a wholesale organisation might 
compete with the members' businesses. Second, it was felt 
that the Chamber itself should not engage in trading.
Despite this dispute, the founding of the African Chamber of 
Commerce marked progress in African commercial organisation.
A new class formation was evolving where educated men joined 
the Chamber and entered the commercial field.
The following people formed the first Executive of the Chamber: 
P.R. Mosaka, President; S.J.J. Lesolang, Vice President;
J.C.P. Mavimbela, Secretary; W.D. Mpolokeng, Treasurer;
J.M. Mohiala, B.J, Mabuza, A.B. Machobela, E.R. Tshabalala, 
Executive members.
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They comprised six former school teachers, two of whom were
university graduates, and one law student.(21^
Traditionally, one of the few professional fields open to Africans
has been teaching. But Africans had never found this field 
sufficiently attractive, as far as salary and working conditions 
were concerned. Consequently, a great many African teachers 
used the teaching profession as a springboard to more lucrative 
occupations. While many moved into White Industry, others 
saw the fields of business and the Ministry as offering the 
best chance for an enterprising African to succeed.(22)
The formation of the African Chamber of Commerce helped to 
put African businessmen on the same level as those businessmen 
in other similar White organisations and, it gave them the 
opportunity to make contact with their White counterparts in 
the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce.
Although the Chamber was active in the following few years, 
publishing a roneod paper the 'African Trader1 and increasing 
its membership, it was unable to take advantage of its new 
position because serious disunity occurred within the Executive. 
P.R. Mosaka, the President, suspended the Secretary, w.S. Pela, 
for 'gross dereliction of duty' in connection with failing to 
submit an audited financial statement, failing to account for 
fifty six gross of matches, and attempting to intercept .a 
cheque of £500 from the Bantu Welfare Trust thereby being
12
responsible for the Chamber's receipt of only £250 instead of 
the promised donation of £500.
This suspension led to an action in the Supreme Court against 
Mosaka, by Pela and his supporters. The Supreme Court action 
was dismissed and a special general meeting was ordered to 
reconcile the differences. Certain members of the Executive 
were dismissed but, for some time afterwards, they continued 
to represent themselves as the true Executive. In the name of 
the Chamber they convened meetings with the Johannesburg City 
Council and the White Chamber of Commerce.
The Chamber's General Meeting in the Orlando Donaldson 
Community Centre on March 30 1958, brought about a partial 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h e  Chamber realized that it would dd 
well to leave the past alone and set the Chamber working 
efficiently for the benefit of its members.
The reconciliation was short-lived. Mosaka was sued again 
about a cheque issued in his personal capacity instead of his 
representative capacity.
Since it was obvious that much of the conflict a t  this stage 
was personal animosity between certain members it is difficult 
to comprehend the involvement of the White Chamber of Commerce 
on the side of the dismissed Executive members.
These former Executive members convened a meeting on the 
7th September 1958 to establish a rival organisation to 
the existing African Chamber of Commerce, The new organisation 
was to be styled 'T e Reef (Native Areas) Chamber of Commerce ' 
or'Egoli Chamber of Commerce. ’
The meeting was convened by distributing notices in the township 
through the municipal township offices. One hundred and three 
businessmen attended as well as four members of the White 
Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, three representatives of 
the White Junior Chamber of Commerce and a representative of 
the City Non-European Affairs Department.
The meeting was chaired by C.G. Corbett, President of the 
Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce. The Europeans sat at a 
table facing a hall of 100 Africans. The proposal for a new 
Chamber came from White men. No African introduced or welcomed 
the White committee.
1 The ...ricans were visitors and the White men hosts.1
It was proposed that this outside White help would establish
an organisation that would represent all African traders.
Its emphasis would be on economics and not on politics.
Such a body would speak with one voice to European bodies
like the White Chamber as well as the local and central
authorities. The Whites, stated that they had 1 reason to 
(271
believe1 that the past troubles did not represent the
united voice of African traders and that they had come to 
assist the Africans present to establish an effective 
organisation.
The Whites seemed to be sadly misinformed about the true 
situation. At the meeting they were asked why they die not 
help to solve the difficulties of the African Chamber before 
proposing the establishment of a new chamber. Mosaka stated 
that the ill-advised meeting only created further division 
in the ranks of Africjn traders. Another opinion voiced after 
the event was,
Its like calling people from the street and 
saying 1 we hear there is a row in the Anglican
Church, let us form a new one.1 (28)
The motion to establish a new Chamber was defeated, forty in 
favour and forty nine against.
1 Golden City Post', commenting on the rejection of the White 
proposal, saw the incident as a 1 lost opportunity . 1 (29)
African Trader, the Chamber's mouthpiece, found the whole 
proposal 'ill-inspired', and if it was desirable, the manner 
of approach was certainly maladroit and injudicious.^0  ^ It
stated further that those who voted for the proposal were
partly influenced by political considerations. The December 
1958 edition of Drum, endorsed this view, though it was
inaccurate about the proposal.
The White Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce 
asked the all-African Junior Chamber of 
Commerce for an alliance of the two bodies.
But the Black body showed their distrust of the 
Whites by refusing, on a forty nine to forty vote,
15
to have any official ties vith the more experienced 
White Chamber... the incident went by as another
demonstration of Black distrust for Whites. (31)
After these troubles the Chamber reverted to its true role of 
self-help for its members.
Although it was claimed that membership reached a peak in
1959, when there were about sixty paid up members and about forty
others who had paid a portion of the annual membership fee of 
(32)
£3.3.0, Chamber records for 1959 show that membership was
only forty one paid up members.
1. (iii) Ikaheng (Zakhenl) Finance Corporation formed 
in 1958
As these changes were taking place a bill was introduced in 
Parliament during 1959, which provided for the establishment 
of the Bantu Investment Corporation (hereinafter BIC). The 
BIC was intended by the Government to, among other things, 
establish industries and business in the Homelands. Such 
investment would not cater for Africans in urban areas but 
only for Africans in rural areas. Therefore, leaders of the 
African business community in urban areas realized that an 
organisation needed to be established to help place urban 
African business on a proper footing.
It was against „his background that the Ikaheng (Zakhenl)
Finance Corporation was founded by African businessmen under 
the auspices of the African Chamber of Commerce.
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The Corporation was registered in December 1958, with a share
(34)
capital of £100 000, of which £3 675 was subscribed by 1960.
Its purpose was to overcome the problems experienced by 
Africans who were unable to obtain loans for trading from 
commercial banks, as well as the problems created by wholesalers 
who were inclined to give limited credit to African traders 
and then allow them insufficient time to pay their accounts.
The Corporation hoped to remove this lack of confidence, by 
banks and wholesalers, in the African trader.
The Corporation helped African businessmen with capital and 
stock and gave expert advice on trade and business. White 
consultants were seconded for the latter purpose, Efforts were 
made to persuade African shopkeepers to lower their prices so 
as to attract African shoppers from the city stores. Goods, 
such as coal and wood, were obtained from certain depots at 
lower prices by buying in bulk.
These practical steps at economic self-help were spurred on 
by the ideological calls of African leaders in the community. 
Robert M. Sobukwe, leader of the Pan African Congress, was 
the African Chamber's guest speaker at its general meeting on 
August 9, 1959. He stated that African businessmen suffered 
because they could not obtain loan facilities or secure
(35)
freehold land tenure and they were harassed by Pass Laws.
Sam Motsuenyane, who became NAFCOC1s President in 1968, said 
that the Corporation was meant for action which entailed 
sacrifices in order to achieve unity and progress. He added 
that it was important to have a pool off monies from Africans 
as well as to have control over it, and he stressed that,
17
1 Economic Independence leads to political 
freedom * 1 (36;
However the Corporation, although it lasted for more than 
seven years, experienced financial and business difficulties.
(37)
Administrative costs for 1959 amounted to £838.13s. The
acquisition of expensive premises costing R2 400,00 used up a 
large proportion of the profits between 1964 and 1965. Despite 
the fact that the accounts at 30th June 1965 revealed a profit 
of R921,88, compared with R341,00 the previous year - an 
increase of 247 per cent, there was a loss of the coal business 
at Braakfontein Mines, one of their main supply sources. This 
was due to lack of funds to provide security for contracts 
with the mining company. Attempts to trade in firewood 
also failed because of the same problem.
After January 1965 the business activities of the Corporation 
began to slow down until, in 1967 the Corporation reported a 
loss of R87,20.(38)
Although the Corporation attempted to recover the arrears on 
unpaid shares it was never able to build up sufficient capital 
to achieve its aims. With the benefit of hindsight, Mr.
M.J. Lefoka, the one time Managing Director of the Corporation, 
told me, in August 1978, that the basic reason for the Corporation's 
failure was that it was too localised. Its base remained in 
the Johannesburg area. In addition, at the very time when it 
was essential to publicise the activities of the Corporation 
in order for it to grow, the African Chamber of Commerce was 
unsuccessful in its attempts to produce a regular monthly
18
(39)
magazine for its members.
Other authors have stated that the lack of success of such 
attempts lay in the widespread tendency of traders to regard 
one another as competitors rather than colleagues. Another 
factor was the unpopularity of some leaders of movements, and 
personality clashes within such movements.(40) These latter 
factors may have contributed to the setting up of other similar 
organisations during the late 50s.
l.(iv) Other Black Business organisations formed in the 
1950s
One example was the Johannesburg and District Traders 
Association, which was formed in 1959 with similar aims to the 
Ikaheng Finance Corporation. However this Association expected 
borrowers to pledge their buildings as security and, in the 
event of default, the business was to be taken over by the 
Association. In 1960 there were 150 members, not all of whom
(41)
were fully paid-up members.
Two other Associations which were formed during 1958 had a more 
immediate bearing on the prevailing conditions in the townships 
during those years. The first was the African Commercial 
Travellers Association. Due to the lack of business premises 
in the early days of the townships' development many businessmen 
resorted to hawking and speculating. Consequently a great 
number spent their time cycling through the townships, as 
travellers, selling their wares to shops and private homes.(42)
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The Travellers Association was an attempt to bring all these 
individuals together. This Association was one of the few formed 
in the 50s which managed to survive well into the 70s when it 
affiliated to NAFCOC.
The second Association was the Orlando African Cartage Association. 
The vast amount of slum clearance, as well as the large number 
of new houses being built in the townships, called for enter­
prising African businessmen with trucks who could d the job 
of removing rubble and delivering building mater;,..'. .
Consequently, in 1958, sixty Africans who owned trucks, formed 
themselves into the Cartage Association. This Association 
controlled the sixty trucks and larger contracts were secured, 
with the people working in groups, which enabled them to make 
greater overall profits. At least one of these members was 
able to build a thriving transport business which survives 
today.1431
The largest membership claimed by any organisation at this 
time was that of the Bantoe Wlnkelierse Helpmekaar Vereeniging, 
with 2 000 members, This organisation started in 1958
and though it was particularly strong in the South Western 
areas of Johannesburg, Pietersburg and the Free State it aimed 
for Union-wide membership. It used the cession of life 
insurance policies to the bank as security for overdrafts in 
favour of its members. If the trader fell behind in the payment 
of his insurance premiums, the organisation took over payment 
in order to cover the policy. The trader later repaid the 
organisation.
While recognizing the small nature of ir. ..st of th^se ventures 
it is clear that they heralded the germ of African capitalism 
albeit 'petty1 in fo~m.
With these various associations springing up, many catering 
solely for specific occupations, the members of the African 
Chamber of Commerce became aware that the strength of African 
businessmen lay in unity. In addition, being a Chamber of 
Commerce organisation they knew that similar White South African 
Chambers, as well as Chambers worldwide, affiliated their 
various organisations under an umbrella body for greater 
efficiency. Consequently, in May 1959, the African Chamber 
resolved to amend its Constitution to allow for affiliation 
of smaller localised bodies of traders, some of whom had already 
expressed their desire to affiliate. They also strove to form 
a closer relationship with the City Council of Johannesburg 
so that they would be recognised as the official body representing 
the traders.
Despite these enlightened steps taken by the Chamber, the 
following two years proved to be another difficult period in 
its history, Disunity was prevalent with old personal 
jealousies erupting once again. The President's intransigency 
over his refusal to refund a Chamber loan of £167.18.0, made 
by M r , S.J.J. Lesolang in 1 9 5 6 , eventually led to the 
Executive's vote of no confidence in the President, Mosaka and 
V.K. Ntshona took over the Presidency in 1960.
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Despite Mosaka's claims of a membership of 101, there were 
no more than forty-one paid up members during 1959 and 196C.^4^  
Therefore, the Chamber's income was very low. It was unable 
to pay the office lease and was soon without office premises. 
There were debts in connection with the production of the 
Chamber's magazine and with loans made to the Chamber by 
several Executive members. The wages of the Secretary and 
Clerk also had to be paid.
• (v) Blgval Masekela leadership
1 • ■ ...^ iit light on the horizon was the Secretary, B.M. Masekela.
In the five years that Bigvai Masekela occupied that position, 
until his death in 1965, he instilled a new spirit in the 
Chamber. His personal Inspiration and industry gave new 
direction to the Chamber.
Sam Motsuenyane said of him that,
He was a positivist, believing that it 
was batte' to do something always than 
to stand still and criticise. He believed 
in self-help as the quickest way in which 
Africans could develop themselves... 
his sole ambition was to make the Chamber 
a powerful organisation that could play 
a useful role in the economic strivings 
of the African people .(4°)
During 19 61 Masekela gave Immediate attention to the Chamber's 
difficulties. The offices of the Ikaheng Finance Corporation 
were used as a temporary measure. The Executive agreed to 
appeal for funds from the European Chamber (Senior and Junior),
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Despite Mosaka's claims of a membership of 101, there were 
no more than forty-one paid up members during 1959 and 1960. 
Therefore, the Chamber's income was very low. It was unable 
to pay the office lease and was soon without office premises. 
There were debts in connection with the production of the 
Chamber's magazine and with loans made to the Chamber by 
several Executive members. The wages of the Secretary and 
Clerk also had to be paid.
1.(v) Bigvai Masekela leadership
The bright light on the horizon was the Secretary, B.M. Masekela. 
In the five years that Bigvai Masekela occupied that p ' cion, 
until i.-lS death in 1965 , he instilled a new spirit in the 
Chamber. His personal inspiration and industry gave new 
direction to the Chamber.
Sam Motsuenyane said of him that,
He was a p- sitivist, believing that it 
was better to do something always than 
to stand still and criticise. He believed 
in self-help as the quickest way in which 
Africans could develop themselves... 
his sole ambition was to make the Chamber 
a powerful organisation that could play 
a useful role in the economic strivings 
of the African people .(48)
During 19ol Masekela gave immediate attention to the Chamber's 
difficulties. The offices of the Ikaheng Finance Corporation 
were used as a temporary measure. The Executive agreed to 
appeal for funds from the European Chamber (Senior and Junior),
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the Bantu Welfare Trust, individuals and friendly firms, and 
the Institute of Race Relations, and to increase membership.
The Bantu Welfare Trust donatedR2 000 and Anglo-American 
Corporation donatedR2 000 with the promise of a further 
R2 000 if the initial donation was used profitably. The
White Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce made a donation in 
1962 and promised to assist with a membership campaign. In 
September 1961, the Chamber had set a target of 300 new 
members within twelve months. By February 1962, 150 new 
members had been enlisted and the White Chamber claimed that 
this new drive had increased membership tol 921.^°^ However, 
there is nothing on record to show that these 1 900 odd members 
were paid up members with their dues having been received by 
the Treasurer of the Chamber.
1.(vi) Johannesburg African Chamber of Commerce formed 
in 1963
In 1963, the Executive decided to change the name of the 
Chamber to the Johannesburg African Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter 
JACOC), The main reason for this change seems to have been 
that most of the leadership came from the Johannesburg area, 
and these aspiring leaders, undoubtedly wanting to retain 
control of the Chamber, caused a split by localising the 
name. But there were other factors which contributed to this 
split. Most of the members were Soweto traders and the authorities 
they dealt with were in the same area. All Executive meetings 
were held in South Western township premises and, consequently,
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local members raised issues which affected the local community. 
These issues included the question of trading hours in the 
townships, the right to sell liquor in African areas, cinema 
facilities and firearm licences.
In order to reach all the traders Soweto was divided into
(5 X)
eighteen cells. These areas were visited by subcommittees.
During 1963 the membership rose from fifty seven to 233 with
another 250 potential members. The total cash paid by members 
(52)
was R246,00. This enormous difference between the 1962
claims of 1900 members and the actual 233 of the new 
Chamber would indicate that the early claims were vastly 
exaggerated and that the change to the more parochial set-up 
of Johannesburg caused a further loss of support.
Nevertheless, from the early donations, Masekela was able to 
send to members many well written letters of encouragement 
and advice. He covered a wide variety of subjects including 
information about what was happening to businesses in the 
Homelands, details of other Chamber branches, the Chamber's 
relations with the State, the trader's duty to his customers 
and to the Nation, advice to members about taking part in 
the Chamber's bulk buying scheme and investigations into 
the laws which restricted them so that they could share 
their grievances.
In one of his letters 'Towards an Expanding Horizon', his 
prophetic words described the rise of Afrikaner capitalism
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and advised African traders to attempt a similar 
course.
I believe that if the Afrikaner 
had not taken his commercial 
life through co-ops and steady 
building of finance houses he 
would not have managed to 
take over political power as 
he has done from poor beginnings. 
Some ten years ago, the manager 
of Non-European Affairs of 
Germiston addressing our Social 
Workers' Conference, told us in 
simple language, the history of 
the struggles of his people 
towards the position in which 
they are. He ended his speech 
by saying 1 Ladies and gentlemen,
I can only say go and do 
likewise.1(54j
During the early 60s South Africa experienced an economic 
boom and real Black wages began to rise by 2.4 per cent 
annually in most sectors of the economy. The mining 
sector was an exception since real Black wages declined 
there until 1969 , when the gold price started to rise. 
Many successful Black enterprises developed around the 
White towns including 1 199 general dealers, 356 transport 
contractors and 114 bakeries and mills (56) as well as 
dry-cleaning factories, garages and filling stations, 
coal distributors and furniture factories.
This growth of African business was seen as a threat to 
the security of White commercial interests in White areas. 
Furthermore, the buying power of Africans, estimated in 
1963 atR1 058 million, encouraged White commerce to 
attempt to retain its grasp of this spending potential 
of the African population.
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Consequently, the Secretary for Bantu Administration and
Development issued a Circular Minute No A12/1 - A8/1 on
*
14th February 19 63 to local authorities concerning
African trading rights in urban areas. Effectively it was 
meant to force African businessmen to establish themselves 
in the Homelands. The most contentious issue was that 
local authorities were ordered not to allow Africans to own 
more than one business.
The new directive represented a tightening of Government 
policy towards urban African trading. The threat to White 
traders, of the expansion of the activities of African 
traders could now be overcome in two ways, namely, restricting 
Africans to dealing only in goods necessary for daily 
existence and by making the African trader realise that he 
was in the urban areas only temporarily.
As the directive affected African traders, the members of 
the Johann iburg African Chamber of Commerce reacted strongly, 
since they were fearful of losing the small privileges that 
they had enjoyed thus far. Masekela sent letters to the 
South African Institute of Race R e l a t i o n s , t h e  Chief 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner and the Department of 
Information^^) requesting clarification on the new directives.
On 18th November 1963, a Johannesburg African Chamber of 
Commerce deputation was granted an intei"iew with the Deputy 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. This 
meeting, between the Deputy Minister, Mr. M.C. Botha (who 
was accompanied by two officials), and the fifty five members
*Government Gazette Extraordinary 430, 8 Feb. 1963.
of the deputation, marked a milestone in the history of the 
Chamber Movement for the State had agreed to interchange views 
on policy with the material leaders of the African business 
community. 'We hope that a beginning is being made today to 
give the African trader ; .tew status.
The traders claimed that the right to serve their people was 
not only in line with State policy but was also natural 
and fair. They requested aid from the BIC for Africans in 
urban areas. While they were not opposed to the development 
of the Homelands, they felt that the State should continue to 
allow their old privileges because industries and the money 
economy in the Homelands wer-a negligible. Furthermore, they 
suggested that the State consider the following three points:
1. Africans, like all sections, do not wish to remain workers 
and labourers only but aspire to other classes of professions 
and merchant class which is a heal t-hy component of a 
capitalistic country like ours.
2. Opportunities in the Homelands to build this type of 
middle class are limited.
3. Our children go to school to prepare for employment beyond 
the labourer's class... Let us encourage policies and act 
as if our generations to come vzi.11 need to enjoy the life 
as we see it in our times .
On the question of traders being moved to the Homelands, the
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Minister pointed out misrepresentations of the intentions of 
the Government policy and said that it was never the intention 
to remove traders to the Homelands but merely to help those 
who were prepared to go there by giving them BIG loans. On 
the point about the limiting of licences, the Minister said 
that there was no limit to the number of licences one could 
obtain in 'Bantu' Residential Areas as long as they were 
obtained from the licensing officer and only one stand was used. 
On the one stand a trader could have many licences. He further 
assured the traders that the Urban Areas Act gave a monopoly 
of trade to Africans in their areas and that there would be 
no interference from White trade.
However, the Minister was adamant about no: allowing large 
commercial or industrial undertakings in urban African areas 
and advised African people not to invest large sums of money 
in these areas. Although the Minister finished by suggesting 
further meetings and wondered why they had not met before, 
the Circular remained unchanged.
Yet, with this policy, the Government unwittingly gave new 
strength to the African entrepreneur.
l-(vii) National African Chamber of Commerce formed in 1964
As there were only 1 682 African traders in Johannesburg's 
African areas in 1959^®^ which constituted no real threat to 
the White trader or to Government policy, the Circular generated 
animosity and a feeling of insecurity among the African traders.
The natural reaction was for the African businessmen to unite 
and discuss, the common danger that was threatening their 
survival.
There was, however, a further reason for unity. The Chamber 
of Commerce was keen to introduce a bulk-buying scheme in 
order to provide cheaper goods in township shops so as to 
curb the flow of Black money from African hands into that of 
White traders near African townships. Thu scheme required an 
organised local Chamber in every township. Therefore a 
national body was essential.
With these two great incentives for unity, Masekela began the 
task of organising the various African traders associations 
in the Republic for a conference which was held in Orlando, 
Johannesburg in April 1964.
Masekela1s Inaugural Address to the Conference, emphasised 
that African businessmen had reached a point in commercial 
effort where they had to expand and use all their power to 
exploit their commercial advantage so as to qualify as 
financial trustees of their communities. He urged that 
the national body of Chambers of Commerce should be built 
as fast as possible with members making maximum use of such 
schemes as the envisaged bulk-buying organisation. He 
concluded by saying that,
In this country there is a case for 
bloodless revolution, in spite of 
ourselves we have to consider the case 
without fear of favour. If we go the 
right way about it traders can play 
an important part in making life 
meaningful.... in using the State 
policies for material development. '^5)
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When the Conference ended, the principle of National Unity- 
had been accepted and an organisation was created in the name 
of the National African Chamber of Commerce (NACOC).
Until 1968, NACOC was organised along provincial lines, and 
local Chamber branches were affiliated to Provincial organisations. 
Masekela had toured the country extensively during 1964 
setting up Chambers in Vendaland, Ventersdorp, Lichtenburg, 
Klerksdorp, Cape T-'Wn, Transkei, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein,
Louis Trichardt, Krugersdorp, Kwa Mashu, Hammanskraal and 
Lebowa. By 1965, forty seven Chambers were organised around 
the country. Annual Conferences were held and African traditional 
leaders like Cyprian Zulu Bekizulu King of the Zulus, Chief 
Mphephu and Chief Lerothod.-1 Mamogole supported them with their 
attendance.
The national body continued with its work of bringing to the 
notice of local authorities the many difficulties which hampered 
African businessmen.
NACOC received several small donations from White companies
and organised small fund raising schemes of their own. However,
at its inaugural conference, in 1964, the Chamber's finances
showed a balance of R2 465,53, and, by 1968, this had dropped
(67)to a mere R19. The Chamber was seriously in need of funds.
This state of affairs was not caused through lack of members 
but because membe -s1 subscriptions alone could not cover the 
coat of running the National organisation. Masekela, the 
Secretary, had died in 1965 and Thagane who was appointed in 
his place died shortly afterwards. These events caused a
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serious setback in the administration of the Chamber and, by 
1968, it was in danger of collapse.
In 1969, the President, Sam Motsuenyane, sadly reported to the
Conference that in the past five years many resolutions had
been passed but not brought to fruition. This again was
(68)chiefly from lack of funds.
Nevertheless, the period after 1968 was a period of phenomenal 
development for NACOC. Several factors were instrumental 
in bringing this change about. The first, and most important, 
was the Government's insistence in 1969, on ethnic regionalisation 
for NCOC. This regionalisation unintentionally strengthened 
the Chamber movement, by improving administration and 
communications, and by providing greater stability.
Additionally, in 19 63 the Government had announced even tighter 
restrictions on African trading. In order to accommodate 
the new regions a newly structured organisation was required.
But at the same time the Chamber aimed to build a new and 
stronger organisation to combat the insecurity and powerlessness 
which their African businessmen were being subjected to by 
the increasingly negative Government policy towards African 
trading.
Consequently, in 1969, a new organisation was formed called 
the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC).
With better organisation, funds .ere acquired by the new Chamber. 
Because it was well organised and spread throughout the
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country, instead of merely large conglomerations in certain 
areas, contact with White private business improved. NAFCOC 
was able to ask for and be given funds. White business was 
able to recognise a viable organised African group capable 
of using donations profitably.
Finally, contact with White private business, resulted in the 
establishment, in 1972, of 'African Business', a regular 
monthly magazine which was to be the voice of NAFCOC.
participation of African businessmen in commercial organisations 
before 1969 was mainly in reaction to restrictive Government 
policy and in realisation of the need for economic self-help. 
Self-help required not only the development of expertise but 
also the pooling of resources to establish schemes like the 
Ikaheng (Zakheni) Finance Corporation and bulk buying enterprises. 
This economic incentive for unity was spurred on by claims that 
economic freedom would lead to political freedom. As these 
organisations evolved, NACOC attempted to represent itself as 
the only national commercial body for businessmen. Consequently, 
its members reacted strongly to the Government's 1963 and 1968 
restrictive legislation on African business. Finally, NACOC 
responded to the Government's 1969 ethnic grouping directive, 
which applied to its organisation alone, by establishing a newly 
structured national organisation (NAFCOC) which aimed to 
change the Government's policy towards African business.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTRAINTS ON AFRICAN BUSINESS BEFORE 1970
This Chapter outlines the legislation which applied to African 
business before 1970. The restrictive effects of such 
legislation on African business development are indicated 
wherever possible.
The Government directive to the National African Chamber of 
Commerce, in 19 69, to divide the organisation along ethnic 
lines, was an additional Government restriction which applied 
to this business organisation alone.
The structural economic constraints, which directly affected 
African businessmen in the late 60s, in the form of wages, 
buying power, bulk-buying and credit are also described.
The organisation which came into being to tackle these problems, 
in 1969, was the National African Federated Chamber of 
Commerce (NAFCOC).
The National African Federated Chamber of Commerce, formed 
in 1969, from the former National African Chamber of Commerce, 
was born in a climate of protest. It was brought into being 
by African businessmen, mainly traders, whose very limited 
opportun. ties in the 1960s were being eroded by Government 
action in the form of ever increasing restrictive, discriminatory 
legislation. Confronted with this curtailment of opportunities, 
particularly in the urban areas, Black businessmen felt that 
there was no other alternative open to them but to build an 
organisation,
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that would constitute a mouthpiece 
through which they could negotiate 
with the Government for better 
opportunities for Afr^an people 
in the urban areas .
2.(1) Government legislation
During the 50s and 60s the Government policy which afforded a 
'temporary' status to urban African businessmen in 'White'
areas, together with pressures for protection put forward 
by White interest groups, were the basic factors inhibiting
African enterprise.
From 19 55 the Government vigorously implemented Section 6 of 
the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. These 
restrictions affected Africans who had acquired premises outside 
locations or 'native villages' since 1936. Local Authorities 
were directed to move these Africans to areas where they were 
legally allowed to operate. This move affected about 160 
licensed traders in Johannesburg, 121 in Cape Town and a 
large number in D u r b a n . ^  The Native Affaire Department 
admonished all Black businessmen in White areas to look for 
suitable sites in their own areas as soon as possible.
Section 2 of the Urban Areas Act of 19 45 stated that Urban 
Blacks were only allowed to trade in Black residential areas. 
Not only did the Act, together with the regulations issued in 
accordance with that Act, set out where Blacks could trade, it 
also stated all the laws, rules and regulations related to
I
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Black trading. The various aspects of the rights and obligations, 
stipulated by the 1945 Act, highlight the difficulties which 
confronted Black businessmen in the 60s.
1. Regulations regarding who was allowed to trade in 
Black residential areas
Residential areas were defined in Section 2 (1)(a)(b) and (c).
Only Blacks who -
1 .1 . were 1 lawful residents’ in the residential 
areas could trade.
The requirements of 1 lawful residence' were set out in 
Regulation 6(1) and (2) (site permits); Regulation 7(1)
(residential permits)? Regulation 8 (certificate® of occupation). 
The conditions relating to the issue of permits, residential 
permits and certificates of occupation were as follows;
The superintendent could, with the approval of the Minister,
issue a permit if he was satisfied that:
(a) a suitable site was available in the area set aside
for the ethnic group to which the Black belonged;
(b) the applicant was a fit and proper person to reside in 
the area;
(c) the applicant was lawfully permitted to remain in the
area in terms of section 10 (1) (a) or (b) of the 1945 Act;
(d) if the applicant was already the registered occupier
in that particular area or any other urban area, undertook
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that on the issue of the permit he agreed to the 
cancellation of the existing permit or certificate;
(e) the applicant, or his wife, was not a foreign Black as
defined in section 12 of the Act;
(f) the applicant was financially able and willing to erect
a dwelling of the required standard;
(g) the applicant should be free from any infectious disease;
(h) the site could only be occupied by the applicant and his
dependants;
1 .2 . were twenty one years or older;
1 .3 . were born in the area or lawfully resided continuously
in the area for not less than fifteen years, or
worked continuously for one employer for not less
than ten years and thereafter continued to reside
in the area and was not employed outside the area; 
Blacks were also allowed to -
1 .4 . form partnerships in which all partners complied
with the conditions set out in 1.1., 1.2., 1.3.
1 .5 . form companies, all of whose shareholders complied
with the conditions set out in 1.1., 1.2., 1.3.
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2- Regulations regarding whe^e trading could be 
conducted
The areas where urban Blacks could trade were in Black 
residential areas as defined in Section 2 of the 1945 Act.
3. Restrictions regarding employees
A trader was allowed to employ such number of Black assistants 
as he deemed necessary, as long as they complied with the 
residential a .d other requirements of Section 10 of the Act.
Many of the requirements of the Act and its regulations 
regarding the qualifications of a 1 trader' were extremely 
rigorous and illogical. To be 1 lawfully resident1 became a 
major objective on its own. A prospective trader had to comply 
with these conditions as well as the other requirements of 
a trader's application to trade.
Having qualified as a trader, the trader might contravene one
of the rules and have his site or residential permit cancelled,
with the result that he became, an unlawful resident, had to
stop trading and often lost his livelihood. The potentially
harsh operation of this provision was illustrated by the fact
that traders were sometimes deprived of their lawful residence ;
for seemingly trivial offences. Factors which could give rise
to cancellation of a permlr included being sent ';o prison for
more than six months, making a false statement in hi a application
using the premises for any purpose other than as a residence for ';
'i
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himself etc. An important factor was that his permit could 
be cancelled if he was no longer entitled to remain in the 
area in terms of Section 10.
With regard to companies and partnerships it seemed illogical
that Black partners and shareholders needed themselves to 
qualify as traders if they did not take part in the management 
of the business.
The age restriciton of twenty one years or older anpeared to 
have no foundation. No such restrictions were placed on 
White traders.
Section 23 (1) (g) of the Urban Areas Act prohibited
any male 'Native' from working as
a casual labourer or carrying on
any work as an independent contractor 
unless the prescribed officer had 
by licence authorized him to do so...
The 1957 Native Laws Amendment Act (No.36) added, after the 
word 'work', the words, 'on his own account in any business, 
trade or other remunerative activity.'
This implied that African businessmen would require Departmental 
permission to carry on their own work, even in an African 
township. As Dr.G.pHart points o u t ^  these restiictions on 
the rights of Africans to trade within the locations 'appear 
to have been precipitated by pressures from the Afrikaans® 
Sakekamer.' Its 1958 conference oppose a the granting of 
trading licences within locations and recommended that White 
trading areas be established outside locations. The Afrikaans®
43
Sakekamer was worried that a policy of monopoly for Africans 
over African trade would seriously disadvantage the Afrikaner 
at a time when he was attempting to redress his own disadvantageous 
position against English-speaking businessmen.
As early as December 19 57, the African Trader reported
that Mr. D.J. van Vuuren addressing a congress of the Health
Officials' Association of Southern Africa in Port Elizabeth,
said there was a danger of impoverishing the economy of a
city if Africans were encouraged to trade in their own
townships and amongst their own people. He went on to say
that Africans earned thousands of pounds in the city, and
he questioned whether the city was protecting its main shopping 
(4)areas.
In 1959, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development
stressed the temporary status of urban Black businessmen,
emphasising that they should be either persuaded or forced to
(5)to transfer themselves and their assets to the Reserves.
This positive enunciation by the Minister, of Government policy 
towards urban African businessmen, not only endorsed the view 
of the: Afrikaanse Sakekamer but it was an indication that even 
stricter legislation, regarding Black urban business, was about 
to be implemented.
In the late 50s the African Chamber of Commerce was fully 
active. Though small, with about sixty paid up members and 
about forty others who had paid a portion off the annual membership
/ g \
fee of £3.3.0. The Chamber Executive held regular monthly
i
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meetings and tackled many issues which affected its members.
Examples of some of the issues taken up indicate that African 
traders were so severely hindered by legal restrictions on 
trading that they were forced to bring to the notice of the 
authorities often very minor annoyances and limitations which 
were arresting development of their business. Complaints 
voiced in this period were:
(a) The request to oil companies that African traders be 
allowed to sell paraffin through their outlets and that 
they be allowed to manage filling stc'ions in African 
townships;
(b) The request that African traders be allowed to trade on 
railway premises in African townships cr at stations used 
chiefly by Africans;
(c) The complaints to local authorities about unfair competition, 
by traders of other races, in the distribution of coal
in African areas, as well as competition by non-African 
shopkeepers situated on the borders of African townships;
(d) The complaints to local authorities about the organisation 
of Christmas hampers by non-licensed and non-African 
persons;
(e) The continual requests to the Government for traders to
be allowed to carry firearms as a protection for their 
(7)
business ea.
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With the maturing of the Government policy of separate 
development, as enshrined in the Promotion of Bantu
IQ\
Self Government Act of 19 59, new pressures were 
brought to bear on African businessmen. The rationale 
is to be found in the White Paper issued by the 
Government in connection with the Act which described the 
position as follows :
The Bantu areas have consistently 
been preserved as living space 
solely for tne Bantu. No European 
may settle in a Bantu area without 
the permission of the Bantu Community 
and the Union Government, and when 
permission is granted it is 
restricted to a specific purpose, 
for example the rendering of a 
particular service. Similarly, 
it was the intention that the 
Bantu should not enter the European 
area without the consent of the 
European community, and then, too, 
only for the rendering of a specific 
purpose.(9)
The implementation of this policy direction began in 1963 
with Circular Minute (No. A 12/1 - A 8/1) from the 
Department of Bantu Administration to Local Authorities, 
which provided for even more stringent and limiting regulations 
regarding African trading.
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Its provisions were as follows:
1.1. 1... trading by Bantu in White areas is not an inherent 
primary opportunity for them, but should be allowed 
only where necessary...'
1.2. The acquisition by Africans of premises outside their 
residential areas (provided for by the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 1945) and 
the Group Areas Act, 1957 (No. 77 of 1957) was to be 
prohibited
1.3. African hawkers and pedlars (or speculators in livestock 
or produce) were not allowed to trade outside their 
residential areas
1.4. The number of Africans who were not employees would 
not be increased in White areas
2.0. If it became necessary to provide trading facilities
in African residential areas it would have to be done on 
the following basis:
2.1. Trading rights would only be granted to Africans who 
qualified under Section 10 (1) (a) and (b) of the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945
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2.2. Only one business would be allowed by the same African
2.3. Only businesses which provided for the daily essential 
necessities of the African would be allowed
Those excluded were dry-cleaners, garages and petrol 
filling stations. Existing like businesses would be 
closed at the first opportunity or their owners would be 
persuaded to move to African areas.
2.4. African companies and partnerships established with the
aim of expansion would not be allowed
2.5. African-controlled financial institutions, industries
and wholesale concerns would not be allowed
2.6. Local authorities would erect all buildings for trading 
purposes. African traders would not have the right to
erect their own premises
2.7. Trading rights would not be granted to all Africans
originating from areas outside the Republic
3.0. ' The Department will appreciate it if local authorities
will ensure that no permission to carry on trade is 
given unless it is clear that the Bantu applicants 
conform to all the relevant legal provisions and the 
policy directives contained herein.1
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The Institute of Race Relations reacted strongly to the 1963 
policy directives for urban Black businessmen, since the 
directive endorsed the statement made by the Minister to 
the Afrikaanse Sakekamer in 1959 - that Black urban businessmen 
were temporary sojourners in urban areas. The Institute 
stated that
Except for daily necessities, it 
is ensuring to White traders a 
monopoly of the big urban African 
market. South Africa is thus not 
a 1 free enterprise economy1 for 
Africans. (10)
The Government ignored these comments and five years later, 
in 1968, it limited the scope of urban African business activities 
still further. (Government Notice R1036 of 1968 and Government 
Notice R 1267 of 1968, Government Gazettes 2096, 14 June 1968 
and 2134 26 July 1968.)
These regulations clearly defined:
!• Where trading could be conducted
(a) The Bantu Affairs Administration Board could set aside 
sites for allotment to traders for trading, business or 
professional purposes and it could specify the type of 
trade which might be carried on there.(Regulation 1 ,
Chapter 3 of R1036)
(b) No person was allowed to carry on a trade unless he had
been allotted a site for that purpose. In general, unless
the Board had allocated sites for trading, no trade was
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allowed to be carried on in the area. (Regulation 2 (1), 
Chapter 3 of R1036)
(c) The allocation of a trading site to a trader was at 
the discretion of the Board. When trading sites became 
available for allotment the superintendent was required 
to put up a notice to this effect in his office, inviting 
written applications for the sites. (Regulation 3 (;} of 
R1036)
He was to allow fourteen days to elapse after vhe da he 
of the notice before he sent the applications received to 
the Board for its decision. The Board might decide not 
to select any applicant and might call for new applications. 
(Regulation (2) R 1036)
(d) A trader was allowed to have only one trading site 
allotted to him unless the approval of the Minister was 
obtained.(Regulation 1 (d), Chapter 3 of R1036) However, 
with written permission from the Board, he might carry on more 
than one trade or profession on the site.
These regulations indicated that the Board exercised sole power . 
over trading sites. No criteria which the Board was required 
to take into consideration, when allotting sites to particular 
applicants, were indicated in the regulations.
The Board might allot or refuse the site in its sole discretion 
and consequently a trader might be refused a site even if he 
were the only applicant. If the Board chose to call for new
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applications, it was at liberty to do this indefinitely and 
might elect never to allot the site.
2. Regulations regarding the buildings on the 
trading site
(a) The Board could erect buildings on trading sites which 
might be leased to traders or it might approve of the 
holder of a trading site permit erecting buildings from 
his own capital after having agreed to the building 
plans. A further stipulation was that i f  the buildings 
on a site were larger than the allowed 350 square metres, 
the application for the erection of the building, whether 
by the trader or by the Board, had to be submitted to the 
Minister for approval.(Regulation 1, Chapter 3 of R1036)
(b) If the Board owned the buildings, it maintained the 
exterior and the trader the interior. If the trader 
owned the buildings, he was liable for all maintenance. 
(Regulation 8 (1), Chapter 3 of R1036)
(c) Buildings owned by the Board that became damaged by 
hail, rain, wind etc. had to be repaired by the Board 
within a reasonable period after being notified by the 
trader. (Regulation (1), Chapter 3 of R1036)
(d) No structural alterations were to be made to the 
buildings or fittings and no fittings could be added 
without the Board's written permission. (Regulation 7, 
Chapter 3, of R1036) If the Board considered that the 
buildings
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erected or purchased from it were not in a satisfactory 
condition, the tenant could be notified in writing to 
make the necessary improvements. Non-compliance by the 
trader might result in his right to trade being suspended. 
(Regulation 8 (2), Chapter 3 of R1036)
(e) If the Board required it, the trader had to fence the 
site and provide sanitary conveniences to the 
satisfaction of the Board.(Regulation 10, Chapter 3 
of R1036)
(f) If the trader ceased trading for any reason his trading 
rights might be disposed of:
(i) If he occupied Board trading premises, he was 
not allowed to dispose of his trading rights 
without the Board's approval (Regulation 20 (1), 
Chapter 3 of R1036)
(ii) If the trader occupied his own premises, he could 
sell his rights to the Board or to a person 
approved by the Board (Regulation 20 (2), Chapter 
3 of R1036)
(iii) If the trader's rights had been cancelled by the 
Board, he had the right to sell his buildings 
before his rights were terminated. He could sell 
him buildings either to the Board or to a person 
approved by the Board. If he failed to sell in
i
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terms of this Regulation, the buildings became the 
property of the Board, but he was entitled to 
compensation to be agreed between him and the Board. 
Failing this agreement the Bantu Affairs Commissioner
might determine the price. If there was still no
agreement, the Board could sell the buildings 
by public auction.(Regulation 20 (3), Chapter 
3 of R1036) Other provisions related to the 
insolvency of a trader. (Regulation 2 4 (2 ) and 
(3), Chapter 3 of R1036)
The African traders with self-built shops were expected to 
build store-rooms for all the separate areas of their business, 
for example, separate store-rooms for groceries, restaurant and 
butchery. This was insisted upon even if a common store­
room was available. Where the yard was too small the trader
was instructed, by the Health Inspector, to build all these
store-rooms on top of the building, which meant not only 
additional costs but also the necessity to amend building 
plans and await the approval of the City Engineer before he 
could be granted a licence to continue trading.
The shops were situated in dusty and filthy surroundings, yet 
the Health Inspectors did not hesitate to prosecute the trader 
for dusty counters, broken showcase windows and unpainted 
shelves. Sometimes, the Health Inspector demanded a coolroom 
when he knew that the City Council was unable to instal an 
electricity service connection.
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The stipulation that no building could be in excess of 
350 square metres, without the permission of the Minister, 
as well as the limiting of a trader to one site and then giving 
permission for several businesses to be conducted on that 
site, merely served to arrest business development and create 
inefficiency through lack of space in which to operate.
The rule that no structural alterations could be made to 
the buildings or fittings only seemed to be logical if the 
buildings were owned by the Board. It seemed an unnecessary 
restriction if the trader owned the buildings. The installation 
of additional fittings should ha^e been welcomed by the Board 
provided that they were subject to normal municipal or town 
planning regulations. In addition the Regulations as a whole 
made no provision for compensation to the trader who, with 
the Board's permission, had added extra fittings or alterations 
to the buildings.
The Board also appeared to be entitled to require the trader to 
make alterations or improvements to a building which he owned 
and which had already been approved by the Board. While it 
might be necessary for him to keep his building in a proper 
state of repair, it might be beyond his financial capacity 
to alter or improve his buildings at the requirement of the 
Board. The penalty for failing to comply with this right of 
the Board, rendered the trader liable to have his right to 
trade suspended. Again, there was no penalty provided if 
the Board failed to effect essential repairs, in a reasonable 
time, to buildings owned by itself. Neither was the trader 
entitled to a reduction in rent if these repairs were not
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forthcoming.
The requirements of fencing and sanitary conveniences provided 
no compensation to a trader who was required to make such 
improvements,
These regulations made it impossible for any trader to bequeath 
to his heirs his right to trade or his ownership of the building 
in which he traded. This, together with the other regulations, 
was extremely restrictive on the growth and type of business 
which a trader cvuld conduct and effectively eliminated 
incentive to a trader to create a successful business which 
might in turn be taken over by his family.
If a trader became insolvent or his right to trade or his 
stock was attached, and if he had been trading from his own 
building, he was required to sell his building within three 
months after cancellation of his trading rights although he 
might continue his business with the trustee's permission. 
Provided that the trader had the trustee's approval there 
appeared to be no reason why the trustee should be forced to 
sell the building which the insolvent might own.
3. The types of trading, business or professional 
activities which were allowed
(a) Restrictions were placed on the types of trade which 
might be carried on - 'Schedule A' (Regulation 1,
Chapter 3, of R1036)
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(b) The Board, on granting a trading site, might specify 
the type of trade, business or profession which might
be carried on. (Regulation 1, Chapter 3 of R1036) The 
trader was not allowed to use the site for any other 
purpose without the Board's approval.(Regulation 11, 
Chapter 3 of R1036)
(c) The trader had to obtain trading licences as were 
required by licensing authorities.(Regulation 2 (1), 
Chapter 3 of R1036)
These restrictions on the use to which the trading site 
might be put resulted in the trader having to exercise great 
care that he did not contravene his right to trade. Even 
though his business in keeping with normal business practice, 
might tend to change over a period of time, he needed to be 
ever vigilant that it stayed within the required range. This 
regulation, together with the fact that the trader required 
written permission from the Board for each new business on 
his site, tended to prevent him from expanding even when he 
had the capital tc do so. Not only was the type of trade 
limited at the Board's discretion but the trader also had to 
sati- v the requirements cf the local licensing authorities. 
This appeared to be a duplication of procedure creating double 
hardships for the trader.
4. Regulations regarding employees
(a) Only Blacks were allowed to be employed•(Regulation 4 (3) 
Chapter 3 of R1036)
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(b) The trader had to conduct the business himself, and he 
had to supervise the work of his assistants. No manager 
could be employed but the superintendent might allow one 
as a substitute for a reasonable period if there were 
good reasons. (Regulation 12, Chapter 3 of R1036)
(c) The trader was allowed t / such number of Black 
assistants as he decided n„_essary provided that they 
complied with the requirements of Section 10 of the 
1945 Act.
Although the physical presence and supervision cf the trader 
was required, this rule did not apply to other members of a 
partnership or company. Even though the expertise of an 
employee from another racial group could be of assistance 
to a trader commencing business his employment would be 
disallowed according to Section 10 of the 1945 Act. This 
regulation precluded the trader from employing the best 
available expertise in his business and he had to make do with 
what he could obtain within the regulations. The regulations 
as a whule did not preclude the employment of a White 
bookkeeper to assist the trader but he could not be employed 
within the African residential area.
5 " Regulations regarding the financing of trading 
operations and profit sharing
The trader was not allowed to permit any person to share in 
the profit of his trade without the written approval of the
i
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Board. (Regulation 14, Chapter 3 of R1036) But a trader 
might raise a loan for the purpose of his trade, business or 
profession. (Regulation 14, Chapter 3 of R1036)
From these regulations It appeared that no company might 
distribute its profits by way of dividends unless the 
Board had given its written approval.
6 . Other specified duties of the trader
(i) The trader had to keep financial books. (Regulation 13, 
Chapter 3 of R1036)
(ii) The trader had to keep his premises and contents clean 
and remove all rubbish. He and his employees were also 
expected to be clean. (Regulation 15, Chapter 3 of 
R103 6). He had to ensure that his premises and 
equipment were in a hygenic condition and complied with 
the health regulations of the local authority. (Regulation 
17, Chapter 3 of R1036) He had to pay rent, light and 
water charges, debited by the Board, monthly in advance
by the seventh day of each month. (Regulation 23,
Chapter 3 of R103 6)
(iii) A trader might give up his right to occupy his trading 
site, and hence his right to trade, by giving thirty 
days notice to the superintendent but he was not allowed 
to dispose of his rights to trade without the ' oard's 
consent. (Regulation 20, Chapter 3 of R1036)*
*S°me information relating to Government Notice R1036 was taker 
from Miranda Barker and Michael Katz, 'African Trading and 
Business in South Africa1, (Johannesburg, 1977).
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When the annual renewal of licences became due, a system 
started in 1969, a Superintendent would sometimes arbitrarily 
declare a person to be not financially sound even though he 
knew that the trader had invested thousands of Rands in 
erecting his shop. A trader who was physically and mentally 
fit could also be called an improper and unfit person to trade.
Because of the Government's insistence on annual renewals 
for trading licences, uncertainty prevailed amongst the traders. 
If their application for renewal was refused they could be 
warned to vacate their trading premises before January first of 
the following year. The result of this uncertainty was that 
many African traders, in order to exercise some caution, 
reduced their purchases towards the end of the year, whilst 
their White counterparts increased theirs to take advantage of 
the Christmas sales. Not only was the African br-' sssman 
seriously disadvantaged by this system, but the ,stem was 
open to abuse by the City Council officials.(32)
The effect of these regulations on African businessmen in 
the running of their businesses in the 60s, can best be seen 
from individual examples of limitations, restrictions, denials 
and sheer exasperation which they experienced. These examples 
can be extrapolated to cover the whole spectrum of African 
business activities at that time.
H. Majola, a Madadeni businessman and Director, Blackchain 
Limited since 1977, recalls that the Black entrepreneurs found 
that there were businesses which were declared, by township 
managers, as non-essentials. In other words this meant that
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Black entrepreneurs were only allowed to operate businesses 
catering for the day to day basic necessities. He remembers, 
when he was applying for his trading rights, as a General 
Dealer in f-'weto, that he was called to delete in his
application the selling of household hardware.
This meant that I could only sell 
food but not a pot in which food is 
cooked. Is it not a paradox that in 
a country where free enterprise is 
officially encouraged, discriminatory 
restrictions are imposed to the extent 
that the Black holder of a general 
dealers licence is not allowed to 
sell a pot? ' J
Solomon Moema, a past President of the Johannesburg African 
Chamber of Commerce and a Soweto businessman, stated that 
in the 60s, when he was a member of the Urban Bantu Council, 
it was common knowledge that, with the rapid expansion of 
Soweto, many African businessmen started to operate businesses 
and traded illegally without licences from their homes.
Most found the long drawn out and complicated procedures of 
licence applications with no certainty of ever receiving one 
after one to three years too onerous to deal with.
The problem of illegal trading in the townships was not new.
As A.W. Stadler has pointed o u t t h e  influx of large 
numbers of Africans from the rural areas into the townships 
between 1944 and 1947 brought with it squatter problems.
Families were consolidated through squatting and this rapid 
growth of the population meant that community services were 
required. Since the only service which Africans could legally
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provide in their communities was trading, and, since new 
trading opportunities in the form of shop premises were not 
available, many resorted to trading without premises and 
without licences.
Stadler found this to be one of the basic causes behind the 
'disturbances at Moroka1 in September 1947. In Moroka, part 
of the South Western townships of Johannesburg, James Mpanza, 
the leader of a band of squatters, illegally sold trading 
licences to Blacks. The Municipality, seeking to break his 
control, issued municipal licences in Moroka. Although the 
Council decided that it would give preference to illegal 
traders who did business with wholesalers, all but three 
licences went to people outside Moroka. And,in effect, the 
State supported the traders who had arrived in Johannesburg 
before the squatters.
Stadler submits that possibly, the crowd of about 200 which 
destroyed the licenced traders stalls and killed the policemen, 
were acting on behalf of the deposed illegal traders.
Further, the intervention of the authorities in trading
had a decisive effect on the economic opportunities of 
particular individuals. The Municipality, in order to consolidate 
its control in the South-Western areas, sought to manipulate 
and divide the incipient class of African traders by 
insisting on wholesaler connections, capital and other criteria 
for licencees. Consequently, many entrepreneurs who draw 
their supplies from unacceptable sources, like local producers 
and the criminal element, found themselves effectively debarred 
from trading as part of the legal African trader class,
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James Mpanza, an unqualified advocate and leader of the 
squatters, was himself accused of providing illegal 
services by conducting a court in his backyard. He was 
also prosecuted for providing stabling for horses in 
his yard. Yet, seemingly debarred from the incipient 
African trader class, since he did not comply with the 
State s criteria for membership, he spent twenty five 
years of his life serving his community as a member of 
the Advisory Boards and later as a member of the Soweto 
Urban Council. When he died, in early 1971, it was the 
African traders, as members of the National African 
Federated Chamber of Commerce, who paid tribute to him, 
in their publication the African Trader, as a man who 
had spent his entire time and energy devoted to his people.
His acceptance by this newly formed class would appear to 
demonstrate that the incipient class formation of 1947 
comprised both legal and illegal traders and that the
State was largely unsuccessful in its efforts to divide the 
two streams.
In the 60s the problem of illegal trading arose not only 
from the aspiring African businessman's inability to find 
the capital to erect his premises but it was compounded 
by the licensing procedure difficulties as stated earlier. 
In some areas illegal trading aasurtied disquieting 
proportions.
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In Meadowlands, part of the South Western Townships of 
Johannesburg, butchers found themselves competing with a well 
organised group of illegal traders who operated their own 
trucks for the transport of meat from nearby farms where 
animals were slaughtered on the spot and sold at prices
below those paid by legitimate traders. Coal and wood dealers 
encountered similar problems.(18)
Paul Monoa, a general dealer in Marnelodi, was one of the 
original members of the Marnelodi Chamber of Commerce, 
but in the early 60s Black businessmen in the area were not 
keen to join the Chamber because they felt it would be unable 
to bring about any changes for Black businessmen. Paul Monoa 
recalls that at that time their main problem was storage space 
since the law only allowed them very small premises. The 
Chamber approached the City Council and eventually managed 
to get separate storerooms erected in the township for 
collective use. Although this by-passed the law it still 
severely hampered business expansion because the storerooms were 
not part of the individual trader's premises. Nevertheless, 
this was a start and local Mamelodi businessmen soon realized 
that a united body could achieve some results. Consequently many 
more of them were keen to join the Chamber.(19}
Walter Dube, a filling station and restaurant owner, a general 
dealer and jewellery and diamond grader from Mabopane, waited 
six months ^or the licence for his beer hall in 1967, six 
months for the general dealer licence in 1968 and one year 
for the garage licence in 1968, despite the fact that the 
garage was started with a loan from the B.I.C. He personally
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knew of others who had waited for three years for a cafe 
licence.
Solomon Rabotapi, a general dealer from Evaton, entered his
father's business straight from school in the early 60s. The
business had to fight strong competition from five other
general dealers in the vicinity and it would appear that the
Licensing Authority paid little attention to the danger of
(2 1 )
overtrading and issued licences indiscriminately.
The late Kenneth Masekela, in his position as Secretary of
the Springs African Trade Association, in 1967, stated
A man who was either a messenger or 
doing a similar job receives municipal 
approval to run a shop. No investigation 
is made as to whether or not he knows 
what is entailed. Some of the far 
reaching consequences are that business 
is stunted and a man who has been in 
business for ten years is still in 
essentially the same position as he 
was when he started. Another reason 
for the stunted phenomenon that 
characterises African business is 
that allocations are made, bearing 
reference to ethnic grouping.
Moses Nyangiwe, an Orlando East trader, wrote to the Editor of 
the African Trader in April 1967 complaining that his area 
was badly arranged. Every street had at least three or four 
shops. This arrangement was recommended by the Advisory 
Board 1 who felt that if the Indians and Chinese were able to 
run shops... next to one another, there was no reason why the 
African could not do the same and be successful.1 He pointed 
out that the mushrooming of shops was undermining African 
businesses and many were unable to meet their rentals. Only 
one supermarket had remained in the same hands in recent years.
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The problem was that there were not enough people to 
support the shops since most left early for work in the 
towns, where they purchased their goods.
The formation of the National African Chamber of Commerce 
in 1964, from the old African Chamber of Commerce, came as 
a direct result of the 1963 Circular, when angry and 
insecure African traders united to discuss the common 
threat to their progress.
The 19 68 legislation brought an even greater reaction from 
African businessmen. Sam Motsuenyane, who was elected 
President of the National African Chamber of Commerce in 
that year, stated that the grand design was to create an 
atmosphere of insecurity among urban Blacks and in that 
way to convince them of the wisdom of moving out to the 
Homelands, where it was promised that 'the sky would be
the limit.' What the Government did not realise, initially, 
was the fact that the urbanization of any community anywhere 
was an Irreversible process. Blacks in the cities would 
never gravitate back to the Homelands in any appreciable 
numbers, given the then prevailing circumstances in those
areas. Blacks who had managed to build up businesses in the 
cities were doubly anxious to keep them and were not interested
in attempting to move their businesses to untried, unknown 
Homeland areas. Indeed very few had the capital to make 
such a move even if they so desired.
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With the common goz± for security of their businesses in 
the urban areas African businessmen joined the local Chambers, 
whore these were already established on Provincial lines, in 
increasing numbers. Though no actual figures are available 
for this period, since many of the local Chambers failed 
to send lists of their members, and their subscriptions, to 
the National Executive, the accounts for 1968 show members 
fees to be R379,50. With the average membership fee at
R6 this gives an official number of approximately sixty three 
members. However, about 500 businessmen attended the annual 
conference of the Transvaal African Chamber of Commerce in 
Pretoria in 1969.(26) discrepancy between the official
paid-up membership and the numbers who attended Chamber 
meetings and conferences is enormous and has remained a 
feature of the Chamber membership to the present day.
Further evidence for the belief in the fact that the official
figures did not reflect the true strength of the Chamber in 
the 60s is given in the records of the Johannesburg Chamber 
in 1963 when the total cash paid by members was R246,00 
whereas the recorded membership was 233.(2?) Furthermore, by
1964, forty seven Chambers had already been organised around
the country.(2®)
^'(H) Rgglonallsatlon Directive
The response by African businessmen to the Government's 
restrictive legislation, culminating in the regulations of 
1968, brought about a period of phenomenal development for the
National African Chamber of Commerce after 1968. But apart
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from the measures which Government inflicted on Black businessmen 
in general, it then insisted on what it expected to be restrictive 
measures on the National Chamber itself.
In 1969-, three months after Sam Motsuenyane became President 
of the National Chamber, the organisation was directed by 
the then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 
Dr.P.j.Koornhof, to break up into ethnic components. The 
Minister requested that they consider the re-organisation of 
their local and Provincial Chambers along the lines of existing 
Government policy of ethnic grouping. The rationale behind 
this thinking was clarified in a letter sent by the Minister 
to NAFCOC a year later.
If the development of the various 
Bantu nations is taken into 
consideration the reason for 
this view is obv.ous. The interests 
of the individual should at all 
times be subservient to the 
interests of the community. Your 
Chamber is urgently advised to 
consider this matter seriously as 
the Minister will probably not 
agree at any future date to consult 
with a body consisting of various 
ethnic groups as the interests of 
a specific ethnic group will ,
differ from those of other groups.
The Minister added that the 'integrated umbrella organisation 
at the top would be tolerated. '
The initial reaction of the Chamber to this request was
totally negative. At its Fifth Conference held at Pietermaritzburg
in May 1969, five months after the request, the opinion of
the country's various Chambers was sought. The response
from local Chambers ranged from a blunt refusal to accede to
i
the Minister's request, to a reluctant acceptance of the 
pattern proposed by the Minister.
The Free State Chamber was against the request, reasoning 
that if ninety per cent or more of branch Chambers, of which 
NAFCOC was composed, were Chambers in urban areas, then 
the possibility of separating NACOC into ethnic Chambers 
was unrealistic. The proportion of African traders according 
to their nationalities, based on ethnicity, in different 
centres was so uneven that the Free State area with only 
two main ethnic groups would be confined to one or two 
Chambers operating for the whole Region. In addition, the 
existing organisation of NACOC utilised the resources of 
African traders irrespective of whether they were Tswana,
Nguni or Sotho and with the existing difficulty of getting 
enough eligible office bearers at branch level, ethnic 
prescriptions would accentuate the difficulty.
The Transvaal Chamber had called a meeting of Black businessmen 
in Pretoria in May 1969 to discuss the concept of regionalisation. 
About 500 people attended. The conference resolved that 
the demand was unacceptable and that TACOC was Incompetent 
to discuss the issue because it was tinged with politics. 
Businessmen attending the conference argued that there were 
eight tribes in South Africa and that in certain areas some 
tribal groups were more predominant than others. If Chambers 
were formed on an ethnic basis a umber of businessmen would 
be forced to close down. Soweto was cited, where the
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that if ninety per cent or more of branch Chambers, of which 
NAFCOC was composed, were Chambers in urban areas, then 
the possibility of separating NACOC into ethnic Chambers 
was unrealistic. The proportion of African traders according 
to their nationalities, based on ethnicity, in different 
centres was so uneven that the Free State area with only 
two main ethnic groups would be confined to one or two 
Chambers operating for the whole Region. In addition, the 
existing organisation of NAf utilised the resources of 
African traders irrespective of whether they were Tswana,
Nguni or Sotho and with the existing difficulty of getting 
enough eligible office bearers at branch level, ethnic 
prescriptions would accentuate the difficulty.
The Transvaal Chamber had ailed a meeting of Black businessmen 
in Pretoria in May 1969 to discuss the concept of regionalisation. 
About 500 people attended. The conference resolved that 
the demand was unacceptable and that TACOC was incompetent 
to discuss the issue because it was tinged with politics. 
Businessmen attending the conference argued that there were 
eight tribes in South Africa and that in certain areas some 
tribal groups were more predominant than others. If Chambers 
were formed on an ethnic basis a number of businessmen would 
be forced to close down. Soweto was cited, where the
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population was said to constitute sixty per cent Zulu-speaking 
People.
If NACOC were to go according to the 
Minister's demands a Zulu Chamber would be 
formed in Soweto. What would happen to the 
Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa, Shangaan, Venda and 
Tsonga traders?
Again the problem of customers would crop up 1 Would a Zulu
, (32)
Chamber be expected to cater for Zulu customers only?'
Consequently the Transvaal Chamber was against ethnicity,
and reiterated at NACOC' s coi C«>rence that both NACOC and the
Transvaal Chamber were alre- ••• enerally ethnically represented
and that ethnic grouping would involve political issues which
(33}
were outside commerce. However, the Natal and Zululand
Chamber known as 1Inyanau which comprise almost entirely 
Zulu ethnic grouping, was prepared to remain as one regional 
Chamber, with branches all over the province. Other Chambers 
reluctantly agreed that, possibly, regionalisation would create 
smaller, more efficient and effective Chamber organisations.
As things were, the Provincial Chambers were far from being 
fully representative of the traders in their areas.
Finally, delegates at the Conference agreed that the question 
was not whether they favoured the policy of separate development 
or not, but rather, how they were to adjust to an already deeply 
entrenched Government policy. It was decided that the National 
Executive should prepare a -^morandum which would form the 
basis of another discussion with the Minister on the matter.
Those present were disturbed by the Minister's suggestion because 
it came at a time when African businessmen were realising the need 
for a Chamber of Commerce and were joining in increasing 
numbers. They pointed out that,
the suggestion to split the organisation 
of African businessmen into ethnic groups 
affected Africans only in South Africa.
It was outmoded as it came at a time 
when White businessmen in the country 
were attempting to club themselves into 
one group to improve the industrial and 
commercial life of the country ...
Commerce was indivisible; it was strange 
that Africans were expected to run their . 
Chamber of Commerce on tribal lines. ^
Searching for avenues in this new Government policy, the 
businessmen realized that it would be unwise to destroy the unity 
of their Chamber since it provided an adequate and suitable 
medium through which their needs and problems in commerce 
could be negotiated. Conference agreed that where running 
branches of the Chamber on'tribal'lines was unavoidable and 
practical, possibly on geographical grounds, the Executive 
would not interfere. But in areas where there was a multiplicity 
of 1 tribes'e.g. Soweto, the Chamber would not encourage the 
establishment of branches on'tribal'lines. Owing to the 
extremely cosmopolitan nature of this and similar communities, 
it would be impossible to divide them into ethnic groups 
anyway without seriously disrupting the organisation.
Conference resolved that the unity of NACOC be retained, but 
that the Provincial Chambers would be re-organised into regions 
so as to accommodate all existing Territorial divisions. The 
new regions would affiliate to Provincial organisations which 
in turn would affiliate to NACOC.
However, it was agreed that regional Chambers should promote 
the interests of all traders in an area, without any regard 
to ethnicity. In areas where branch members were of one tribe
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they could write their documents in their language and 
communicate in the same language. But English would be 
used at Provincial and National levels.
Despite these movements by NACOC to come some way towards 
implementing the Government policy directive, the Department 
of Bantu Administration and Development had no direct 
dealings with the National Chamber for the following seven 
years.
2.(iii) Structural economic constraints
With the restriction of African businesses to African areas, 
African businessmen found that progress of business was partly, 
if not wholly, dependent on the buying power of the Africans 
in their respective communities.
Although, as stated earlier, in the twenty five years from 
1935 to 1960, real Black wages increased by 2.4 per cent per 
year in the industrial sector, there was evidence of a 
widening Black/White income ratio until 1 9 7 2 . From 
1960 to 1971 wages increased by thirty per cent, also 2.4 
per cent annually.
Some of these gains in 'real' wages were eroded by inflation,
Black population growth, larger Black families and low
(37)earning occupations for Blacks.
Nevertheless there were indicav ons in the late 60s that 
the 'growing' buying power of the African had become a source 
of interest among Black business organisation in South Africa.
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At a business seminar at Ga-Rankuwa in 19 67, Dr. J. Adendorff, 
Managing Director of the BIG ,stated that the buying power of 
Africans was Rl 200 million per year and of that R240 million
was earned by Homeland residents. He added,
I doubt if half of this latter amount 
is actually being spent within the 
Homelands. (38)
At NAFCOC'S conference in 1969 , Sam Motsuenyane quoted from
figures of the Bureau for Market Research,
Africans in Pretoria, Witwatersrand 
and the Vaal Triangle command a 
buying power of R487 million which 
is largely spent on consumer goods ... 
The buying power of the Africans 
would soar seven-fold to R7 500 .
million by the turn of the century.
How much money did Africans have to spend in the years up to 
19707 As Mr. W. Langschmidt, Chairman of Market Research Africa 
stated at that time,
There were as many estimates as 
there were researchers and 
economists. ( 40)
therefore the following figures can, at best, only give a 
general indication of Black buying power up to 19 70.
Table 1
Estimated number of Households in South Africa 1972 
(earlier estimates unavailable) (Market Research Africa)
Whites 1 060 000
Coloureds 333 000
Asiatics 89 000
Africans 2 716 000
Total 4 198 000
Table 2
Remuneration of all employees
Amount Rm.
1970 68d8
(Bureau of Statistics)
Table 3
Claimed Average Household Income
Rand per month
1962 1970
Whites 258 398
Coloureds 60 94
Asiatics 91 156
Africans 25 36
(National Readership Surveys, Radio Bantu Survey)
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Table 5
Estimated Budgets of White and Black Households in
the main Metropolitan areas
Note - Figures based on 1966 Bureau of Statistics, C.O.L 
Survey and the 1970 Bureau of Market Research 
Budget Surveys
Item Blacks Whites
Black as a 
% of White
Rand Rand
Food
Clothing 
and foot 
wear
Housing
500
152
101
40,3
12,2
8,1
1 165
536
884
18,7
8,6 
14, 2
43
28
11
Fuel and
Light 38
Medical and 
Dental 5
Education 13
3,1
0,5
1,0
113
181
118
1.9
2.9
1.9
32
3
11
Insurance,
Pension and
Burial 10 0 ,8
Recreation 
and Enter­
tainment 10 0,8
Alcohol 64 5,1
374
168
100
6,0
2,7
1,6
6
64
Item Blacks Whites Black as a 
1 of White
Rand % Rand %
Cigarettes
and Tobacco 24 1,9 112 1,8 21
Washing
and
Cleaning
Materials 22 1,8 62 1,0 35
Laundry
and
Dry cleaning 22 1,8 37 0 6 59
Personal 
care and
Medicine 43 3,5 162 2,6 26
Transport 72 5,8 1 009 16,2 7
Furniture
and
Equipment 96 7,7 417 6,7 23
Tax** 12 1,0 536 8,6 22
Miscellaneous 57 4,6 249 4,0 23
Total 1 241 100,0 6 22b 100,0 20
The following Table 6 demonstrates that supermarkets 
received 77,2 per cent of their male, from White, in 1970
and 12,2 per cent from Africans. African stores, not surprisingly, 
did 97,6 per cent of their turnover with Africans.
In Table 7, Soweto falls in the Region 1 where there are 995 
African stores (37,3 per cent of all stores) doing 11,1 per cent 
of the grocery business against 185 supermarkets (6,9 per cent of 
stores) doing 53,5 per cent of the food business.
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The basic conclusions gained from these figures are, that 
although African wages had rj:er slowly between 1960 and 1970, 
the wage gap between Blark nrd White was not closing. Africans 
commanded ou.’.y 17,3 per cent of the total income, as against 
74,7 per cent of Whites. Although this did mean a buying 
power of FI 173 million in 1970, which, with rising wages, 
indicated th-t it might grow larger in the ensuing years, in 
Soweto alone, with Africans owning 37,3 per cent of the total 
stores in the Johannesburg area, only 11,1 per cent of the 
grocery business was commanded by African shopkeepers.
If we consider that African shopkeepers were doing 97,6 
per cent of their turnover with Africans and this percentage 
was only 11,1 per cent of the grocery business (which virtually 
all African shopkeepers were involved with) then the economic 
constraints on Black business in 1970 are obvious.
Two other economic factors severely constrained African business 
at that time. These were the lack of credit facilities and 
the non-existence of Black bulk buying facilities.
A business can be operated without credit facilities provided 
that sufficient capital exists. However even if enough 
capital is available it is normal business practice to use 
certain types of credit facilities. But the situation of 
Black businessmen was quite different. They did not have the 
required security to obtain the required credit. In fact, no 
form of credit was available to the majority of them, and,
if available, the conditions were very stringent. Those who 
could obtain credit under certain conditions found it 
difficult to comply with the conditions. The few that could 
obtain credit reasonably easy, did so only on their gocd name 
with hhite wholesalers. Banks normally require security to 
be provided for overdraft facilities but since most Black 
businessmen could not supply any security, the banking sector 
was debarred from them.
Usually wholesale credit to African businessmen averaged 
about seven days- Therefore this credit could not be viewed 
s & form of finance. The effect of this situation was that 
roosi. African businessmen were forced to buy on cash terms.
With their small capital bases and Inadequate store space most 
businessmen were forced to buy from White wholesalers.
This often led to a situation where the businessmen felt that 
wholesalers, knowing this, took advantage of them in terms 
of price and quality.  ^  ^ Consequently, it became apparent
that it would be in the longterm interest of *lack businessmen 
to arrange some form oi collective stock purchasing since 
the problem of stock purchasing was fundamental to successful 
business development.
Clearly there was an economic need for Black businessmen to 
unite and the National African Chamber of Commerce was quick 
to harness this need. But the members of the Black Chamber 
Movement were also aware that Black unity would give them 
greater bargaining power for the rights of the Black man in 
South Africa. For, only a strong, united nationa] Black business
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movement would be capable of fighting the ever increasing 
restrictive Government legislation being applied to African 
business, particularly in the Black urban areas. They 
realised that it would be difficult for any single ethnic 
group to effectively fight for greater opportunities for Black 
businessmen.
Consequently, at the annual conference of the African Chamber 
Movement in 1969, Black businessmen came together with a united 
voice, a voice born in a climate of protest. They agreed, that 
in order to give a greater measure of autonomy to the 
forthcoming new regional structure, the name National African 
Chamber of Commerce should be changed to the Nati' :1 African
F derated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC).
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CHAPTER 3
THE FORMATION CF THE NATIONAL AFRICAN FEDERATED CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE IN 1969
3.1. First points of focus
This Chapter describes the activities of the first few 
years of NAFCOC'S new federated organisation. It outlines 
the first points of focus and the difficulties encountered.
There were three main spheres of operation. The first 
dealt with the building up of the organisation into an 
efficient national body. The main activities which this 
encompassed were first, the Implementation of regionalisation, 
and second, the organisation of annual conferences.
The second sphere of ope^.ticn, which was an on—going activity 
for NAFCOC, was the organisation's continual, and largely 
ineffective, attempts at negotiation with the Government, 
where it pointed out the grievances of African businessmen 
and requested the Government to change the restrictive 
legislation affecting them.
The third sphere of operation was a practical plan of action 
for its members in the form of a Buy-at-Home Campaign.
The fact that the negotiations with the Government and the 
Buy-at-Home Campaign were largely failures does not detract
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from the successes of the regionalisation implementation 
and the annual conferences. For, by these two activities 
alone NAFCOC was in a position in the mid 70s, as an efficient 
and well organised body, to begin a plan of action which,
during the following five years, would demonstrate its
effectiveness as a Black businessmens' organisation in 
South Africa.
3,1‘(i)  Implementation of Regionalisation
Though the directive from the Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development, for the National Chamber to divide into
ethnic groups, had been received in the middle of 1969, it
was almost a full year later before the Chamber officially
moved into action. The publicity given to the directive
t the 1969 Annual Conference had caused much strong feeling
among members, with most realizing that it would take a great
deal of organisation and energy if it was ever to be achieved 
without loss of unity.
At the Annual Conference, held in Bloemfontein on 24th May 197o,
after some prolonged discussion, Conference unanimously agreed
that regionalisation should be implemented in accordance with
the decision made at the Pietermaritzburg Conference in 
1969 .
From the directive sent out to members by the Chamber 
Executive, it appears that they had the foresight to see 
that, though they were effectively toeing the line as far 
as Government was concerned, they stood to gain a definite
87
advantage in the re-organisation of the C  imber, in terms 
of increased efficiency. This was something Government may 
have overlooked. 1 For more efficient organisation our country­
wide Chamber must be demarcated into regions with due regard 
to the ethnic character of the various Chamber areas.1^
Consequently the Chamber machine rolled into action. Almost 
immediately the most difficult aspect of the operation 
became apparent. It was the sheer physical task of finding 
volunteers to tour the whole country to establish the 
branches. Time, expense and expertise loomed large. The 
Executive felt that the existing Provincial Chambers were 
best placed to decide where and how demarcation lines should 
be laid. Each Provincial office was to confine its suggestions 
to the area falling under its jurisdiction. Sketch maps 
would have to be provided to indicate clearly the boundary 
lines of each region.
From experience, it was expected that only a few people would 
actually volunteer to offer the dedicated service required 
in such an operation. Therefore, the Executive Committee, 
keen to familiarize itself with the problems and complications 
that might arise, did everything possible to gain knowledge 
about regional!sation by attending all the Regional meetings 
when they were organised.
An unforseen complication soon arose which was to be as 
difficult as the physical aspect. That was thu propaganda 
required to try to convince the various people, with diverse 
opinions, about the need for a Chamber at all. In many areas
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there were no organised Chambers or recognised traders 
Associations. In other places they had to contend with 
suspicion and disunity arising from petty local quarrels.
Therefore, though it was the honest belief of most members 
that their organisation would reap enormous benefits from 
regionalisation, since they anticipated a faster rate of 
growth of the association and also expected a greater 
measure of participation by members in the organisational 
activities of the Chambers, they realized that there was a 
need for sacrifice, tolerance and diplomacy on the part of 
those who were immediately charged with the responsibility 
of organising new branches and regional organisations.
Cognizance had to be taken of the autonomous nature of the 
regional chambers contemplated. It was also considered 
'unwise' to fall for names that would suggest ethnic grouping.
The task of organising in the Transvaal fell to the Transvaal 
Chamber of Commerce. The Executive visited many areas in 
the Transvaal either to resuscitate dormant branches or to 
start new ones. Their early efforts were rewarded by the 
large number of delegates who attended the annual conference 
at Springs. An interesting feature was the attendance of the 
Dobsonville Township Manager,Advisory Board Members and
Urban Councillors.
Txie formation of the Tswana Region (hereinafter BQCOC) on the 
7th September 1970 was viewed as a tremendous achievement by the 
Transvaal Chamber. The area of operation for BOCOC stretched from
89
Hammanskraal to Upington in the Northern Cape i.e. all areas 
falling under the jurisdiction of the Bophuthatswana 
Government. Here the task of forming the branches had been
tery difficult because the BOCOC axea was large and scattered. I
The Chamber was new and relatively unknown.
All that traders had were the 
so-called 'Traders Associations' 
whose aims were to protect 
individual scattered groups 'of 
friends' interests and in the end 
served no useful purpose to the
communities they served. (2 )
Some Chambers in the area had been formed before the formation 
of BOCOC and had not yet registered with the new organisation.
The Chamber had not been able to find out whether those
traders were aware of their umbrella body or whether there
were other obstacles preventing them from registering. Most
branch areas in Bophuthatswana lay in rural areas and
traders operating there were miles apart therefore to convene
a meeting took a great deal of hard work, patience and
persuasion on the part of TACOC's Executive committee. Some
traders were very sensitive and apprehensive of new movements
in their areas. Many had been running their businesses
for several years and had never had anything like a Chamber
of Commerce. Nevertheless, the committee faced up to this
suspicious mentality and managed to form branches at Mahika -
Mafeking and District, Western Transvaal - Lichtenburg, Coligny
and Ventersdorp. These and GaRankuwa, which was already formed,
affiliated to NAFCOC. - j
Three local executive meetings were held during the year and *"
at its first meeting, the committee attempted to obtain 
recognition of BOCOC by the Tswana Government, A letter was
sent on the 16th November 1970. In the reply on the 14th
December 1970, the Government expressed its 1 satisfaction
(3)
that a purely Tswana organisation has been formed1 and 
that, although there was no existing legislation by which
the organisation could be recognised,
the Council has however taken 
cognisance of the fact that your 
organisation exists and that it 
purports to represent the Tswana 
Iraders. In this connection the 
Executive Council will consider any 
representations which you may have 
on their merits... (4)
However, the Government made comments on matters contained 
in the proposed Constitution of BOCOC - that the Name of the
(5
Chamber should be such that it signified the 'Tswana Character1 
of the organisation, and also that the paragraph dealing with 
finances should be drawn up with the assistance of a Chartered 
Accountant who would help in drafting a more comprehensive 
set of rules dealing with finances.
On receipt of this communication from the Tswana Government, 
the Transvaal African Chamber of Commerce. (TACOC) 
proudly announced its great achievement in getting the 
Bophuthatswana Chamber of Commerce (BOCOC) recognised 
by its respective Government. By 1974, membership of BOCOC 
had reached 250 and was increasing rapidly.^ The Tswana 
Government's attitude changed from its original stance, 
since it now seemed to view BOCOC as a quasi-political 
organisation. Some of the leaders of BOCOC were in fact members 
of the Opposition Party in the Bophuthatswana Parliament.
Mr. S.J.J. Lesolang, NAFCOC'S Treasurer until he retired from
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that post in 1979, was a member of the Tswana Territorial 
Authority from 1968 to 1971 and a Member of Parliament in 
the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly from 1971 to 1977, 
as a member of the opposition Seoposengwe (United) Party 
under the leadership of Chief Tidimane Pilane. Chief Lucas 
Mangope was First Vice Chairman in the Tswana Territorial 
Authority under Chief T.R. Pilane in 1961. It was not until 
1972, when elections for the new Assembly were held, that 
the Chief Minister L . Mangope formed the Bophuthatswana 
National Party which, upon winning the elections, became the 
ruling party Then, in 1974 , Chief Mangope established the 
Bophuthatswana Democratic Party..
Therefore several of the elder politicians, like Mr. Lesolang, 
who remained faithful to the original Seoposen.we Party, 
found themselves in opposition to Chief Mangope's new Party 
in the 70s.
Though better organised than many other regions BOCOC was
not afforded official recognition and there was no contact
with Government * •, matters pertaining to economic development
in general or commerce and industry in particular. This
uncertainty as to its status led BOCOC to send a Memorandum
to the Chief Minister, Lucas Ma- )pe, of Bophuthatswana in
(7)1974, stating that since its inauguration in 1970, BOCOC 
had been operating in the assumption of a de facto recognition, 
whereas the Chamber wanted to feel that it also hau de jure 
recognition. The Chamber further stated that Jt was an 
economic organisation with aims and objects strictly confined 
to the field of economics. It emphasized that politics
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were no part of it.
Despite this and further pleas the status of BOCGC was to 
remain uncertain throughout the greater part of the 70s - 
the Tswana Government taking no part in NAFCOC initiated 
projects like the African Bank and the Homelands Leaders 
Conferences - until further harsh directives to split the 
reoion in Bophuthatswana came with that State's independence 
in ?78 . This crisis w. s delicately handled by NAFCOC 1 S 
Executive in the middle of 19 79 when it held talks with 
Chief Mangope to resolve the differences.
During 1970, ^he Transvaal Chamber also attempted to establish
a region in the North Eastern Transvaal. A meeting was held
on 10th October 1970, at the Jane Furse Hospital in
Sekhukhuniland. Four hundred traders attended and the meeting
was given some prominence by the attendance of the Chief
Minister of Lebowa, Dr.C. Phatudi who was the Minister of
Education, the Paramount Chieftainess of the area and members
of the . However, regior alisation was not finalised at
that time due to some minor difference between traders in
the East and in the Nortr.. Therefore TACOC left a well
(8)
established Eastern Transvaal Executive as caretaker.
The TACOC Executive travelled to the Pietersburg region on 
1st April 1971 in order to see whether they could finalise 
its formation. Unfortunately the turn out was not as good 
as at Jane Furse and members present asked to be given an 
opportunity to convene another meeting for 9th May 19 71 when 
they would have the majority of their members present to
explain matters to them. However the principle of regional!sation
was accepted and the TACOC committee was requested to visit
(9 )
them again for finalisation on 12th July 1971.
Tne differences in these areas stemmed from the fact that 
many of the branches were geographically far apart and some 
of the branch members felt that this also made a difference to 
the particular problems which affected each business community. 
Consequently, they preferred to operate as three sub-regions, 
that is, Eastern Transvaal embracing Groblersdal, Sekhukhuni- 
land and Lydenburg/Steelpoort areas, Pietersburg region 
embracing Pietersburg and surrounding areas up to
Phalaborwa and lastly the Mandebele region embracing Potgietersrus, 
Mahwelereng, Zebedelia stretching up to the Botswana border 
in the North. However, during 1972, all three sections 
amicably agreed to federate as a Lebowa region.
Bethal, Ermelo, Klerksdorp, Witbank and Lichtenburg were 
also visited in 1971.
By 1973 a strong Southern Transvaal Region had been established, 
though the far North and North West sectors of the Transvaal,
Sibasa and Louis Trichardt, were still being organised. As 
there were no definite links with any national body there, 
the formation of Regional chambers proved to be rather time 
consuming.
With the autonomous regional chambers in the Transvaal 
affiliated directly to the National organisation, the part 
played by the TACOC body had become somewhat dubious by 197 3.
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There were two schools of thought about it:
1. There was a feeling that TACOC had in fact completed 
its important task and should therefore dissolve.
2. Others maintained that TACOC should remain as a co­
ordinating body among the regional chambers of the Transvaal, 
although if it was to be retained it should operate in
a clearly defined area where it would not interfere with 
the autonomy of the regional chambers. Its existence 
should also be reconciled with the concept of the three 
tier organisation as visualized in the new Constitution.
However in June 1974 TACOC was eventually disbanded to allow 
the newly established regions to function autonomously.
The Transkei Region was formally launched in November 1972, 
and given recognition by the Minister of Justice of the 
Transkei Government at an inaugural function at the Transkei 
Hotel on the 14th January 19 73. It affiliated to NAFCOC in 
March 1973. Due to the geographical distribution of the 
Transkei peoples it was decided to divide the Chamber into 
a number of local branches which would be better acquainted 
with the local needs of their respective business communities.
In this manner the whole of the Transkei was represented in 
the Chamber Movement by 1974, with seven local branches. At 
this stage, with its eye on the forthcoming independence 
of Transkei in 1976, the White Chamber of Commerce in Transkei 
requested amalgamation which was favourably received by the 
Black Chamber.
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The Ciskei Region was formed in 1974 at King Williamstown, 
though not before difficulties had’ been overcome. A mainly 
rural Ciskeian African Traders Association had existed for 
some timi^Hn 1970, Mr. S. Zuma reported that prospects for 
Chamber work in the Eastern Cape were extremely bleak because 
of the unsettling effect of the mass removals of traders 
in the Western Province.
The application of the 196 8 Regulations with regard to the 
control of business rights and occupation of premises appears 
to have been particularly stringent in the Cape Province.
The Cape Province was a declared preferential work area for 
Coloureds and the practice was to admit African workers into 
the Cape Province solely on a contract labour system. These 
contracts had to be renewed annually. Consequently, Cape 
township African businessmen were considered to be inessential 
and even more 'temporary' than their counterparts in other 
provinces. It appeared to be the Government's intention, 
at that time, to cut down on their numbers wherever possible.
These African businessmen complained that they were
forced to endure perpetual agony, 
frustration and threats of with­
drawal of our.business rights by 
officials
The lack of security in their businesses, caused by the 
stipulation that they make annual applications for occupation 
of their premises, created an untenable position of fear. 
Problems also arose when m licencee of a business died.
There was no guarantee that a widow or heir would be allowed 
to take over the business. It meant that the family faced an
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immediate and complete reversal of fortune. Often this had 
resulted in the loss of not only th-. u.^mds of Rands but 
also status and position in the community. In 1972 the 
National office of NAFCOC reported that no reliable contacts 
had been concluded with the local Chambers in the Cape 
therefore they made a special effort to r--anise the area 
during 1973. The resuscitation and organisation of this 
region was so great that by 1975 it was able to send a 
Memorandum to the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration 
am' Development setting out its difficulties which included 
general harassment by junior officials. It stated that 
when the Bantu Administration Boards took control of the 
Townships in the Cape their position towards the organisation 
changed.
Instead of being sympathetically 
received we have, over the past 
few months been treated like 
'naughty children1 by junior officials 
and threatened with eviction and 
closure. Officials also resented 
the existence of our organisation. ^
The Chamber, magnanimously stated that though this untenable 
situation prevailed, some senior officials had saved the 
situation The Chamber emphasised that it was a responsible 
organisation and desired, at all times, to act responsibly.
It appealed to the Government to recognise officially that 
it was a legitimate organisation protecting the interests of 
businessmen in the townships.
The NAFCOC Executive drew up a tentative regional plan for 
the Orange Fren State in May 1971. This area had once formed 
a very strong branch of'the National organisation, but, by 
January 1972 there was little Chamber activity. The main
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problem was thought to be a lack of sound and consistent 
leadership In the area. However reports soon came in that 
the Orange Free State was organising a regional conference 
for the 22nd April 1972.
Inyanda, the Natal and Zululand area, was perhaps the easiest 
to organise since the Chamber operated as a homogenous 
entity, under one administrative authority. Therefore, the 
need for autonomous regional chambers such as those formed in 
the Transvaal was not considered essential. Whilst the old 
Provincial Chamber was of the opinion that its area was too 
wide and therefore needed to be sub-divided, it was also of 
the opinion that any sub-division, as may be created, should 
remain an integral part of one unified Chamber organisation 
in Natal. During 19 70 the Inyanda organising Committee worked 
tirelessly criss-crossing Natal and Zululand, taking the 
Chamber voice to the remotest areas in an effort to publicise 
the organisation and increase membership. The first branches 
formed were Harding and Richmond which, oddly, until that 
time had been places which were hard to convince about bhe 
Chamber's value.
Nineteen seventy one found the Inyanda committee experiencing 
great difficulties with the immensity of the area that they
had to cover as well, as the diverse opinions.
We as a'scattered Homeland region...' 
gave us extra work of having to 
deal with people of all opinions, 
even to the point where we began
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to wonder what our own opinion 
really was, when we put across the 
objects of the Chamber and the reasons 
and the existence of.the need for 
a Chamber at all.
In order to lessen the burden, the organising committee 
temporarily divided the Province into four regions though 
by 1972 they decided to remain as one official region. Their 
greatest complaint was that they did not have enough funds 
for a fulltime organiser for the project and the work had to 
be left in the hands of volunteers. By 1974 membership of 
Inyanda was 400 with twenty one branches.
The twenty one branches were : Madedeni/Osizweni African
Chamber, Bergville, Mtubatuba, Nongoma, Maphumulo, Msinga, 
Kliprivier, Port Shepstone, Umzinto, Paulpietersburv, Natal 
and Kwazulu African Commercial Representatives Association,
Zulu Thuthuka Trading Society, Pholela African Traders 
Association, Ixopo, Mpumalanga, Mondlo Zakhe, Umlazi, 
Pietermaritzburg, Pinetown and District, Estcourt and 
Indwedwe.
It should be noted that where active business associations 
were already in operation these were largely allowed to 
remain intact and given the status of a branch organisation 
within one of the four semi-autonomous regions. These 
regions were: Durban and South Coast, Durban and North Coast,
Northern Natal and Zululand.
To give greater efficiency to the process of regionalisation, 
the National Executive insisted upon yearly regional
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reports in order to give them an idea of the state of affairs 
in the Regional Chambers. These also formed a basis for 
future planning. The contents of these reports were to list:
(a) Name of local branch
(b) Place where its activities were mainly centred or its 
headquarters
(c) Name of Office-bearers
(d) Number of registered members
(e) Membership potential
(f) Local branch activities during the particular year under 
review
(g) Future activity plans
The local branch Chambers were to be the strength of NAFCOC. 
They formed the base supporting the three tier pyramidal 
structure of NAFCOC. If the base was weak and unstable, so 
would the whole structure be weak.
It was recommended that when drawing up the programme of 
activities for the year, these activities should form part 
of NAFCOC'S master-plan, to attempt to gain a share of the 
growing African market. Suggested activities were:
(a) Buy-at-Home campaign
(b) Functions to which customers were invited
(c) Donation of School Trophies, donations to Football 
Clubs etc., bursaries
(d) Socials
(e) Beauty contests
(f) Seminars and addresses by eminent authorities in commerce
(g) Frequent and regular meetings
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'In fact an enterprising businessman can still find the 
list well nigh inexhaustible.'^^
With the process of regionalisation almost completed in May 
1973, it was felt that the general application of the new 
Federal Constitution could no longer be delayed. Whereas the 
Constitution was in fact adopted at the Mamelodi Conference 
in May 1971, to accommodate the principle of federalism 
and regionalisation, on an objection raised by Inyanda in 
1972 it was agreed that the general application of the new 
Constitution be withheld in order to enable members to study 
it and suggest appropriate amendments, if necessary.
The dispute which arose over the implememtation of the 
Constitution stemmed from more basic problems which were 
affecting the Inyanda Chamber during 1972.
Mr. 3.C. Conco, Chairman of Northern Natal region and later 
a Member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, together with 
Mr. A.S. Nene, who spoke for Inyanda at the 1972 conference, 
assured the Chamber that, although Natal stood with the other 
provinces as far as African unity was concerned, instructions 
had been given to the Inyanda Executive, by the KwaZulu 
Government, to withdraw from NAFCOC. This instruction was 
given because of the stand taken by the Inyanda Chamber with 
regard to the operations of the BIC.
The Chamber, while acknowledging that the BIC was a Government 
sponsored institute created to sponsor economic development 
in the Homelands, was critical about the manner in which the
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Corporation operated. The lack of consultation between 
the BIG and the Chamber was the main factor, although the 
complicated applications and the delays which these involved, 
the Corporation's acquisition of business sites and its 
involvement in the brewing business, the bonding of all 
assets to the BIC for loans and the provision of pro—forma 
invoices in lieu of cash, inexperienced field officials and the 
non-impartiality caused by the presence of the BIC as part of 
the screening committee for applicants, were also cited.
Because Inyanda was at the forefront of this dispute it 
complained to NAFCOC that Natal 1 carried the National 
Executive on their back with little help from the other 
provinces. 1  ^ Whenever Inyanda delegates raised objections,
they were over-ruled. Inyanda also claimed that the Constitution 
had oeen tampered with unconstitutionally since sufficient 
time was not allowed for notices to amend the Constitution.
Consequently, in an attempt to resolve this dispute amicably,
conference decided that the status quo fce maintained until
such time as the affiliated Chambers had circularised a
draft constitution to be considered the following year, and
that no election of office bearers was to be held until that 
time.
In addition, NAFCOC supported Inyanda by giving it a mandate
to take up the various issues with the BIC and, by May 1973,
Inyanda and the KwaZulu Government were in accord about BIC 
policy.
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The principle objective in amending NACOC'S Constitution 
was to provide for regionslisation without destroying 
national unity, when regional Chambers had to be provided 
with a measure of autonomy. The clauses on the categories 
of membership also proved contentious. Thus, only slight 
alterations were made to the wording but not to the meaning 
of some of the aims of NAFCOC'S Constitution:
1. Affected especially the category of membership. There 
were to be six classes of members comprising Ordinary, 
Regional and local Chambers, Professional associates,
Honorary, Affiliated organisations and Affiliated 
members. It was hoped that this diverse membership would, 
in the long run, serve to ^vitalize the whole Chamber 
Movement.
2. With the creation of autonomous regional branch Chambers, 
the structure of NACOC changed from one of a unitary body 
into a federal body.
3. As this change in structure also necessitated a change in 
tne name of the federal body, the Executive recommended
that HACOC be substituted by NAFCOC, which would characterise 
the nature of the organisation more accurately.
Since no other amendments were received from members, the 
Constitution was formally adopted at the Annual Conference 
in Mafeking in 1973. This was the last time that elections, 
delegation system and affiliation fees were based on the 
old NACOC Constitution.
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After regional!sation, in 1974, the Constitution was further 
amended:
1. The composition of the Federal National Executive was 
to comprise of members directly elected for two years, 
from each region.
2. A new system of representation of Regional Chambers at 
NAFCOC1S Annual Conferences.
3. A uniform minimum subscription of F.’ '.00 per Chamber per 
member per annum.
3.1.(i i) Conferences
During the difficult and busy years of regional!sation NAFCOC 
continued the Chamber tradition of organising Annual Conferences 
for its members and interested parties.
The Chamber. attained very gre.it success in this area, since 
all the conferences were well attended, not only by members 
but by Government officials and private sector individuals, 
and were generally very inspiring for the Black Chamber 
Movement in South Africa. The topics discussed at the 
conferences give some indication of the general direction in 
which the Chamber moved during the 70s. The degree of 
participation at the conferences emphasised the growing 
Interest and awareness of Black businessmen in the Chamber 
Movement and of Black needs and aspirations generally.
The fifth Annual Conference held at Edendale, Pietermaritzburg 
in 1969 dealt mainly with the re-organisation of NAFCOC, due 
to regionalisauion, as well as the projected Buy-at-Home 
Campaign. The following sixth and seventh Conferences at 
Bloemfontein in 1970 and at Mainelodi in 1971, where attendance 
was about 400, were still engaged in regionalisation and 
aspects of the new Constitution as well as explicit directives 
about the activities of the new local branches. Therefore, 
these first three years were really an attempt to instil 
a sense of unity, efficiency and order into the organisation.
In fact recognition of NAFCOC'S success in this direction 
came in 1972 when its unity was acknowledged by Chief M.G. 
Buthelezi of KwaZulu, when he opened the eighth Conference 
at Urilazi. He stated that it was highly creditable that 
the Chamber of Commerce organisation was still in operation
after eight years of existence since
Blacks seem to be great experts 
in all wanting to be leaders and 
this is the reason why most Black 
organisations soon.|nd up as 
splinter groups.
Chief Buthelezi's presence at that conference marked a step 
forward for the Chamber, since it saw the beginnings of 
NAFCOC involvement and hoped for co-operation with Homeland
Governments. Sam Motsuenyane, NAFCOC'S President said,
This unique day and occasion will go 
down into the history of our Chamber 
of Commerce, as the day of great 
beginnings; a day that one hopes 
will mark the beginning of true and 
closer co-operation and collaboration 
between our organisation and homeland 
Government ... (20)
The announcement, that African Business magazine, which was
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first published in June 1972, the month of that conference, 
was to be the official voice of NAFCOC, was welcomed by the 
members. Details about the publication of this magazine, as well 
as the failure of earlier attempts at publishing, are given 
in Chapter 4 (v) (b) of this dissertation.
The increased attendance at the ninth Annual Conference in 
1973 at Mafeking, was evidence of the remarkable growth that 
occurred in the organisation during 1973. The organisation 
was achieving a new status both at home and abroad. The
new image was mainly attributed to NAFCOC'S involvement in
its African Bank project.
Members were informed at this conference that Barclays 
International Bank was prepared to give full support to
the African Bank project. Details about the African Bank
are given in Chapter 4 (v) (a) of this dissertation.
It was also announced that NAFCOC had been accepted as a 
member of the International Chamber of Commerce. On 27th 
April 1973, the members of the South African committee of 
the International Chamber met and unanimously agreed to the 
affiliation. This not only entitled NAFCOC to representation 
on the South African committee of the International Chamber 
but they were also in a position to send delegates to the 
International Congress of Chambers of Commerce which met once 
in two years in various parts of the world.
Being members of the International Chamber, to which both 
the Afrikaanse Handelsinstltuut and ASSOCOM were affiliated,
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meant that NAFCOC had attained the same status as those 
organisations. Therefore conference resolved that NAFCOC 
should take immediate steps towards meeting and establishing 
good working relationships with these groups in South Africa.
The tenth Annual Conference at Umtata in 1974 was opened 
by the Transkeian Minister of Justice, Chief George Matanzima 
who stressed Transkei1s support for free enterprise and a 
stable middle class Black elite. He said that the South 
African Government was gradually losing the political bonds 
which had restrained the Black man and although the process 
v/as opposed by many Whites, opposition was crumbling at an 
increasing rate.
Our capitalist society is often accused 
of favouring the rich. In fact it 
does nothing of the sort. What it 
does favour is initiative, drive and 
hard work. (
The presence of Chief Matanzima emphasised the growth and 
influence that the NAFCOC organisation had attained since 
1969. The Conference attracted senior Ministers from 
Homeland Governments, observers from many White organisations, 
Black representatives from Rhodesia and close on 800 delegates 
from African Chambers of Commerce throughout the Republic.
Apart from the main talking point, details about the progress 
of the African Bank project, the President informed the 
delegates that NAFCOC1S Executive had been instrumental in 
bringing together the heads of the following employer 
organisations: ASSOCOM, Afrikaanse Handels instituut , BIC,
Federated Chamber of Industries, the National Development 
Foundation and the South African Foundation with a view to
sponsoring a joint National
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Symposium to discuss Black participation in the economy
of South Africa 1 above the servant level.' The discussions
which took place led to the formation of a sub-committee
consisting of academics under the chairmanship of NAFCOC'S
President Sam Motsuenyane, who were conducting a thorough
study of the problem with a view to finding the real strangle-
*
holds to African economic progress in South Africa.
The Witzieshoek Conference of 1975, chose the name for the 
Bank as 1 The African Bank of South Africa Limited. 1 By
April 1975 an amount of R700 000 was fully subscribed
towards the capital of the Bank and plans were drawn up for 
the establishment of the Bank later in the year.
During that year a number of consultations took place between 
NAFCOC and officials of the BIG about the tripartite issue.
The Corporation came forward with a new proposal supporting 
the establishment of tripartite companies in which the 
partners involved would be:-
(a) White entrepreneur or company
(b) The BIC and
(c) A Black entrepreneur or company
However, conference decided that NAFCOC could not agree to 
have the BIC as a partner in any company or partnership
* The findings published by Dr. P.C. Sehutte assisted by 
Professor N. Swart in Problems of Black Businessmen 
in Metropolitan Areas,(1975) , revealed that the primary 
development areas required were ; training and consulting, 
capital, physical facilities and shared development; '
while the secondary development aspects were s credit 
facilities, collective buying, procedures in homeland
transfer and legal restrictions.
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Involving Black entrepreneurs in the Homelands. Consequently 
NAFCOC decided not to support the establishment of joint 
companies in the Homelands in which Africans did not have 
majority shareholding since they regarded the 50/50 or 
45/50 basis of Black/White partnership which had been proposed 
by certain White companies as being unfair. Nothing of a
similar quid pro q u o  existed in White areas for /-fri ins.
Following this decision a Research Committee was constituted, 
by NAFCOC, to investigate and recommend to the Executive, 
business and development projects in the :o.ielanes.
In order to encourage Chamber development at both regional
i
and national level, through a spirit of competiti n, a 
President's Shield, donated by Unilever, was presented for 
; the first time at this eleventh Conference, to the best
! organised region.
I In 1976, it was announced at the twelfth Conference, held
t' at the University of the North in Lebowa, that the President
i Sam Motsuenyane had been nominated 'Business Statesman of
the Year' by the Harvard Business School Club in America.
The Odi Chamber of Commerce arranged a prestige dinner on 
his behalf to celebrate this award.^^
i
The President's policy statement for 1976 contained details
*
of a new Five-Year-Plan for NAFCOC which, it was hoped would 
! serve to place NAFCOC in a position to cope with the growth
and interest in Black business projects during the coming 
years, since the unplanned and haphazard development of the 
*Five Year Plan 1975-1980, see Chapter 4.
1
work of the organisation had been recognised as a weakness 
which needed an immediate remedy. The initiation of a 
Black insurance project as well as a Black Supermarket 
Chain were also announced. Details of these projects are 
given in Chapters 4 (iii) (e) and 8 (i) of this dissertation.
Hoping to foster communication and co-operation among the 
Chambers of Commerce in Southern Africa, NAFCOC took the 
initiative, during 1975, in trying to organise a Southern 
African Conference of Chambers of Commerce in Lesotho. It 
was announced at the 1976 Conference that Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Malawi and Rhodesian Chambers supported the move, but lack 
of funds prevented the Malawian and Rhodesian Chambers from 
sending delegates to a preparatory meeting held at Roma 
University in Lesotho. The President also visited Zambia 
where he held informal talks with members of the Zambian 
Commercial and Industrial Association. Their response was 
positive towards the idea of forming a co-ordinating body 
of Chambers of Commerce in Southern Africa as long as they 
could avoid any formal links with South Africa that might 
embarrass their Government. Consequently NAFCOC decided to 
keep the project in mind because it was only through co-operation 
among businessmen in Southern Africa that the problems of 
economic development for the Black man in South Africa could 
be overcome.
At each of the Annual Conferences held in 1977 at Belville 
in the Cape, in 1978 at Durban, and finally in 1979 at the 
Carlton Hotel at Johannesburg, the Chamber attained an 
attendance of about 1000 delegates. It had become the
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laigest gathering of any business association in Southern 
Africa, and, by 1979, the organisation was in a quandry as 
to where to hold future conferences since there were no facilities 
available for such a large number. The unprecedented step 
of limiting the number of delegates from each region was 
proposed. The undoubted value and success of the Annual 
Conferences could not be ignored since they provided an 
annual forum for discussion and mobilisation of policy by 
Chamber members, as well as a meeting place with outside's,
White company officials, White organisations, Government 
officials, Homeland Government officials and overseas 
delegates. In fifteen years of conferences the changed 
status of NAFCOC was succinctly put by Sam Motsuenyane at
the 1979 conference when he opened his speech by saying,
Exactly fifteen years ago our 
organisation held its inaugural 
conference in the Orlando East 
Donaldson Community Centre in Soweto.
It is most gratifying that we can 
return to Johannesburg this year and 
meet in the very heart of the city,
a venue which in those days was
regarded as forbidden territory 
to the Blacks. (23)
3.2. NAFCOC'S early attempts at negotiation with the 
Government
Although NAFCOC was preoccupied from 1969 with the physical
practicalities of regionalisation and its new constitution,
it was eager to consult immediately with the Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development about legislation 
which affected Black businessmen.
Ill
Consequently, when NAFCOC sent Its reply, about regionalisation, 
to the Minister on 29th August 1969, in the form of a 
Memorandum, it seized the opportunity to re-emphasise 
difficulties which had been submitted in an earlier Memorandum 
in October 1966, which had produced no positive results from 
the Government.
However, the Minister was not prepared to negotiate with 
NAFCOC at that time and instead insisted on the Chamber's 
regionalisation along ethnic lines if it wanted the Government 
to consider its activities.
(2 5 )The main points in the 1969 Memorandum were :
1. Restriction against business expansion due to 
policy
The Chamber, though it understood the policy of one man one 
business in urban African areas to be confined to 'White' 
areas only found that it had been extended to some Homeland 
areas especially in places where the BIC had established 
shopping centres. NAFCOC claimed that this practice 
restricted business expansion in the Homelands. Business 
expansion in urban African areas was also affected by the 
political, and not business, qualification that a particular 
ethnic group should be served only by members of that specific 
ethnic group. It was also pointed out that urban African 
businessmen were not easily permitted to open new businesses 
in the Homelands without closing down their original businesses. 
As Kuper pointed out, in the homelands White traders who
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wej.e long established, demanded tne protection of their
interests 'while Africans exert pressure both against White
traders and the Government, for fulfilment of the promises
(26)of separate development.' Consequently Government
policy tended to fluctuate between offering assurances of 
security to Whites and assuring Africans of their paramount 
interests in the homelands.
Businessmen who had tried to form companies in order to be
able to buy White-owned businesses in the homelands encountered
difficulties from junior officials of the Department of
Bantu Administration and Development. African businessmen
complained that some White-owned businesses were too big
and expensive for an individual African to afford. If
Blacks were discouraged from forming partnerships in the
homelands then Individual Africans would never be able to
(27)
buy Whites out of the homelands.
2. Suggested amendments to the structure and 
operations of the BIC
While the Chamber appreciated the work being done by the 
BIC, it felt that certain changes would make the BIC more 
acceptable to African traders. It was suggested that Blacks 
be appointed as members of the Board of Directors of the 
BIC, failing which a National African Advisory Council on 
Commerce and Industries, comprised of African businessmen, 
should be created. The proposed Council would work in 
collaboration with the Government and the BIC.
i
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The Chamber also recommended that all business sites in 
Homeland African townships should be sold to African businessmen 
instead of being owned by the BIC. In areas where the BIG 
established wholesale stores which did not carry all the 
merchandise requested by traders in the area it should continue 
to allow other wholesalers to compete in competition with 
its operations. Although NAFCOC was of the opinion that, 
preferably, the BIC1S participation should be limited to the 
financing of business transactions.
It was further suggested that shareholding in the BIC be 
opened to Blacks.
3. The status of African businessmen
Referring to its earlier meeting with the Minister, NAFCOC 
contended that, "current legislation does not place the 'Bantu' 
businessman in the position of respectibility that befits his 
high status and responsibilities in his community.
Consequently the Chamber recommended that African businessmen 
be freed from influx control regulations and be allowed to 
establish their own businesses anywhere in the African areas.
To this end they requested exemption from the inconvenient 
and time-consuming practice of having to submit Reference 
books for endorsement each month to the local Labour 
Registration offices in urban African areas.
4. The issue of fire-arms to responsible African 
traders
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This request had been a constant plea of African traders 
for many years. The Chamber reminded the Minister that in 
1966 the matter was discussed at great length and he had 
undertaken to meet the Minister of Justice and then to 
notify the Chamber of their decision. As no communication 
about the matter had been received by the Chamber, from the 
Minister, and because there had been an alarming increase 
in the number of cases of armed robbery where African traders 
were the victims, the Chamber felt compelled to appeal to 
the Minister once more.
^ “ African representatives of Local Chambers to serve 
on Licensing Boards
The Chamber had noted that, when considering the allocation 
of trading sites and licences, certain authorities in the 
Homelands, for example, Hammanskraal, included in the committee 
considering applications, a representative of the local 
African Chamber of Commerce. Therefore, the Chamber 
recommended that this privilege be extended to the Urban areas 
as well.
6 - Development of Industries inside the Homelands
It was pointed out that the Border industries, which had 
been established near the Homelands, could not possibly lead 
to the level of industrial development required in Homeland 
areas. Therefore, the Chamber requested that more emphasis 
be put on the establishment of Industries inside the Homelands.
J
5
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Though NAFCOC, since its inception in 1969, desperately
tried to promote a sound working relationship with the
Central Government, the above Memorandum, together with
further requests for interviews with Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, the
Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, were
totally ignored. Two yea- later tn October 1971, Sam
Motsuenyane NAFCOC'S i t, said he thought that the
Chamber was deliberately ueing ignored because it had not met
Dr. Koornhofs demands that it run its organisation on'tribal'
lines . He added that tne last time members of the Chamber
V r (29)
Executive had met Dr. Koornhof, was two years before.
Nevertheless, undeterred, NAFCOC persisted in trying to use 
the now strongly formed organisation as a mouthpiece for 
negotiation with the Government. In the first five years 
the NAFCOC Executive was pre-occupied with drafting memorandum 
after memorandum to the Government, trying to state the Black 
businessman's case in the urban areas.^ Most of these
presentations were made to the Hon. M.C. Botha, Minister 
of Bantu Administration and Development. No replies were 
forthcoming but NAFCOC persisted. Each year after the 
Chamber's annual conference, NAFCOC prepared yet another 
memorandum to Government in the hope that whatever they did 
as a positive organisation, would, eventually, bring about 
the desired results as far as the Government was concerned.
Apart from the points mentioned in the 1969 Memorandum, 
which were presented yearly through to 1974, NAFCOC stressed 
the following points in the intervening years.
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1. Change of policy regarding urban traders
NAFCOC pointed out the necessity for the Government to 
recognise the permanency of urban Black businessmen. In 
view of the fact that more and more Africans were moving 
into the urban areas, and because the country's economy 
could not do without urban African workers, it was unrealistic 
to expect urban African businessmen to move to the homelands 
where limited opportunities for expansion were available, when 
the natural development of business was in the urban areas. 
Consequently NAFCOC pleaded for businessmen to be allowed to 
own property. The Land Tenure system restricted the 
aspirations of businessmen who were keen to enter estate 
development and property mortgaging.
The lack of security of tenure in the urban areas, together
with restrictions on the size of businesses, companies and
partnerships, capital loans for business expansion, the
provision such as the twenty mile radius required between
any two businesses owned by a licencee or his spouse and
the two mile radius rule in terms of Proclamation 244 of
1934, denied Black people the opportunity of unrestricted
participation in the economy and it was NAFCOC'S fervent
contention that these laws and regulations were not in the
country's interests if it wished to promote a spirit of
(31)harmony and lasting economic stability.
2. Trading by Whites on the outskirts of African 
townships
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NAFCOC was of the opinion that trading by Whites on the 
perimeters of Black townships represented an unfair practice 
which directly militated against the growth and development 
of urban Black business. It requested that these trading 
licences be withdrawn.
3. White Capital in homeland areas
Although NAFCOC supported the establishment of large shopping 
centres in urban homeland townships, because this would in 
effect harness the growing buying power of the homeland 
population, it stressed that White companies should be allowed 
to operate there only if the major controlling interest lay 
with the Black people in those areas.
However, NAFCOC also encouraged the establish'"" t of chain 
stores on a partnership basis between the - .dent Blacks and 
foreign partners.
4. Bantu Investment Corporation
Apart from the continual calls for shareholding and representation 
by Blacks in the BIC, NAFCOC recommended the adoption of a 
sliding scale of interest charges on all loans given to 
Black entrepreneurs by the BIC. NAFCOC1S reasons for this 
suggestion were that invariably, when loans were made, they 
were not based on varying profitability margins of the enter­
prises undertaken. For example, agricultural projects, 
which were normally subject to considerable risks and low 
profit margins, should be charged a lower interest rate.
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5. Discriminatory tax law
The complaints about tax discrimination were voiced yearly.
Althouc NAFCOC accepted that Blacks should pay their fair 
share of tax, they disagreed with the principles of taxation 
underlying the Bantu Tax regulations. Black people became 
taxable at a much lower income level than other race groups.
Furthermore, Africans were not given tax rebates in respect 
of their children. Consequently, NAFCOC requested that the 
existing Bantu Tax Laws be amended to bri ig them in line with 
the prov ons of tax laws which affected other race groups.
6 . Inadequate telephone facilities
In view of the gross inconveniences to which African 
businessmen were subjected, owing to the inadequate telephone 
services at their disposal in all African areas, NAFCOC made 
yearly representations to the Government requesting it to 
do something to alleviate the situation.
7. Compulsory Chamber membership for Black Businessmen
In 1974, NAFCOC, recognising the need for all Black businessmen 
to be involved in the development of a strong Federation of 
Black Chambers of Commerce in South Africa, requested the
Government to authorise compulsory membership of the organisation. *
i
This would, they hoped, bring it in line with a similar ^
system practiced in West Germany.
Consequently NAFCOC recommended that : />-
i
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(a) Both the central and homeland Governments be urged to 
promulgate appropriate regulations requiring every 
licenced Black businessman to become a Chamber member 
in the area in which he is trading.
(b) Chamber membership be a condition for the granting of 
a new licence or the renewal of an existing one.
(c) A Chamber membership receipt be produced to a licensing 
officer before a licence is issued.
(d) As the independence of the Chamber movement and its 
autonomy needed to be safe-guarded at all costs, the 
Chamber should in no way become identified with the 
Government, it must all the same enjoy the full recognition 
of the Government and be used as a source of consultation 
and negotiation with Black businessmen.(32)
There are several possible reasons why the Government did 
not assent to NAFCOC'S request for compulsory membership of 
its Chamber for African businessmen. First, although it was 
true that it would bring it in line with West Germany where 
Chamber membership was compulsory for businessmen, in 
countries like Britain and France membership was not compulsory 
and, since the. South African Chamber of Commerce movement was 
modelled on that of Britain's, compulsory membership of 
NAFCOC only would set it apart from the other White Chamber 
organisations in the country.
Second, compulsory membership of NAFCOC would turn it into a
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much larger, and possibly much more powerful,organisation 
than it was in 1974. With the backing of every Black 
businessman in the country it would have the strength to 
demand and get greater benefits for Black businessmen.
Finally, if the Government acceded to the request it would 
be giving tacit recognition to NAFCOC as the leader of 
African businessmen in South Africa. In 1974 the Government 
was not prepared to grant this recognition. Neither would it 
recommend that the homeland Governments give such recognition.
There were no meetings or direct negotiations between NAFCOC 
and the Government between 1969 and 1975. NAFCOC waited nine 
months for a reply to its 19 7 4 Memorandum only to be informed 
that the Minister responsible had chosen, instead, to discuss 
NAFCOC'S latest Memorandum with the Homeland leaders and had 
decided that there was no need to meet NAFCOC representatives.(33)
Although NAFCOC was happy that the Memorandum had been discussed 
with the Homeland leaders, and even quoted in Parliament by 
the Hon. the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development Mr. T.N.H. Janson, they were displeased at the 
lack of consultation and the length of time for the Minister's 
reply. Consequently, NAFCOC promptly drew .he Minister's 
attention to the fact that the Homeland leaders were not in 
a position to deal with the points in the Memorandum as 
competently as NAFCOC could and requested an immediate 
response from the Minister. Two months later the Minister's 
Secretary replied that they were still investigating the 
Memorandum and another month was required before they could
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give any comprehensive response.
NAFCOC1S pressure produced results, when, on the 1st May, 1975 
the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development announced 
in the Assembly that, the procedure regarding the annual 
renewal of trading licences or permits for African traders in 
African urban residential areas would be changed. It was 
the intention to bring the position of African traders as 
closely as possible in line with the procedure followed in 
the case of White traders, as far as licences were concerned. 
Traders would also be permitted to trade in a larger range of 
commodities, and also to establish more than one business 
on the same premises. Partnerships would also be allowed 
and where traders had already established businesses in a 
Homeland, they would be permitted to retain their existing 
business in the urban residential area. The ownership of 
buildings on leasehold stands for businessmen in African 
residential areas would now be possible again, as was the case
before 1968.^^
It was not until May 1976 that this stated policy was implemented.
After NAFCOC'S Witzleshoek conference in June 1975, NAFCOC, 
as usual, supplied the Minister with a Memorandum containing 
the Resolutions of the Conference. In 1976 the Minister 
favoured NAFCOC with a comprehensive response to its 
memorandum. However, NAFCOC was not satisfied with some of 
the Minister's replies which merely stated that, certain 
requests could not be met as they were in conflict with the 
existing policy'/35) and they pressed for an Interview with
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the Minister.
Although this was not immediately forthcoming, NAFCOC was 
granted an interview on 20th August 1976, with the Deputy 
Minister Mr. W. Cruywagen on an entirely different matter.
The interview was the first since the NAFCOC consultations 
with the then Deputy Minister, Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, in 1968, and 
it represented a major breakthrough for NAFCOC in its attempts 
to negotiate directly with Government officials. The 
delegation conferred with the Minister to discuss a memorandum 
submitted to him following a study conducted by the University 
of South Africa's Bureau of Market Research and the Small 
Business Advisory Bureau of Potchefstroom University.
The memorandum, based on the following reports : problems
of Black businessmen in metropolitan areas; attitudes of 
Black consumers towards Black businessmen in Johannesburg 
and the Black man in the South African economy, was commissioned 
and paid for by NAFCOC, therefore, the Government was compelled 
in this Instance to consult with NAFCOC on the subject.
Despite NAFCOC'S efforts it was a sad reflection on the 
Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development that, only 
after this meeting with the Deputy Minister in 1976 did the 
Department agree to grant NAFCOC recognition, to the extent 
of having an annual meeting with the Deputy Minister to 
discuss the problems affecting Black businessmen in South 
Africa. It was only in August 1978 that NAFCOC was finally 
granted an interview with the Minister himself, Dr. C. Mulder.
It was indeed the lack of effective
communication between government
and Black businessmen which accounted
for many of the wrongs of the past. (37)
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It should be noted that the Government1.? willingness to 
communicate with NAFCOC at this late stage came after NAFCOC 
founded the African Bank and an insurance company and had 
planned the Blackchain retail outlet. It also came after 
the Soweto riots cf 1976.
3.3. Practical Action
3.3,(1) Buy-at-Home Campaign
As indicated in earlier Chapters the newly acquired buying 
power of the African was a source of interest and debate 
among Black businessmen in the late 60s and early 70s.
The desire to capture this African market, which showed 
signs of rapid expansion in the 70s, sparked off NAFCOC'S first 
major campaign - the Buy-at-Home Campaign.
The decision to attempt the campaign was made at the Annual 
conference in Pietermaritzburg in May 1969, when NAFCOC 
was constituted, and hopes ran high that Black united 
action would help to uplift the African business community.
Those members present at the conference realized that unless 
the Black businessmen could begin to Interest themselves in 
the enormous, and much, discussed, 'growing buying power1 
of the African, and how they as traders could benefit from 
it, their whole future as businessmen was at stake. Though 
they knew that they needed to educate their community to 
support them in their own ventures they were careful to
i
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stress that it was only their own ability to 'to compete' 
that would safeguard their future.
Essentially, then, the Buy-at-Home campaign was an effort 
to restore Black money to Black people. The published aims
of the campaign, which in fact were sent to members as early
as February 1969, were:
1. xc encourage Africans to give greater support (patronage)
to their own businessmen and;
2. To demonstrate that the African businessman can give service
to his community.
However, underlying these published alms were further aims.
These were, to enable Black businessmen to get good publicity 
for their shops and businesses and so raise the standard of 
business generally, and further to get publicity for the 
Chambers themselves and increase the membership.
To organise our people for the 
Buy-at-Home campaign, we shall also 
be giving life and meaning to the 
objective for which our Chamber 
stands. (40)
For their part, businessmen were expected to give good service, 
sell goods cheaply and show boundless appreciation of the 
support that their people gave them. They were expected to 
display courtesy over their counters and to play a big 
role in the social services of the people who had supported
them. Each trader was requested to contribute R2 towards the 
running costs of the campaign.
Interestingly, in Zambia in 1970, a 'Buy Zambia' campaign 
was started by the national Indeco group. Companies were 
requested to buy petroleum from Shell, which was partly owned 
by Indeco, and Indeco companies were instructed to advertise 
only in the state-owned Zambian Mail in preference to other 
foreign owned papers. A campaign against using non-Zambian 
made goods on the national airline was started later in the 
same year. It was also eported that printing of magazines 
and brochures should be tackled locally wherever possible. 
Items like clothes, sweets, and paper cups, which were 
available in Zambian-owned concerns, were given special 
mention.
Although this campaign undoubtedly had political overtones 
it, nevertheless, revealed a desire on the • art of the 
Africans involved to keep African money in African hands and 
can be equated with the similar aims of NAFCOC1S Buy-at-Home 
Campaign which operated during that time.
The original date for NAFCOC'S campaign was scheduled for 
29th August to 7th September 1969 . However two things 
delayed the campaign until the end of the year. The first 
was the intimate involvement of a White wholesale company, 
the Afmark Organisation. At a meeting between Afmark and 
the Chamber Executive on 23rd May 1969, the discussion 
centred on plans to ensure the success of the Buy-at-Home 
campaign. Afmark reassured the Chamber that expenses for 
the running of the campaign would be borne by itself. It 
would also pay for two clerks, advertising and the printing 
of hand bills etc.
126
NAFCOC later announced that in order to help traders achieve 
the goal of the campaign, the Executive had contacted certain 
wholesalers, operating nationally, with a view to getting 
them to supply merchandise at rock bottom prices for the 
occasion and that one firm in particular, was prepared to 
spend R7 500 and more on publicity as well as supplying goods 
at low prices to all Chamber members during that week. 
Consequently, at Afmark1s request, the Chamber postponed the 
campaign until 27th November to 13th December and possibly 
until Christmas, in order that they, both Afmark and African 
businessmen, could take ad^mtage of the Christmas period 
when much of the Africans' money was usually spent outside 
their own areas.
The second factor which delayed the campaign, was that the 
Chamber, and Afmark, needed time to organise the campaign 
more intensively throughout the country. A confidential 
price list of 'rock bottom' prices from Afmark was sent to 
local Chambers for distribution to all traders in their areas 
on 9th September 1969 . (42) They were requested to decide on 
their orders as soon as possible and send them to the Afmark 
offices so as to give t h e m  enough time to work on the orders. 
All orders were to be sent to the traders concerned in early 
November. The orders were for cash but bulk orders could be 
made through the Chambers.
It was not until July 1972 that African Business Magazine,
NAFCOC1S Voice, reporting on the on-going campaign indicated
(4 "M *
that Afmark was 'assisting' -J the Buy-at-Home Campaign.
* An obvious reason for this was that the magazine only 
commenced publishing a month earlier in June 19 72
Afmark's reasons,as stated in African Business, for assisting
were that they realised the unfairness to African retailers 
who were in need of technical advice and assistance. Too 
many distributors provided only 'hardsell' service which 
created confusion and the African overbought or wrongly 
bought goods. With the growing competition from chain stores 
and supermarkets it was necessary to help the African retailer 
to develop and expand his business knowledge and so his 
profits, rather than just sell as much as possible to him. 
Afmark stated that it assisted in merchandising, promotions 
and display and modern business techniques thereby generating 
an ever increasing flow of '.sumers to the dealer.
It was not possible to obtain a more personal view of Afmark1s 
reasons for involvement in NAFCOC'S Buy-at-Home Campaign 
because, in the late 70s some of the officials involved were 
no longer part of the new company, Metro Cash and Carry, which 
took over Afmark's business. Although there was undoubtedly 
good personal co-operation between Afmark's directors and 
NAFCOC officials and, consequently, there was probably a desire 
on the part of Afmark's directors to help NAFCOC members, the 
fact that other wholesale companies were not drawn into the 
campaign at the early stages leads one to the conclusion that 
Afmark's main interest was profit. This does not necessarily 
mean profit from the campaign itself but profit in the long 
run, which it hoped to gain from its involvement and publicity 
amongst African businessmen as an efficient and low priced 
wholesaler.
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Nevertheless, in 1969, with its intimate involvement in 
the campaign, in the form of financial assistance, publicity 
and offers of low wholesale prices and early deliveries, Afmark 
did steal a march on its competitors who loudly voiced their 
scepticism once the campaign had started.
Possibly, Lionel Katz, Managing Director of Metro Cash and 
Carry, best summed up Afmark's attit Je, when in 19 79 he 
admitted that Metro's success was : uilt out of philanthropy.
•My fight is for the small trader - but I make a living out
of it too.'(44)
The plan of action of the campaign was left to local Chambers
who were expected to organise public meetings so that air
businessmen in the area could be contacted and involved in
tne campaign. During the campaign all African traders,
throughout the Republic, would be urged to lower their prices.
The local Chambers were 1 to make the biggest noise ever1 in
their respective areas. Loudspeakers were co blare through
the towns and villages so that the Chamber's message could be
carried to the people. It was suggested that there should be
as many meetings, functions and pageants with floats, as 
(4 5 )
possible.
The campaign was launched in Soweto on the appointed date. A 
large procession drew thousands of people who followed it 
through the streets. They came by all manner of transport from 
horse-drawn carts to motorcars. This gala day ended with a 
cabaret in the evening. The hoped for results were to be reaped 
later. Over one thousand people were entertained in the
129
evening at Hammanskraal and, in Lichtenburg, a multi-racial 
beauty contest was held with a number of top officials 
attending.
A businessman reported from Kwa Thema near Springs on the
East Rand that the shops in Kwa Thema were set out in a block
system which allowed each shopkeeper about 1 000 customers
though some only got as little as a quarter of this amount.
He stated that, in an attempt to improve his business, he
invested R800 in advertising and necessary equipment. He
emphasised reduced prices for meat. Within six month he had
his money back with a greatly increased profit. Regular
customers doubled and he had to increase his staff. This
(47 i
coincided with the campaign.
To lend support to this Kwa Thema claim of a successful campaign 
the vice President of the local Chamber reported that 
it was unfortunate that the White-owned newspapers that were 
circulating in our townships did not support our campaign. 
However, he added that the exception was the Springs African 
Reporter, which boosted the campaign to such an extent that 
it contributed magnificently to the increased turnover enjoyed 
by the Kwa Thema traders.
'The success led to the decision to sell permanently at reduced 
prices.'
The Rand Daily Mail reported success in some areas, particularly 
the East Rand, where it stated that some shopkeepers had had
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to employ additional staff to cope with the large flow of
customers. In Natal, it reported that Mr. P.O. Gumede,
Vice President of the Chamber, had said that they were competing
favourably with chain stores in the towns. He added that some
White residents, discovering that they were selling some items
at much lower prices than chain stores, were sending their
(51)African servants to buy from them.
These reports of slashed prices in the shops caused many 
non-members of the Chamber to come forward and join so that 
they could be helped to sell at reduced prices and so join in 
the bonanza.
After this initial burst of enthusiasm and success, the Chamber 
Executive visited many areas during the year to keep the 
momentum of the campaign going, fox it had been decided that 
where possible it was to be an on-going project.
The Inyanda Chamber reported that the campaign had gone well 
in Madadeni, Umlazi and Kwa Mashu. In these areas they had 
stressed the need to place orders together (with the resultant 
big discounts) since they believed that these benefits would 
condition them for future schemes that would need to be done
(5 2 }together. They resolved to continue it as u. long-term project. '
However the Executive was disappointed to find that very little 
was being done by other Chambers, to continue this campaign.
In the Transvaal the Chamber was pre-occupied with the formation 
of its regional and branch Chambers and in the Cape and the
M
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Orange Free State very little had been done in the way of
(53)
organisation.
By January 1971, The Star headline ran 1 Buy Black Campaign 
Dismissed. 1 it reported that so many factors militated
against Africans altering their shopping habits in order to 
buy only from African businessmen that they expected the 
campaign to have little success.
Other Whites were also sceptical about the campaign, clearly 
stating their views about its expected failure.
Mr. H.J. Van Der Merwe of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce
had this to say about the campaign,
Much as I sympathise with Bantu 
traders, I do not think such a 
campaign can be successful. (55)
Stressing that 1 Bantu1 traders problems were not based simply
"" ‘ Bantu1 buying in White areas, he said,
Their problems are not going to 
be solved by asking them to buy 
only in non-White areas. (56)
His reasons for his pessimistic view of the campaign were:
1. Disparity in prices between the township stores and 
especially the discount chain stores in White areas.
2. Convenience for African shopping in White areas where they 
worked.
3. The fact that shopping areas in the townships were not —
always conveniently situated. 1
4. Severe limitations placed on the expansion of African-owned 
stores in urban areas. |
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5. The Buy Black Campaign was impractical.
6 . It was also to the detriment of the non-White consumer
(57)whose best interests would not be served by it.
He added that business did not work on racial lines and the 
campaign appeared lo be trying to introduce a factor into 
trading 'which we have always tried to avoid. 1 He
further pointed out that the Chamber (the White) had worked 
to prevent legiilation precluding non-Whites from buying in 
White shops.
The Managing Director of OK Bazaars, a country wide chain of
stores, Stanley Cohen, described the campaign as a 'non- 
(59)starter1 with no hope of success. It was something that
need not worry White businessmen.
I think Africans get the best deal 
from White traders, who buy in bulk. 
Their prices cannot be matched in the 
townships. African customers are ,,Q . 
treated the same as anyone else. *
3.3.(11) Bulk-buying
With this talk of bulk buying, Mr. Cohen had hit the nail on 
the head. That the African businessmen were perfectly aware 
of this White 1 goldmine1 was shown by Sam Motsuenyane in his 
Presidential Address at the Annual Chamber conference in 1969 
when he said,
There was a general belief and hope 
that bulk-buying, properly organised 
and supported, would render the African 
businessman victor in the big war for 
customers which goes on constantly 
between the small traders of Soweto 
and the big.business tycoon down Eloff 
Street. ( x;
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Again in 1Q 1, when the campaign started to fizzle out, the 
Chamber E ■ cutive not cnlv emphasised that ic must be a 
commitment for all time so that it became 'a National 
Economic Ideology of our people' but that they should
also be in a position to obtain their merchandise at low 
prices by uniting for the purposes of bulk-buying. Failure 
to unite, even on a small scale was a weakness that would 
cripple the campaign.
For the following two years the project was left in the hands 
of regional and local Chambers. The result was that only a 
few of their very active branches, Huhudi, Batlharo-Thlaping 
and Inyanda were engaged in schemes to attract support from 
their local people.
The Inyanda scheme, called 'Mazidle 1khaya1 was quite an 
extensive bulk-buying scheme encompassing traders throughout 
Natal and Zululand. The Chamber Executive resolved to watch 
this development with keen interest in the hope that it would 
be successful, to such an extent that it could become their 
showpiece for future large-scale bulk-buying undertakings,
The important fact was that it was entirely in the hands of 
their own members with no other party involved as a middleman.
The Huhudi branch Chamber of BOCOC, had, to a large
extent, appliod the campaign as well as bulk-buying with a u
fair amount of success
In Batlharo-Thlaping, also a branch of BOCOC, apart from •:$
•I
some individual attempts to practice bulk-buying in soap, ||
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sweets and sugar, the Chamber itself decided to buy sugar in
bulk. This project proved very successful, in order to
encourage a competitive spirit, the area was divided into
four zones, with a bulk-buying committee headed by Mr. Ditrebe.
In March 1973, they were in need of a warehouse to store their
bulk b u y s . i n  a similar position the Taung branch
built itself a warehouse to serve all businesses in the area.
It was built by one member on his own initiative.(66) However,
the Chamber reported in June 1975, that though the bulk-buying
syndicate revealed a healthy balance, they needed another
warehouse because goods stored in the original warehouse had 
been spoiled by rain. ^
The Bophuthatswana Region of NAFCOC reported, in June 1974,
that among the branches of Hammansk.-al, Vryburg, Taung and
Kuruman, bu.k-buylng was progressing fairly. Since 1973 one
branch, which started with R1000, had increased this to 
Rl 535. (68)
As early as January 1972, the Chamber Executive had drawn up 
a detailed report on the feasibility of a national bulk-buying 
scheme for its members.'69) Details of the report revealed 
that it would be an immense task with many problems to be
solved if it was ever to get off the ground. Among the prlncip
points raised were:
1. Would the introduction of the scheme have the desired effec 
of increasing the share of the market accruing to African 
traders, or was this perhaps one of the problems, so
that solving it would not make any difference to the overal
problem?
Since the establishment of a wholesale distribution 
organisation may not be in strict accordance with 
policy, the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development needed to be consulted, at an early stage, for 
permission to proceed. Should the BIG be approached?
Apart from anything else, it was thought that the BIG might 
have useful information as to how a wholesale distribution 
system worked in the Homelands, e.g. the Vendaland 
Trading Company.
Could they learn anything from Spar's operation?
Similarly they might learn lessons from their previous 
experiment with S.A. Bulk Buyers.
On 24th April 1964 , when NACOC was born,one of the uniting 
themes had been bulk-buying. At that time S.A. Bulk 
Buyers, a White Company, was employed by NACOC on a ten 
year contract to organise bulk-buying facilities for 
African traders. However, the White wholesalers insisted 
that African traders settle their debts with them before 
joining the new scheme. Blacks responded by saying that 
White wholesalers had been exploiting them by dumping 
goods on them, where they were forced to buy them since 
they still owed for previous orders. A year later, in 
June 1965, NACOC severed relations with S.A. Bulk Buyers 
in order to undertake bulk-buying for its own members.
Again, this scheme failed since it was thwarted by White 
wholesalers who exerted pressure on manufacturers in order
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to stop them dealing directly with African traders.
Evidence was shown that one tobacco company was known
to have complied with these demands.
4. There was little clarity as to any definite ideas about
how the scheme would operate on such a large scale.
(a) If it was to be a strictly cash-and-carry scheme then
enquiries would have to be made as to whether the
large majority of traders had their own transport.
Additionally, would one depot in a central position, 
suffice for the whole of the Reef?
(b) If it was to be a non-profit organisation, would there
be any difficulties in securing credit, since there 
would be little or no security to be offered?
Should wholesalers be involved in the scheme? Their 
involvement appeared essential in practice since many 
large manufacturing concerns were also wholesale 
distributors, handling a range of imported lines as 
well as their own manufactured goods.
If African traders were to be put in as competitive a 
position as possible there needed to be a wide range 
of suppliers participating so that a comprehensive 
range of products could be offered to the consumer.
5. Most important of all detailed calculations were required 
on the economics of such a scheme - the capital
required and the size of the establishment, assuming that 
the aim was to supply at least forty per cent of the 
requirements of African traders. The total value of stocks 
required for a two week turnover as well as depot expenses 
would also have to be calculated. For this, it was 
necessary to know whether manufacturers could give an 
indication of their prices before any commitment could 
be entered into.
The Chamber went no further than to ask t* t s.- questions about 
a national bulk-buying scheme, preferring ,nstead to allow the 
local chambers to start bulk-buying in a small way. They 
had learnt their lesson in 1964 and were not yet ready to 
attempt the scheme again.
By 1974, the Chamber admitted that the campaign was over, 
that it was no longer a national commitment and that it had 
failed because it was started too ambitiously and without
(71)
funds and expertise to back it.
Another important factor was that during the time of the launch
of the campaign, in 1969 , until 1972, the Chamber was without
any form of publication with which to put its ideas across and
rally the African businessmen. David Pooe, President of the
Kwa Thema branch mooted the idea of reviving their old
publication,'The African Trader', in 1970 so that they could
provide lists of prices for traders, but the suggestion came 
(1 2 )
to nothing.
From this failure the Chamber learnt a great lesson in that,
their approach to bulk-buying in any form, big or small, would 
be more practical, would acquire c.pi.al and expertise and 
would be organised efficients. .
Added to this, by 1974, the Chamber had already thought about 
establishing it' own Black chain stores with a wholesale 
distribution outlet for its members. In August 1974, Mr.
B.R. Dalberg of Unilever, pointed out that manufacturers 
would become more dependent on the endorsement and approval 
of the Black businessman for promoting their products.
For many years the Black trader had been involved in a battle 
for survival with large White organisations who used 
sophisticated marketing techniques and their capital resources 
to attract Black consumers. The changing situation in the 
African market, whereby African Businessmen acquired the 
skills of cost control and stock evaluation, would soon result 
in businessmen negotiating directly with manufacturers for 
the type and quality of goods they desired. Dalberg, of Unilever, 
felt that African businessmen were fast approaching this position 
and that it would have a more general and more immediate effect 
on negotiations with manufacturers, than the large Black owned 
Chain stores of the future with their capacity for bulk buying.
Black identity would bind traders 
together into an effective force for 
negotiating with manufacturers.
This would probably happen before 
capital was 'dated in
Black chain
NAFCOC'S initiatives in its first five years of operation 
reflected a mixture of successes and failures. Its regionalisation
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and conferences were successful but attempts at negotiation 
with the Government and the Buy At Home and bulk buying 
campaigns were ineffective. However, these did indicate 
that NAFCOC was an active organisation. Through these 
diverse activities it was able to gain a certain amount cf 
recognition, particularly from White business, as a viable 
and potentially useful Black businessmens organisation 
despite the fact that the Government was not yet prepared 
to negotiate with it. Inspired by this recognition of its 
/osit ion, NAFCOC announced a Five Year Plan in 1975 which 
designed to establish a more efficient and effective 
organisation. NAFCOC1S aim was to attain Government 
recognition so that it could communicate directly with 
the Government in order to change legislation which 
hindered African business development.
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CHAPTER 4
NAFCOC'S FIVE YEAR PLAN
This Chapter deals with NAFCOC'S Five Year Plan which was 
introduced in 1975. The reasons for the plan are outlined.
The details of the Plan, together with the implementation of 
its various facets, showing its strengths and weaknesses, 
are analysed at length. The development of NAFCOC, stimulated 
by the various projects in the Plan, is highlighted and the 
importance of NAFCOC'S Increased contact with White business 
is emphasised.
One section of the Plan provided for national projects. 
Although the African Bank was the culmination of many years 
of effort by NAFCOC it was founded during  the first year 
of the Plan in 1975. As it was the most significant of the 
national projects and provided a stimulus for all future 
successful initiatives it has been analysed in this Chapter. 
National projects, such as the Masekela-Mavimbela Scholarship 
Fund, the S.A. Permanent Life Assurance Company and African 
Business Publications formed an integral p a r t  of other facets 
of the Plan and are also dealt with in this Chapter. Details 
of other NAFCOC projects have required lengthy explanation 
and have been itemised separately in following Chapters.
The reasons for NAFCOC'S introduction of a Five Year Plan 
in 1975 were plain. Although it had achieved a certain 
status and it had reglonalised the organisation and held 
successful Conferences, it found th: it was still not in
a strong enough position to advance the interests of Black
business to any great degree.
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It was obvious that Government felt this way too since it
still refused to have any real communication with NAFCOC
except through consultations with its various Bantu Administration
Boards and the Bantu Investment Corporation, which were
usually ineffectual.
Although NAFCOC put out feelers to ASSOCOM and the Afrikaanse 
Handelsinstituut their response too was largely superficial.
The White Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, affiliated to 
ASSOCOM had, as part of its organisation, an African Affairs 
Department but the work of this group dealt largely with 
labour relations, trade unions and education and social 
amenities for Africans rather than directly involving itself 
in any support for African business. At other times ASSOCOM 
went ahead and negotiated on matters relating to Black business 
without even consulting NAFCOC. After ASSOCOM1S 1975 Congress in 
Margate, NAFCOC1S President pointed out the irregularity of the 
White Chamber deciding on matters affecting Blacks without 
consulting them. They felt that more communication was needed
After this dispute ASSOCOM requested the co-option of a 
delegate onto NAFCOC'S National Executive. However, this was 
accompanied by a request for NAFCOC to join an ASSOCOM Sub­
committee to fight against 'Creeping Socialism.’ NAFCOC 
declined the invitation. ^
Nevertheless, NAFCOC, when it received a reply from the Minister 
of Bantu Administration and Development refusing its request 
to be allowed to serve on licensing and Administration Boards, 
resolved to enlist ASSOCOM'S aid. ASSOCOI 'S reply was that
i
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it was not responsible for the present situation, and that 
NAFCOC should reconsider taking part in the discussion on 
the free enterprise system which ASSOCOM was keen to sponsor. 
Caught between two thorns, NAFCOC reviewed its decision and 
rescinded its original refusal,reasoning that it stood a 
bettei chance of fighting from within than from outside. 
Consequently, two members were nominated to co-operate with 
ASSOCOM and attend the 11th May 1976 meeting. ^  *
A further decision was made to approach the Afrikaanse 
Handelsinstituut for better co-operation. A useful meeting 
and contact had been made in December 1974 but nothing 
constructive had come of the meeting.
In an effort to forge links with Homeland Governments in 
rural areas, NAFCOC had foir. ulated a policy and approach, for 
giving advice to Homeland Governments, by setting up a 
Research Committee in 1975. Most Homeland Governments, with 
the exception of KwaZulu and Gazankulu, were not even buying 
shares in the African Bank and, much to NAFCOC1S dismay, 
Transkei, with its impending independence, was actively 
supporting the establishment of ties with Volkskas Bank. 
Therefore, it became Imperative that NAFCOC strengthen Itself 
in order to negotiate on the same level as these groups.
As late as 1977, ASSOCOM published a booklet, 
about the Association of Chambers of Commerce and the 
Chamber of Commerce Movement in South Africa, for its 
seventy fifth Annual Congress at East London, and 
failed to even mention the existence of NAFCOC or 
the Black Chamber of Commerce Movement in South Africa.
The reasons why NAFCOC had not been in a position to do just 
that before 1975 become apparent when details of the Five-Year- 
Plan are studied since they indicate clearly the weak areas 
of NAFCOC up to that stage.
4. (i) Permanent Secretariat
Until 1975, NAFCOC did not have a permanent paid Secretariat 
like its counterpart ASSOCOM. It had had to rely on volunteers 
in the form of members of its National Executive as well as 
members of Regional Committees throughout the Republic.
However it did pay an honorarium to its President, only raised
to R400 ,00 per month in September 1974 , as well as a car .(4)
Nevertheless these emoluments barely covered the President's 
expenses let alone payment for the time ha spent on the 
Chamber's work. His duties involved travelling the length 
and breadth of the country to attend meetings, a great deal 
of time spent on drawing up Memoranda and speeches for the 
various functions he was expected to attend, time spent outside 
the country on Chamber business as well as the day to day
running of the National Chamber offices.
In addition the Chamber, at its small offices, employed two 
part time clerks to attend to the Chamber's affairs.
After eleven years NAFCOC had reached a stage of development
where its activities could no longer be efficiently managed by
a few officials on a part time basis. There existed an urgent
need for the Association to be reorganised, in such a manner
that a permanent Secretariat could be created, with a full 
time staff.
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The financial report of NAFCOC for the year ending July 1974
(5)
showed a balance of Rll 19 5 ,75 which was totally inadequate to 
contemplate employing any full-time staff.
Therefore, it was evident that the successful function of 
the Secretariat needed support from outside.
On 6th September 1974, the Rembrandt Group invited NAFCOC1S 
Executive to a dinner at the President Hotel in Johannesburg, 
where the Company announced that it would be donating R5,000 
per annum towards establishing a permanent Secretariat for 
NAFCOC.^  This donation resulted from personal negotiations 
between Sam Motsuenyane and Rembrandts 1s directors and can be 
viewed as a recognition, on the part of Rembrandt's directors, 
of NAFCOC'S new status as an affiliated member of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and prime mover in the 
inauguration of the African Bank.
In order to be in a position to present a realistic picture 
especially to those organisations from whom further assistance 
would be sought, a budget covering the period September 1974 
to September 1975 was prepared by NAFCOC, with professional 
help given by the Rembrandt organisation. Consequently, a 
well motivated appeal for financial assis'ance was directed 
to more than one hundred large and small firms in the 
Republic. The response to this initial appeal was most 
encouraging resulting in a constant flow of other donations 
from White companies during the following six months. ^
These donations contributed towards ninety per cent of 
NAFCOC1S funds at that time and enabled NAFCOC to acquire
M
ISO
new offices in the new shopping centre, BIG premises, at
Ga-Rankuwa in August 1975, in addition to the four temporary
offices that were occupied at the beginning of 1975. The
donations comprised R5 000per annum from Metro Cash and Carry;
R200 per annum for three years from Toyota; R50 from Superior
Rocks and Gems; R20 from the National Cash Register Company;
R2 000 from General Motors as well as a further RIO 000 from
Toyota. Nor n Abrasives contributed tov. -• the President's 
•')
honorarium.
NAFCOC employed a full-time Administrative Secretary and a 
National Organiser, both of whom operated under the President's 
supervision. These new members of NAFCOC'6 staff, B. Khumalo 
and E. Mahlo, spent four months in Paris at the end of 1975, 
studying the administration of Chambers of Commerce under 
the sponsorship of the Paris Chamber of Commerce. A secretary 
was also employed and two cars were purchased to aid Chamber 
members in their work.
NAFCOC was managed by an executive on which the ten regions 
were represented.
The National Executive
1. Representatives nominated by each region.
2. Office Bearers - elected by the Annual Conference from 
the names under 1 .
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Regional Executive
The Regional Executive was nominated by the different branches. 
These nominees were ratified by the Regional Annual Conferences. 
The Office Bearers were elected by the Annual Regional 
Conference from the names cn the Executive.
Branch Executive
The Branch Executive was elected annually at a Branch meeting.
In 1975 the Execui ve consisted of :
S.M. MOTSUENYANE 
P.G.GUMEDE
S.J.J. LESOLANG
C.D.M. ROBOTl'O
S.M. ZUMA 
J.T. OLIPHANT
D.W.S. KAMBULA
H. BUBU
MRS. 0. NHLUMAYO
D.J. POOE 
REV. I .L . SHEMBE
A.R.T. KUMALO 
K.T. MASEMOLA 
J.H. KHAAS 
J.C. MOLOISI 
L.G. MAKLEIN
H.M. PITJE
E. GOBODO
President 
Vice President 
Treasurer 
Secretary
& ^
I  1
J
s
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The regions represented were as follows:
1. Inyanda, representing Natal and Zululand
2. Lebowa
3. Bophuthatswana
4. Orange Free State
5. Southern Transvaal
6. Transkei
7. Inqaba, representing Ciskei
8. Eastern Cape, representing the area from Grahamstown to
Humansdorp
9. Western Province
10.North Eastern Cape
At the next level were the regional committees and finally
the different local branches numbering about 200.
NAFCOC1S Constitution set out its objectives as:
(i) To promote a spirit of co-operation and unity among 
Black businessmen in South Africa
(ii) To mobilise the African community towards self-help 
and full participation in the economy of South Africa
(ill) To further the development of the Black business
community by sponsoring needed industrial and commercial 
projects; collating and disseminating information on 
business matters; creating scholarships for commercial 
training, and organising special training courses and
seminars for businessmen.
(iv) To protect the rights and interests of Black South
Africans in business by proposing any measures which
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directly or indirectly further the!ir progress.
The work of NAFCOC'S new Secretariat was geared towards 
ensuring that the above objeotives of the Chamber were well 
publicised and that they were effectively carried out. it 
was the Administrative Secretary's task, as chief Executive 
of the Organisation, to be in overall charge of the activities 
of the Chamber, thus leaving the President free to embark on
ernment and quasi-Govern^.ent contacts etc. The Administrativ 
Secretary controlled both the office and field staff; ensured 
that proper records of the proceedings of the Executive, 
including Conferences, were kept; ensured that proper books 
of accounts were kept, including the setting up and administratio, 
of budgets; ensured that the finances of the organisation 
were erflciently and profitably managed and in particular to 
eupply regular information in this connection to the Executive 
Committee as well as information relating to the organisation 
»  «  to enable them to arrive at decisions. He was also the 
co-ordinator between the various Chambers and maintained 
tact with other Institutions and Government Departments.
African Businessmen were increasingly looking to NAFCOC to 
cater for their particular interests. Therefore it was important 
that NAFCOC was sufficiently organised to cater adequately
otherwise the tendency might be for businessmen to start new
organisations.
During the following four years the Secretariat bought two 
more cars in order to strengthen its field services and it 
was paying salaries of R 1 000 per month to its staff.(9)
Although a great deal in the way of organisation was achieved 
this did not lead to the hoped for increased membership of 
NAFCOC. Additional field officer posts were created in 1978 
to get more Information from the Regions. The Regions in 
general were notoriously bad at sending in the then stipulated 
quarterly reports and it had become impossible for the 
National office to plan its activities 'in the dark.'
By August 1977, the offices at Ga-Rankuwa had become too 
cramped to cope with the volume of work and new offices were 
sought in Pretoria. Unfortunately, the President had fallen 
out with Chief Lucas Mangope,in whose territory Ga-Rankuwa 
lay,over the suggestion from Chief Mangope that BOCOC should 
cecede from NAFCOC. The President was also forced to move 
from his farm in Bophuthatswana, at Noodgedicht. Therefore, 
it was thought best for NAFCOC to move its offices to avoid 
further conflict. Office accomodation was available at Mutual 
Centre in Pretoria but not only was the suggested rent too high, 
R4,25 per square metre, an exemption permit from the Group 
Areas Act would also be required for any move to Pretoria.
No move was made because six months later, with a R5000 donation 
from Anglo American, NAFCOC opened an Education office in 
Johannesburg.^0  ^ This was at the African Bank's premises, 
where the Group Areas Act was seemingly overcome. It was 
decided to use the Johannesburg office as extra temporary offices 
for NAFCOC.
The last aspect of NAFCOC'S re-organisation was its specialized 
and Ad-hoc committees. These committees did not represent 
any sectoral interest. They were appointed by the National
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Executive to investigate certain matters or to fulfil 
certain functions. An example of a Commit fee to investigate 
a certain matter was the Committee that investigated the 
feasibility of establishing a supermarket chain. This was 
formed in 1975 and ceased to exist when its recommendation 
to the Executive was accepted and implementr .. An example of 
a Committee for performing a certain function was the Education 
Committee formed in 1976. This Committee continues to exist 
and renders an education and training service for members.
Although the National Executive appointed these Committees 
they were normally given power to co-opt members, who had 
specialist knowledge, to serve on them.
Other Committees set up by NAFCOC after 1975 included a 
Research Committee to report on agricultural and industrial 
projects; an Ad-hoc committee to investigate economic 
development in Black areas; a sub-committee to investigate 
differentiated membership fees; three sub-committees investigating 
industrialisation, legal restrictions and the problems of 
raising capit .1 in the Black urban community? and a Captial 
raising committee. This last was intended to channel foreign 
funds so as to reach deserving Black entrepreneurs.
4 . (ii) Membership
The actual membership of NAFCOC has been a constant problem 
and source of difficulty to the National Executive since the 
organisation was formed. Membership figures were supposed to 
be sent from the Regions in their Annual Reports. However many 
Regions either sent no report or reports which made no mention
_  i
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of membership. There vre four possible reasons for this lack. 
The first was the natural element of competition which 
existed between the regions. They were not keen to reveal 
their true membership in case it was lower than that of other 
regions and they would not appear to be running their regions 
efficiently. The second was that some regions were not honest 
in the amount of membership fees that they had collected, and 
which were to be forwarded to the National office, preferring, 
instead, to keep back some of the funds in order to finance 
their regional and branch activities better than the other 
regions. The third was that many members who attended meetings 
paid no subscriptions, often because they could not afford 
it, or paid part of their subscription only. The last arose 
from a mixture of mismanagement in the branch offices, where 
figures were improperly kept, and lack of volunteers to do 
the practical job of collecting subscriptions and forwarding 
the relevant information to the National office.
That NAFCCC'S actual membership was far greater than its paid 
up membership was borne out by large numbers of members who 
attended Annual Conferences of tne National Chamber and Regional 
Chambers. Approximately 400 delegates attended the seventh 
conference at Mamelodi in 1971,(11) whereas close on 800 
delegates attended the tenth conference at Umtata in 1974.
As indicated earlier, in June 1974, NAFCOC sent a Memorandum 
to Government requesting that membership of NAFCOC be made 
compulsory for all African businessmen but this was not 
accepted. In 1975 the Five-Year-Plan envisaged the increasing 
of membership from 4 000 to 16 000 during the following five
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years. The Presidential policy statement published in June
1976 stated that, 'All our Chambers with few exceptions
have registered more members during the year.' (14) However,
the National Executive Minutes for August 1976 reveal that
the President was, only three months later, emphasizing the
need for intensified membership campaigns in all regions
because, from the figures obtained at the last Conference, it
was evident that numbers had diminished overall, rather than 
(15)
increased. The Minutes of 15th March 1977 showed that
there had been a significant decline from 1 951 in 1975, to 
1730 in 1976. These figures gave cause for great concern 
amongst the Executive. Consequently they resolved to 
reverse the trend during 19 77..
A possible reason for these low figures was that they 
were collected during the first six months of the riots 
in South Africa which occurred in 1976. Poor collection 
and poor attendance at meetings were not conducive to 
obtaining actual or paid up membership at that time.
Early in 1977, Lebowa reported a slight increase in 
membership and the Eastern Transvaal reported an increase 
from fifty four to 104 since 1976. Vaal Triangle rose
from fifty to 100 while Standerton stood at twenty five.
These last two areas were in the Southern Transvaal Region 
(hereinafter SOUTACOC) whose reported membership was 334, 
'which does not or course represent actual membership.' (16)
SOUTACOC was the fastest growing region. In 19 7 6 it 
was awarded the President's Shield for the best attended
and most organised region, and, in 1977 it was
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awarded the Reckitt and Colman prize for the fastest growing 
(17)region. However, its growth potential was in fact much
higher than all other Chambers put together. This region
consisted of the major growth areas of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand
and Vaal Triangle complex as well as areas like Standerton,
Middleburg, Ermelc, Bethal and Wiibank. In Sower.o alone with
its approximately 2 000traders, JACOC had claimed membership
(18)of 300 in May 1975. Therefore it would seem reasonable
to agree with SOUTACOC remarks in May 19 77 that the reported 
membership of 334 for the whole region did not represent 
actual membership.
The Western Province by contrast reported a lower membership 
in May 1977, citing the riots as a reason for the decline. The 
regions were then urged to try to recruit professional men, 
doctors and lawyers, into the organisation in an effort to 
swell the numbers.^19  ^ The implications of this move were 
that NAFCOC, essentially comprised of middle class African 
businessmen, was attempting to unite with the professional 
sector of the African middle class. Thus it would strengthen 
its ranks and ga.1n the active participation of that sector in 
its struggle for change. At the same time NAFCOC would hope 
to assume leadership of these middle class groups.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that NAFCOC was 
successful in this direction, the move might have posed 
serious problems for NAFCOC. While the Government's policies 
had attempted to retard the emergence of an African middle class, 
that middle class, because it suffered the same restrictions 
as other Africans, identified its straggle with that of all
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Africans. Consequently, if NAFCOC aspired to lead, by 
acting as the negotiating body between the Government and the 
African people, would it have been able to exert enough pressure 
and, at the same time, retain its moderate position? If 
the Government continued to exclude Africans from full 
participation in the economic activities of the country and from 
political participation then NAFCOC might have been compelled 
to change its stance and provide a more radical type of 
leadership in order to satisfy the masses and retain its 
power.
In August 1977, a new organiser was employed by NAFCOC'S
Executive at head office to try to do something about increasing 
the membership.
Dr. A. Makunyane, President of the Lebowa Chamber, gave several 
reasons for Lebowa's fluctuating m e m b e r s h i p . D u r i n g  1977 
the Lebowa Chamber experienced leadership problems resulting 
in personal disputes and lack of interest by certain Executive 
members and a general lack of management control. In addition, 
the Chamber's financial reports were delayed because of the 
claimed fraudulent involvement of a certain Mr. Cooper in
its affairs. Consequently a new Executive was elected 
in March 1978.
The geographical position of the branches often meant that 
members were forced to travel long distances to attend meetings. 
Therefore, it was decided that some of the branches would be 
sub-divided to make them more accessible to members. The 
overall effect of these difficulties was a lack of communication.
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There was an over expectation on the part of members about 
the role the Chamber should play in their activities and 
impatience about the Chamber's achievement of results.
Members had long been keen to develop a milling company in 
Lebowa and they wanted closer liaison with the Lebowa 
Development Corporation. The old Executive had done little 
to promote these activities. Consequently, the new Executive 
immediately formed committees to deal with these proposals.
In order to improve the overall membership situation the 
NAFCOC Executive proposed that members of a financial committee 
should be given the task of getting the membership figures and 
subscriptions from the Regions. A circular was sent to all 
Regions reminding them of the importance of submitting written
reports.
The following list, which indicated membership of the Southern
f 21)
Transvaal Chamber of Commerce (SOUTACOC) for 1979, 
demonstrates what NAFCOC was up against in trying to attain 
clear details about its members and their subscriptions.
Atteridgeville 13 paid up 45 unpaid
Daveyton 33 paid up 47 unpaid
JACOC 15 paid up?
Krugersdorp 22 paid up 13 unpaid
Kwa Thema 48 paid up?
Katlehong 15 paid up?
Mamelodi 30 paid up 55 unpaid
Soweto 100 paid up?
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Standerton 20 paid up?
Tembisa 64 paid up?
Tokoza 15 paid up 10 unpaid
Vaal Triangle 85 paid up?
Witbank 30 paid up 15 unpaid
Vosloorus 39 paid. up?
Duduza (New) 
Balfour (Absent)
Total 529 185
Whether there was a lack of actual membership or not is hard to
determine but what can be determineu is the amount of money
which NAFCOC was receiving from membership fees. For the year
ending 28th February 19 75, the affiliation, subscription and
12 2 )membership fees received wereR2 814,00, an amount which
was far too small to pay the expenses of running the Organisation. 
Hence, at the beginning of the Five-Year-Plan, NAFCOC1S funds 
showed a deficit of P.5 504,00 v^ ^
These membership claims compare roughly, though not exactly, 
with claims by other Chambers of Commerce e.g. Lesotho. The 
President and Executive of the Lesotho National Chamber claim 
a membership of 10 000/^ ^  This claim is backed up by the 
fact that they send a monthly circular to an equal number of 
people. However a much smaller number actually pay an annual 
subscription. Only seventy people attended the 1980 Annual 
conference in Maseru. There are only 800 business ventures 
in the main commercial centre of Maseru. Only forty White
i
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members are paid up in the non-racial organisation. These 
latter points would seem to imply that a great many of the 10 000 
are not actually Lesotho businessmen in the entrepreneurial 
sense. The point is that a great deal of the commerce in 
Lesotho falls under quasi-Government leadership. The Lesotho 
National Development Corporation alone handles about 180 
companies. Consequently the Chamber circular is sent to many 
professional management people.
This is not necessarily the case in South Africa since there 
are about 30 000 known African businessmen conducting their 
own businesses. Most of the claimed membership of NAFCOC 
refers to this type of businessman who runs his own business.
NAFCOC'S way out of its membership dilemma was to amend the
Constitution to allow a new category of membership as Associate
Members. In November 1975 it was agreed that since many White
companies, who had dealings with the African market, were keen
to be members (the African Bank was cited as one of them) ,
, (25)
they should be invited to join NAFCOC as associate members.
This decision enabled White company representatives to attend 
and speak at all general meetings and conferences, although
they were not given voting rights.
The response from White companies was immediate and by July
1Q76, these Associate Members stood at forty one.
These were : African Bank of South Africa Ltd.; Norton
company (Pty) Ltd.; Barclays Bank; United Building Society, 
Anglo American Corporation; The Prudential Equity Building
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Society; Afribank Brokers; Glsgivllle Enthoven (S.A.) Ltd,;
S.C. Johnson & Son S.A. (Pty) Ltd.; Standard Bank; Index 
Film and TV Products S.A. (Pty) Ltd.; Maizecor; Barlow 
Rand Ltd.; Thomas Cook (Pty) Ltd.; Greenstein & Rosen (Pty)
Ltd.; Ruto Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd.; Premier Milling Company 
Ltd.; Gerstle & Hochstadter (Pty) Ltd.; Cargo Motor 
Corporation Ltd.; T.W. Beckett & Company Ltd.; Superior 
Rocks and Gems (Pty) Ltd.; United Tobacco Company Ltd.;
B.P. Southern African (Pty) Ltd.; S.A. Associated Newspapers; 
World Printing and Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd.; The Keeble 
Prins Company (Pty) Ltd.; Coca-Cola Export Corporation;
Mobil Cil S.A. (Pty) Ltd.; S.A. Philips (Pty) Ltd.; Legal and 
General Assurance Society Ltd.; Volkskas Ltd.; Homes Trust 
Life Assurance Company; Siemens (Pty) Ltd.; Old Mutual;
Rembrandt Tobacco Manufacturing Corporation; Nordberg 
Manufacturing Company S.A. (Pty) Ltd.; W.L. Tansley & Company 
(Pty) Ltd.; Messrs ICI S.A. Ltd.; Reckitt & Colman (Pty) Ltd.;
S.A. Marine Corporation Ltd.; European Banks International.
In August, General Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd.;
Jacob Frankel Ltd.; S.A. Breweries Ltd.; and African Oxygen Ltd.; 
joined the list.
The reasons for this White company response to NAFCOC'S 
invitation for Associate membership, were several, and some 
comprised a mixture of these reasons. Generally it provided 
better scope for wider co-operation and better communication 
between the Black and the Whj.ce business communities. However, 
many saw it as a chance to participate in the development of 
Black business people. It would be pointless to attempt to
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indicate which companies felt this way because, if they had 
been questioned about their involvement, then most companies 
would probably have claimed this motive. Nevertheless, there 
were certain companies, both large and small, which had 
developed close affiliations with NAFCOC over the years, 
either in the fields of donations, expertise and advice, or 
merely on a personal interest level. Obviously companies 
like the African Bank and the Koeble Prins Publishing Company, 
which had direct connections with NAFCOC, come into this 
category. But companies like Unilever , Barclays Bank,
Anglo American, Rembrandt and B.P. Southern Africa, to mention 
just a few, had been involved in NAFCOC'S activities, and were 
therefore keen to continue their contacts and participation 
in its development. There were others who, until that time, 
had had little to do wi-h NAFCOC but who were directly or 
indirectly economically connected with the African market and 
African businessmen. Companies like wholesalers, banks and 
newspaper groups were in this category.
Finally there was the business strategy for survival and what
z 2 g)
ASSOCOM'S Secretary termed 1 conscience money.1 Undoubtedly,
social responsibility on the part of certain companies was a 
reason for becoming an associated member of NAFCOC. But it 
was also sheer common sense on the part of White
business to become involved in the activities of the Black
business community in South Africa.
It would be a grave act of folly if the 
White private sector in South Africa 
continued to expand without recognising 
its immense responsibility for the 
development of a fully integrated economy 
in which the Blacks would share increasingly 
as partners... I can therefore only view 
the introduction of Associate members in 
our organisation as a process of mutual
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enrichment which in the long run will (29 
yield enormous benefit for South Africa.
Associate membership fees went according to a grading system 
based on the size of the company though it was left quite 
flexible so that members who wished could pay more and were 
encouraged to do so. Membership scale for Associate members 
was as follows:
Turnover R5 000 00C R100
R5 to RIO million R25C
RIO million and over R500
The 1977 financial statement of NAFCOC showed a total income 
of R6 4 511 ,35 as against R56 870,00 for 1976. Of this figure, 
amounts of R19 274,08 were donations from Associate members 
and R22 783, 34 were Associate membership fees,
Therefore, this consociation of Black and White business
proved to be of very considerable benefit to Black entrepreneur
ship not only in its improvement of communication but also'in
its financial benefits. The ASSOCOM view that most of these
(31)companies joined merely to pay 1 conscience money1 cannot
really be upheld. The list indicates that the companies 
included South African public companies, overseas arms of 
British and American companies as well as quite small private 
companies.
In July 1977, NAFCOC added a further type of membership to
£
its Constitution in the form of Special Members. These Special 
Members were to be those individuals and companies in the *
d
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African community who, after satisfying their normal local 
and Regional Chamber dues, subscribed directly to the National 
African Federated Chamber of Commerce on the following basis;
A business or individual with an Annual turnover of up to 
R30 000 pays R30 per annum; R40 000 pays R40- R50 000 pays 
R50; and R100 000 pays R100; R200 000 pays R2G0; R300 000
pays R300 membership fees.
These Special members were entitled to ine full benefits of 
ordinary members provided that they in no way neglected their 
local or Regional Chambers.
Part of the reason for this new type of membership was that 
it could accommodate those businessmen who wished to join 
NAFCOC and who had no branch Chamber in their area. A businessman 
in Alexandra had sent R30 to join as he had no Chamber in
(32)
his area. But the main reason was that it was another way
of increasing membership fees, and thus income, to be paid 
voluntarily by those businessmen who could afford to pay more 
than the ordinary membership fee of R13.
Nevertheless, despite these new categories of membership and 
the large membership drive after 1975, the projected membership 
income, with the hoped for 12 000 members for 1979 did not 
materialise.
The projected membership income for 1979 was R60 OOc/33  ^ but 
the actual income was R14 350 from ordinary members and 
R18 372 from Associate members, making an actual total income
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from membership fees of R32 722. This amount, together
(35)
with donations of R10000/04 went some way towards making 
NAFCOC self-sufficient by 1979 but, the costs and expenses 
incurred in the running of the organisation rose rapidly, 
so much so, that the projected cost of running the Secretariat 
al 'ne, for 1979 , was in the region of R64 COO.
Therefore, though ic would be true to say that Associate
member fees and donations did help NAFCOC financially in the 
years 1975-79 they were not the sole source of income and, by 
1979 , were supplemented by other sources of income, gained 
very much by NAFCOC1S own initiative and negotiations.
4. (ill) Income
The third part of the Five-Year-Plan was NAFCOC'S aim to 
attain a measure of financial self-sufficiency to make it 
possible for the organisation to meet its commitments. 
Increasing membership was one way of acquiring funds but the
problem of income was something in its own right. There was
little chance that membership funds would be able to continue 
financing NAFCOC1S growing activities.
The plan called for capital of R20 000 per annum for general 
expenses, rising to R50 000 within five y e a r s .  ^7) NAFCOC'S 
financial report for the end of 1974 showed a balance of
(•30)
R6 962 and the Treasurer complained that the system of fund 
control left much to be desired since there was much that was 
not approved by the auditors. He stated that even the sales 
money from the magazines did not all reach the office. 
Therefore, by 1975, the problem of finance was
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twofold; firstly to get enough funds, and second]y to channel the 
funds that were raised in an efficient manner. Apart from 
funds accruing from membership fees, fund raising in the 
organisation took various forms, some minor and some large 
scale.
NAFCOC'S magazine African Business brought in a certain amount 
of money from its sales to non-members in the regions. All 
members received their copies fiee of charge. About 4000 copies, 
usually the Conference issue, were donated annually by the 
publishers to help bring in funds. In addition a sum of about 
R3 000was donated from the proceeds of the Annual Conference 
programme.
Inyanda Chamber spent a good deal of its time during 1974
and 1975 organising football matches and live shows as well as
a Jackpot competition which they organised with 'The World1 
(39)
newspaper. But the most important small fund raising
efforts were the beauty contests which the Chambers ran to 
find a 1 Miss NAFCOC1 and later a 'Miss Black Bank1. Committees 
were organised to lay down rules governing the annual contests.
In 1976 there was so much interest in them that it was necessary 
to apply stringent rules so that there was better judging, and 
disciplinary measures could be taken against those who 
displayed unbecoming behaviour at the contests since it was 
brought to the notice of the National Executive that the behaviour 
of some members at the contests left much to be desired.
The finals were held each year at the Aniual Conference with 
the contestants usually being housed in a separate hotel from
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conference delegates. The sponsorship of prizes for these
contests turned into something of a competition between the
White sponsoring companies when, after a Potchefstroom company
donated a trophy in 1974 , united Tobacco donated a prize
of R500, Permanent Life Assurance donated R500 in 1977,^2)
Beechams donated gifts in 1978, and the Elida Gibbs Company
sent in a proposal in 1978 to give the Regions R200 for sole
rights to sponsor the Beauty contests. They also offered R500
as a cash prize to the National body for sole rights to sponsor
the National Competition/^) This proposal was turned down
with such vehemence that the National Executive recorded,
that no company shall be allowed to dominate our Organisation 
in any manner whatsoever.'^4)
The 1977 figures reveal that R403 were the proceeds from
the Beauty Contest(45) as against R367 in 1975 , (46) the value 
of the prizes far outstripping the proceeds.
Sponsorships provide an excellent springboard for publicity. 
Basically sponsorship can be broken down into three main
categories/4 )^ These are:
1. External special events, which usually involve the
sponsorship of a number of organisations and focus attention 
more on the events themselves than upon an individual 
sponsor. Conferences fall into this category and they 
offer specific publicity opportunities in the form of 
newspaper coverage, assembling representative leaders of 
organisations from all over as well as interest to the 
public as legitimate news.
2. Internal special events, which usually involve the
sponsorship of a single organisation and focus attention 
more on the sponsor than on the event. Contests like the 
Black Businessman of the Year competition are in this 
category. The accompanying banquet ceremony and presentation 
of prizes symbolises and dramatises accomplished facts and 
there is also the possibility of sustaining a series of 
stories throughout the course of the competition. Public 
service programmes are also included under this heading, 
where many companies engage in a 'public service' type of 
operation, which simultaneously performs a good deed and 
generates widespread public interest and news coverage, 
for example, the provision of educational facilities.
3. Gimmicks, differ from other special events in that they
are more of a single shot operation. A company's sponsor­
ship of a beauty contest would fall into this category.
Frequently, sponsorship as a form of publicity, is confused 
with other activities such as advertising. However, there 
are four characteristics which identify advertising. (48)
These are:
1. It is paid for by the advertiser.
2. It is a non-personal presentation.
3. It is used to sell ideas and service as well as
goods.
4. It has an identifiable sponsor.
Assuming a company decides on sponsorship, as its medium of 
publicity, it might be interesting to consider why it should
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choose to do this through a Chamber of Commerce.
Chamber of Commerce organisations to which businessmen belong 
can influence the thinking and decisions of their members.
The President of such a group often has much to say about the 
organisation's official attitude. In addition, every 
opinion leader has a following in his community or sphere 
of activity, for example, editors, ministers, teachers 
and public officials.
The task of obtaining an organisation's endorsement can 
sometimes be accomplished by simply contacting the President 
in person. Or, it may be as complicated as canvassing all 
members of a committee, sending a speaker to address the 
membership or making personal contacts by telephone call to 
key members and committee chairmen. The support of such 
leaders can be publicised in the press.
Therefore, a Chamber of Commerce can be an excellent publicity 
medium within a community.(50) The well organised Chamber's 
programme of activities encompassing publicity about the 
development of business, negotiations with government and 
general contributions to community welfare, all offer raw 
material for an imaginative publicity executive.
A Chamber may award plaques or certificates to companies 
for suitable accomplishments thereby making legitimate 
business news.
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By making these events legitimate and newsworthy, acceptance 
is built up in the media and benefits accrue to the association, 
its members and the community.
NAPCOC gained other sundry income from the sale of badges, 
cuff links and ties as part of the NAFCOC uniform which was 
adopted in 1975.
Another interesting method of fund raising was the 
'Malihambe', or spot cash collection. This appears to be a 
peculiarly African traditional way of collecting funds, 
where those present at the meeting, after being goaded and 
cajoled by the Master of Ceremonies who stirs their consciences 
about a particular project which needs more funds, respond 
by placing whatever small cash they have available into an 
open box, which is passed between them. The collection is 
accompanied by much laughter and loud cheers as each person 
dips into his or her pocket trying to better the last person. 
During a meeting on 18th August 1975 a collection of this 
sort resulted in R739 , 1 0 ^ ^  being raised for funds. A 
similar collection was also made amongst the many guests and 
officials, both Black and White, who attended the opening 
of the African Bank at Ga-Rankuwa in 1975.
However, these small fund raising efforts apart, most of 
NAFCOC'S funds in the years directly following the Five-Year- 
Plan came from donations from White companies. In many cases 
these were solicited by NAFCOC who regularly sent out letters 
to companies asking for sponsorship for its various activities. 
Positive responses were nearly always forthcoming.
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NAFCOC'S main sources of income cfn be divided into
five categories. The first three are donation income whereas the
last two involve business initiatives.
4. (iii) . (a)" Small donations and prizes
In 1974, Reckitt ar^ i ran a competition with a prize
for the new NAFCOC c. . and emblem. Unilever donated
the President's Shield for the Region with the best
achievement in 1975 , This was followed, in 1976 ,
b}' Reckitt and Colmans R250 prize and trophy for the
fastest growing Chamber. They also contributed
Certificates of Merit and gifts to As sec 1 •; members, a
(55)
new scheme started in 1976. Mobil Oil donated a
Presidential Chain of Office in 1977.(56)
4iiii).(b ) Donations for conferences
With the increased attendance at the Annual Conferences, 
this proved to be one of NAFCOC'S largest expenses.
Consequently sponsorship of the various aspects of the 
functions was sought from as many companies as possible.
The total cost of the 1976 Conference was R9 247,32,1^ss 
income from Registration and amounts paid to hotels etc. of 
R6338 ,00, resulting in a cost to NAFCOC of R2 909 ,32(.57) In 
1977 an amount of R29 020 was paid to a Cape hotel for 
conference expenses and the figure was rising yearly.
Unilever sponsored the Annual Banquet but in February 1976 
they sent a controversial letter asking what benefits would 
accrue from their Associate membership. They wanted their
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case to be treated as special since they were old sponsors.
This auery seems to have come from one of Unilever's 
officials on his own initiative. Since he was the person 
actively involved in supporting NAFCOC events with sponsor­
ships from his company, he merely sought an explanation 
from NAFCOC about why he should ask his company for still 
more funds to be channelled into African sponsorship.
The consensus of the Executive was that Unilever was not 
the only firm to have given NAFCOC 'unstinting' support.
A letter was sent to Unilever to that effect expressing 
gratitude for services rendered but they could not see 
their way to acceding to Unilever'r request.
S.A. Breweries, Stellenbosch Wineries and Coca-Cola usually 
donated drinks and liquor at the Conferences. In 1977,
S.A. Permanent Life donated a Cadillac car to the President!60) 
This donation put NAFCOC in a quandry since it questioned 
whether a Cadillac car would harm the image of NAFCOC,
After a discussion the consensus was that it would not. 
Nevertheless they agreed to dispose of it after six months.
It was said to be a 1965 model anyway.
The list of donations for the 1978 Conference reveals that 
quite large amounts were given by Associate memht ■*s:
Permanent Life R12 000 including folders and reception;
B.P. R1 000 Transport and Braal; Alida Gibbs Rl 000 Beauty 
Contests; Standard Bank R2 000; S.A. Breweries R2 000? 
Coca-Cola R2 000; Via Afrlka Rl 000? Barlow Rand Rl 000;
UTC R7 000 and Carlton Paper R500.
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„ r-i n an/A P a  T i t  Oil
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4. (ill).(c) Donations for particular projects
Donations for particular projects were usually, though not 
always, given by Associate Member companies or institutions.
In lla /4 the 'Bread of Life1 organisation gave R15 000 for 
printing the African Bank prospectus. The following
year several companies gave funds for the establishment 
of the Secretariat. General Motors gave R2 000 and Toyota 
RlO 000 towards NAFCOC1S general office e x p e n s e s . I n  
1976, the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Programme 
(hereinafter US£3ALEP) , in its careers development programme, 
donated R6 000 over six years, for management training.
.This was followed, in 1977, with Anglo American's contribution 
of R7 000 annually towards educational training courses.
Though these latter donations did not strictly add to 
NAFCOC1S funds they were given to, and administered by,
NAFCOC in its general expense account. Similarly, in 1978, 
when NAFCOC established an Education office, Anglo American 
and Rembrandt Tobacco Company donated R5 000 each, Barlow 
Rand R3 000 and Mobil Oil RIO 000 per annum for five years.
Shell Oil donated R26 000 towards the Blackchain project in 
1978.(67)
Since 1974, Gilbeys Distillers and S.A. Airways have sponsored 
the Black Businessman of the Year award, run by African 
Business magazine in conjunction with NAFCOC.
There are several reasons for these large donations from 
mainly big South African companies. But the reasons, in 
most cases, would appear to overlap so it would be
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unwise and unfair to indicate any particular reason for a 
specific company.
Obviously, in some cases, donations might have been given 
with a particular idea in mind, for example, publicity 
from sponsorship, but this need not necessarily preclude 
philanthropy. It would appear that most of the donations, 
given either at the direction of individual company executives 
or at the direction of company board policy, were presented 
with one or more of the following reasons in mind:
(a) With a genuine view to help with the upliftment of
African business in South Africa. A natural concomitant 
of this would be that if African business was upgraded 
then business in general would expand.
(b) Solely for publicity. Many large sponsorships could be 
put into this category.
(c) For publicity and White business expansion, as well as 
for puollcity accrued from helping Black business.
(d) Conscience money. This could be the individual's
conscience who persuaded his company to donate the money
or it could involve all the members of the company's 
board.
(a) and (d) overlap in that a genuine desire to do something 
to help Black business, particularly after the 1976 riots, 
often involved the consciences of the donors who had not done 
more in the earlier years. Some decisions to donate, as in 
the case of Anglo American, were made by the Board on 
behalf of shareholders, when Mr. H. Oppenheimer announced 
that it was 'the moral duty of companies to invest i.e. 
donate company funds towards the upliftment of Blacks in
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South Africa. '
Some sponsorships gained very little publicity over the 
years but they were continued with, either in the hope 
of increased publicity, and therefore sales, or because 
there was an underlying philanthropic reason on the part 
of the sponsors. Again it would be foolish to pretend 
that most White company donors were merely being beneficent. 
Most probably saw the value of the African market and were 
keen to be involved with it in any way possible even if 
that meant giving large donations in the early years so 
that they could benefit later on.
4.(111). (d) Quid pro quo offers - business initiatives
During the years of the Five-Year-Plan and with the 
corresponding growth of the Chamber , NAFCOC received many 
business offers from White companies. Some were accepted 
for specific reasons while others wore refused outright.
The increased interest of White business in the Black 
consumer market in the mid and late 70s stemmed from two 
factors. First, the increasing Black buying power which 
arose from the rising Black wages. Second, the changes 
in legislation after 1976.
At the beginning of the 70s it was widely claimed that 
Blacks had gained little from economic growth in South Africa. 
The example of the mining industry, where real wages declined 
between 1911 and 1969 , was used, although it was also claimed 
that, even in manufacturing, construction and commerce, few
M
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Blacks had g a i n e d . H o w e v e r ,  as indicated earlier, 
these claims were disputed by people like Merle Lipton, 
who showed that in many sectors Blacks had made substantial 
gains in real wages. Consequently, most researchers accepted 
that real wages of Blacks had increased since 1960.
Changing trends in personal disposal income, claimed personal 
income and employer income confirmed that from about 1972 
the ratio of White to Black incomes began to narrow.
The need for higher wages to increase the Black's spending 
power and reduce the expanding wage gap between White and 
Black wages became a matter of urgency only after 1971 when 
discontent prevailed amongst workers in the form of militant 
African strikes. These strikes, which continued for two 
years, started in December 1971 with the Ovambo strike.
This was followed with strikes by African and Indian workers 
from October 1972 to February 1973 until, eventually, about 
50 000workers were on strike in Durban. There was also a walk 
out en masse by part-time Black doctors in Soweto clinics, 
a strike by Durban and Cape Town stevedores, a strike, in 
January 1973, by 5 000 brickworkers in Durban, as well as 
strikes by other smaller groups. 7^2^
These strikes brought wage rises and, after 1972, there was 
a narrowing of the wage gap.
The following figures show the narrowing of the wage gap by 
1974 :
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1969 1974
Gold Mining 20 to 1 11, 9 to 1
Manufacturing 6 to 1 4,7 to 1
Construct!; n 6,9 to 1 4,9 to 1
Commerce 4,2 to 1 3,8 to 1
Government
Service 6,2 to 1 4,6 to 1(73
However, possibly more important than the wage gap or the 
new rises was the wage level compared with living costs.
A survey by the Productivity and Wages Association found in 
1971-1972 that, in private industry, eighty five per cent 
of Africans were paid less than R15 per week, while the 
Poverty Datum line for Johannesburg, caused partly by a 
rent rise in August 1972, was estimated, by the city's 
non-European Affairs Committee, at R73,55 per month for a 
family of five, while the minimum effective level (hereinafter 
MEL) was one and a half times as much. Assuming two-thirds 
of a family's income was derived from one wage earner, the 
breadwinner needed R82,18 per month to keep the family at 
the MEL.(74)
Although, as Merle Lipton states, from mid-1971
to mid-1975 (when the annual Black industrial wage equalled
R1 264), wages Increased by thirty seven per cent, an annual
rise of 8,2 per cent since 1972, food prices rose much
faster than the general cost of living index, by which these
rises were deflated. Nevertheless, there was a rapid and
(75)accelerated real rise.
Subsequent calculations of income shares by Nattrass confirmed
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the redistribution trend since 1970, showing a clear shift 
of personal income from Whites to others (including Coloureds 
and Indians), whose share increased from twenty six per 
cent in 1970 to thirty two per cent in 1975 - a rise of 
over one-fifth in five years.
In 1975, when researchers were looking for quantitative bases 
on which to forecast potential markets for certain durables, 
they discovered that the average expenditure of Black urban 
families (as surveyed by the Bureau of Market Research in 
Report fifty four) equalled for the first time the lowest 
White income group measured in the Department of Statistics 
survey of Household Expenditure. They also discovered that, 
if Black incomes grew at the 5,3 per cent for Blacks postulated 
in the Theron Report, then the income of the average urban 
Black family would, after ten years, slightly exceed that of 
the second lowest income level in the White Household Survey 
in 1975.(77)
There discoveries led to questions being asked in all 
business sectors about how fast Black markets would grow , 
what future there was in the traditional White markets , 
and how far (and in what sectors) Black spending would offset 
the fall-off in these traditional markets.
During 1977 it was estimated that Blacks spent R3 800 million 
and, by 1990, it was projected that they would account for 
fifty per cent of total expenditure in South Africa. 7^^
Table eight Indicates Black households by income for Soweto,
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Table 8
Preliminary Marketing Feasibility Study for Development 
of a Business Centre - Pimville Zone 7, Soweto 
The Urban Foundation, March 1979
Black Households by Income
Income Intervals Soweto Dube Alexandra
R (Sample Size' 508 307 316
% %
0 - 500 2,8 2,0 6,6
501 - 1 000 4,9 3,2 6,0
1 001 - 1 500 11,0 11,7 14,6
1 501 - 2 000 14,2 7,5 18,1
2 001 - 2 500 15,4 16,5 15,8
2 501 - 3 000 11,6 7,8 9,8
3 001 - 3 500 10,5 7,2 11,1
3 501 - 4 000 8,1 7,8 5,4
4 001 - 4 500 5,5 7,2 5,7
4 501 - 5 000 4,1 8,5 3,5
5 001 - 5 500 3,4 2,6 1,9
5 501 - 6 000 2,2 1,6 0,6
6 001 - 6 500 2,0 5,2 0,6
6 501 - 7 000 1,8 2,6 0,0
7 001 - 7 500 0,8 2,0 0,3
7 501 - 8 000 0,2 1,6 0,0
8 001 - 8 500 0,4 1,6 0,0
8 501 - 9 000 0,2 2,0 0,0
9 001 - 9 500 0,0 0,4 0,0
9 501 - 10 000 0,0 0,0 0,0
10 001 - 10 500 0,4 0,6 0,0
10 501 - 11 000 0,4 0,2 0,0
11 001 - 11 500 0,0 0,0 0,0
11 501 - 12 000 0,0 0,0 0,0
12 000 + 0,2 0,2 0,0
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0
(Arithmetic mean
x for average annual
income in Rand) 2 950 3 606 2 353
O' (Sample error) 80,2 129,8 73,6
95% Confidence
interval 2 793- 3 352- 2 209
3 107 3 360 2 497
Jumber of inhabitants more than one. million
average income ) Rjvm 1Q77 R2 950 •» R245 per mon
Average household sizej 5 # 9
Dube and Alexandra in 1977, where the average income was 
found to be R2 45 per month in an average household size of 
5,9 .
Therefore, if Black incomes continued to rise at even 5,3 
per cent per annum in real income, their expenditure patterns 
would more closely resemble that of Whites. These facts, 
together with changes in legislation after 1976, began to 
make the demands on both Black and White retailers similar. 
Consequently, changes v~\a necessarily occurring in Black 
retailing in order to compete, and this change affected 
wholesaling which was largely in White hands. In many cases, 
White business interests, aware of the changing income and 
expenditure patterns, sought avenues into the Black market by 
attempting to unite commercially with Black businessmen.
In 1976, Thomas Cook travel agency offered credit facilities 
to Chamber members „ During 19 78, when most offers were
made, McCarthy Motors offered to donate to NAFCOC twenty five 
Rand as commission for every car bought by a Chamber member.  ^ ^  
This offer was accept ud provided NAFCOC continued to advertise 
its own people in similar businesses. A proposal by Consolidated 
Power, dry cell battery manufacturers, to sell its products 
through members outlets was approved provided that members 
were contacted directly.(81) Via Afrlka proposed that, in 
partnership with NAFCOC, they should start a Stationery 
Manufacturing company.(82  ^ A committee was set up to look 
into this proposal and at the »ame time the NAFCOC Executive 
reasoned that they should exercise caution when working on 
similar programmes so that they could be tackled systematically.
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After several months of negotiation, this offer fell away 
when Via Afrika decided, instead, to establish stationery 
manufacturing companies in the homeland areas in conjunction 
with the Governments of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu.
An offer from Wimpy Restaurants for Chamber members to be 
involved in their franchise operation was rejected as being 
unacceptable to the organisation. The reason for this
was that a pilot operation had been started in Umlazi the 
previous year and had not met with much success. It was found 
that, since most Africans were employed outside the township 
during the day, the restaura did little business. In the 
evenings, when workers returned to the township, they seemed to 
prefer eating at home with their families. Therefore business 
was slack at that time too.
Franchising undoubtedly has much to offer the small businessman 
since the system represents a means of marketing a product or 
service and generally expanding his business without depleting 
capital, going heavily into debt or diluting his ownership through 
the sale of equity. Staff are usually better motivated, there is 
a common marketing approach and most franchisers provide 
training programmes. In the United States, the International 
Franchise Association estimated the failures in the first year 
of operation of independent non-franchise operations at between 
fifty one per cent and fifty seven per cent, whereas the 
failure of franchise operations, in their first year, was put 
as low as two to four per cent.(84) In the United Kingdom ninety 
five per cent of Independent businesses fail within five years, 
whereas, again, franchise failures remain at a low level of two
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per cent. Although franchisers claim that their operations
are valusble because they impart know-how and create self 
employed busdnessmen, in the case of South Africa, franchisers 
attempts at entry into urban African townships, particularly in 
the field of 'fast food' restaurants, appear to have overlooked 
the prevailing situation. Consequently, it would seem that, until 
workers are able to find employment closer to their homes the 
development of franchised 'fast food' outlets in the townships is 
_imited.
Therefore, NAFCOC'S rejection in this case was on purely economic 
grounds.
Kodak's invitation, to assist businessmen willing to open up 
photographic businesses, was favourably received by NAFCOC.
The USA Johnson and Johnson company wrote to NAFCOC stating 
chat they were keen to involve it in a business supplying and 
distributing Black beauty products in South Africa and its 
neighbouring territories. It was emphasised that the
'partnership should be with NAFCOC rather than with an individual 
(a former President of NACOC had approached them before). There 
was a positive response to this proposal since it was felt that 
the Chamber should be innovative in its business dealings if 
Black business was to progress and prosper. However, a note 
of caution was sounded when it was realized that no one Chamber 
branch was strong enough to handle the project alone. The 
President took on the responsibility of further contact w ith  
Johnson and Johnson, and, together with Minister Nxumalo of 
the Swaziland Government (who had shown an interest in the 
proposal), he later visited the American
I
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company. A year passed and nothing positive was achieved.
The reason for this was partly Johnson and Johnson's insistence 
on dealing with and having Black partners only. But an 
added stipulation was that the company should be registered 
and operated outside South Africa, probably in one of the 
neighbouring territories. This explained the involvement of 
Swaziland interests. Although NAFCCC tried hard to establish 
this company it soon became obvious that there were too many 
problems, in areas such as capitalisation and company 
control, for NAFCOC to become actively involved in such a 
venture. Consequently, tne project was dropped.
A further business proposal, from a local Coal Merchant
Company, was rejected when it was decided to support instead, 
Mr. S.J.J. Lesolang's (the Chamber Treasurer) company s 
project which was stated to be similar.  ^  ^ An unrevealed
offer from the Institute- of Retail Management was rejectee 
outright. NAFCOC was particularly wary about offers from 
institutes and educational institutions because many were 
found to be taking money from Africans without really providing 
suitable or satisfactory c o u r s e s . A g a i n ,  some conflicted 
with NAFCOC'S own educational courses.
Most of these offers, those accepted and those rejected, 
appeared to be normal business deals, with NAFCOC or its 
members participating as far as possible in a normal free 
enterprise way. There were several other similar offers,
The reasons why many came to nothing, or NAFCOC saw fit to 
reject them, appear to have stemmed from a concern to protect 
the particular business interests of members, a lack of
186
immediate Black capital and expertise and the desire for 
better business deals.
It is also possible that, in some cases, NAFCOC felt that 
the companies expected too much from them in the way of 
shareholding, capital, expertise, publicity or even the 
acceptance of 'charity' in the form of donations. Any one 
of these 'expectations' could have been a cause for failure 
or rejection.
There were other business proposals made to NAFCOC which more 
clearly reveal NAFCOC's stance in this regard. Some companies, 
particularly those in the wholesale and grocery retail trades, 
were keen to tie up with NAFCOC as an organisation. The 
objectives behind the offers of a partnership with NAFCOC 
included good publicity for these companies, with increased 
membership awareness of them, as well as press coverage, 
since NAFCOC was in an influential position in the African 
business sphere; increased sales with profits to the 
companies and to NAFCOC; and, to a lesser degree, an attempt 
to promote African business. Nevertheless, NAFCOC rejected 
some and accepted others. It rejected those that tended to 
conflict with its interests and chose those that it felt 
would be in the best interests of NAFCOC.
As early as 19 7 4, Metro Cash and Carry, which had taken over 
Afmark, NAFCOC'S 'old frier V  from its Buy At Home Campaign 
in 1969, suggested that it was interested in taking up 
equity in the Black Bank.(90) It would also contribute 
towards the running and establishment of NAFCOC'S office.
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During 1974 NAFCOC indicated that it was to go ahead with its 
plan to establish a chain of Black owned supermarkets to 
compete with the White giants in the field. Therefore,
Metro, as a wholesale operator, saw this as a good chance 
to enlarge its operation if it could sell merchandise to 
the proposed supermarkets. Metro, having already established 
its bona fides with NAFCOC, stated that it was keen to 
establish a partnership between itself, Tswana entrepreneurs 
from NAFCOC and the BIC, to develop a cash and carry whole­
sale outlet near Rustenburg. Metro, a public company, was
prepared to make skills available to such a partnership.
The partnership would benefit from 
Metro's already established buying power 
and depending upon financial arrangements. 
Metro would contribute its share of the 
capital.
The benefits to Tswana traders and 
consumers would be numerous - the most 
significant being a reduction in 
consumer prices. O D
Despite the 'carrot1 offering, NAFCOC did not take up this 
offer. The main reason was that NAFCOC wanted to continue 
with its own project of a wholly-owned and run Black retail 
chain. In addition, NAFCOC was not interested merely in 
a wholesale business since it hoped to incorporate both 
retail and wholesale into its own project. Neither did it 
want to confine the trade to Tswanas because the original 
concept was for a nationwide business. Lastly, NAFCOC was 
definitely not interested in a business venture which would 
involve the BIC in any way since it smacked of partnership 
with a Government agency. Other hidden details of NAFCOC1S 
expected capital involvement could also have contributed 
towards the refusal. That Metro's heart was not really in 
the proposal or that NAFCOC was right to refuse, possibly 
came to light some years later, when, in 19 79, Lionel Katz,
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Metro's Managing Director, commented on the company's
expected sales of R450 million, by saying, 11 didn't build
(92)
that out of philanthropy.' He added that it was a case
of you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours. 'I am where
I am because of black trade. To a degree black trade is
(93)
where it is because of me.' He further stated, in a
complete reversal of his 1974 policy, that he did not 
believe in a partnership philosophy to advance Black 
entrepreneurship, admitting instead that he had been lobbying 
for overdraft facilities, lease protection and training 
facilities for Black businessmen. 'This is what is needed -
not a partnership philosophy. ' Katz felt that more
realistic and practical solutions could be found to aid the 
development of Black business if Africans had access to credit 
facilities and better training and if they had security of 
tenure of their businesses, rather than merely relying on 
the injection of White capital in the form of partnerships.
Pick 'n Pay's offer in 1977 also fell victim to Black 
businessmen's rejection of White capital as long as it
(95)
jeopardised 1 our controlling role in our business.'
Pick 'n Pay, a White retail group, started in 1967, comprised 
thirty nine supermarkets and five hypermarkets throughout 
South Africa with a combined sales v>f more than R400 million, 
proposed that it would share its ownership in enterprises in 
White areas. This was the first proposal of this sort.
Basically there were to be two companies, one in which Pick 
'n Pay held eighty per cent shareholding in White areas with 
NAFCOC, or its proposed Blackchain trading arm, acquiring 
twenty per cent of the equity of all future Pick 'n Pay
*See The Blackchain Company Chapter 8 (i)
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stores in White areas; and another in which NAFCOC would
hold eighty per cent shareholding in Black areas and Pick
'n Pa- acquiring twenty per rent equity in all Black area
stores - Pick 'n Pay proposed to supply expertise in the
form of management control as well as training and credit
(97)
facilities for supplies.
Initial reaction to this offer among Chamber members was 
one of overwhelming support in favour of a partnership 
arrangement in the manner proposed. However during the 
following six months there was a complete reversal of opinion. 
It would seem that Pick 1n Pay itself was partly to blame 
although from the final reasons given for the rejection of 
the offer it would appear that there was never any real 
likelihood of the project being given the go ahead.
From the start NAFCOC was keen that a large flagship store 
with HI million investment and turnover of R500000 should 
be the initial plan. Then would come the smaller convenience 
stores. Pick 1n Pay's idea was the reverse. In addition 
Blackchain wanted to be free to reserve the right to determine 
which of its outlets it would prefer to run jointly with Pick 
1n Pay, since it did not want to be swallowed up, nor rendered 
ineffective, in its influence within the Black community.
Pick 1n Pay pushed for joint ownership in all Black stores.
But, more important, NAFCOC stated that its basic requirement 
in Black areas must be a fifty one/forty nine per cent 
partnership with Black control in the flagship type store, 
before it would consider the eighty/twenty deal in the 
smaller convenience stores. In 1975 Pick 'n Pay's Raymond 
Ackerman had said that he would be willing to have fifty one
i
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per cent Black control of any venture he might undertake, 
provided that he was given guarantees that Pick 'n Pay 
could recoup any capital that they invested and make a 
reasonable profit. In 1978, by rejecting NAFCOC'S
insistence on fifty one per cent he was presumably doing 
so because he felt that Pick 1n Pay would not recoup its 
capital and make a reasonable profit, if it had only forty 
nine per cent equity in a large store. Whatever the reason 
Ackerman was fairly confident that his offer would be accepted 
and indeed, in April 1978, had been led to believe that the 
eighty/twenty shares deal was acceptable to NAFCOC.^^^^ In 
July 1978, in an interview published in To The Point, Ackerman
announced the scheme stating that,
We are trying to do it on an eighty/ 
twenty basis to convince black traders 
that we are not trying to intrude on 
their preserve, but that we genuinely 
want to help them to become 
entrepreneurs. (101)
However NAFCOC was not convinced, neither did it appreciate 
Ackerman's untimely press statement, and, in the same week, 
sent Pick 'n Pay its formal rejection of the whole proposal.
The reasons given were that
whilst partnership between Black and 
White business was considered desirable 
in business ventures where Black 
businessmen had not yet acquired the 
necessary expertise, it was felt that 
there was at present no need to extend 
Black/White partnership into the retail 
trade, especially in view of the creation 
of Blackchain which intended to establish 
larger retail facilities in Black 
Townships all over the Republic. (103)
NAFCOC had rejected the offer because it felt that such a 
partnership was not realistic in the existing climate and 
NAFCOC had established a policy of insisting upon at least 
fifty one per cent of equity, from the onset, in any operation
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per cent Black control of any venture he might undertake, 
provided that he was given guarantees that Pick 1n Pay 
could recoup any capital that they invested and make a 
reasonable profit. In 19 78, by rejecting NAFCOC'S
insistence on fifty one per cent he was presumably doing 
so because he felt that Pick 'n Pay would not recoup its 
capital and make a reasonable profit, if it had only forty 
nine per cent equity in a large store. Whatever the reason 
Ackerman was fairly confident that his offer would be accepted 
and indeed, in April 1978, had been led to believe that the 
eighty/twenty shares deal was acceptable to NAFCOC.^^^ In 
July 1978, in an interview published in To The Point, Ackerman
announced the scheme stating that,
We are trying to do it on an eighty/ 
twenty basis to convince black traders 
that we are not trying to intrude on 
their preserve, but that we genuinely 
want to help them to become 
entrepreneurs. (101)
However NAFCOC was not convinced, neither did it appreciate 
Ackerman's untimely press statement, and, in the same week, 
sent Pick 1n Pay its formal rejection of the whole proposal.
The reasons given were that
whilst partnership between Black and 
White business was considered desirable 
in business ventures where Black 
businessmen had not yet acquired the 
necessary expertise, it was felt that 
there was at present no need to extend 
Black/White partnership into the retail 
trade, especially in view of the creation 
of Blackchain which intended to establish 
larger retail facilities in Black 
Townships all over the Republic. (103)
NAFCOC had rejected the offer because it felt that such a 
partnership was not realistic in the existing climate and 
NAFCOC had established a policy of insisting upon at least 
fifty one per cent of equity, from the onset, in any operation
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which it initiated for its members. Because of the lack 
of facilities in Black areas it was likely that far more 
supermarkets would be opened in Black areas than in White 
areas. There appeared to be a near saturation point of 
supermarkets in White shopping centres, consequently Pick 
1n Pay's gain in Black areas was likely to be far greater 
than Blackchain's in White areas. Enthusiasm over the 
launching of its own Blackchain company led NAFCOC to the 
decision that it would be better to pursue that project in 
order to build first and so place itself in a stronger position 
to negotiate with similar White groups at a later stage.
Although Pick 1n Pay's proposal was initially felt to be 
well-motivated there were other offers, from White companies 
during 1978, which NAFCOC reasoned would be detrimental to the 
interests of its members. Under circumstances where Black 
and White businessmen had equal rights and opportunity to 
trade wherever they wanted, NAFCOC would have considered these 
business offers from White companies to be a healthy development.
Another method of penetration of Whites into African business 
involved the use of front organisations whereby a White nominee 
leased premises for a member of another race group. Although 
this custom had a long history already restrictions had 
undoubtedly led, during the late 19 70s, to the spate of front 
operations and, in the view of Nigel Handy of the Johannesburg 
Central Business District Association, the practice held 1 the 
possibility of corruption.' Nevertheless, the practice
appeared to be quite widespread and was not confined to White 
Central Business Districts. It took place in White zoned
business areas which were close to African townships. One. 
African accountant
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operated his business from a Kempton Park White zoned 
office area near Tembisa. He had no fear of being closed 
down because he employed Whites whom he was quite prepared 
to say owned the operation instead of himself.(105) Fronting 
also took place within African areas whereby Whites owned the 
businesses and used Africans as the 'front' owner. A large 
supermarket and night club in Kwa Mashu ostensibly had an 
African proprietor but the business was owned by a company 
of French accountants. Similarly, in Soweto, many small 
businesses had Indian owners and African ''ront' proprietors.
The overall situation had caused much H a r n e s s  amongst 
African businessmen, as well as busing snen from other 
race groups, who contested the necessity for nominees, 
which were in fact encouraged by law, in order to operate 
a business, when the Government, meanwhile, professed to 
support a free enterprise system in South Africa.
It is interesting to note that these reasons for the increase 
in front organisations in recent years differ from the 
reasons given during the 60s when similar complaints were 
made about the number of frontmen operating in the townships.
In 196 4 it was revealed that the Johannesburg City Council 
was aware that some African businessmen did not own their 
shops and that the businesses were owned by White wholesalers. 
Consequently the Council let it be known that it was about 
to start a campaign to weed out those African shopkeepers who 
did not own their own businesses. To this end it met with 
thirty five well-known African traders to discuss a complete 
overhaul of trade in Soweto - and a proposal for 1 complete 
apartheid' in the townships. The deputation of African traders
M
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was led by Mr. R.J.P. Maponya, President of the African 
Chamber of Commerce. One of h% chief complaints was against 
White businessmen who A/rican 1 pirates' to compete
against licensed traders. He said that Africans were 
expected to pay for milk in advance but found that the milk 
was sometimes diluted and delivered late. Tenders for coal 
in the townships, given to Whites, when African firms were 
capable of doing the job, was another complaint. ^ B u t  
the reasons for the many frontmen operating in the townships 
at that time, which the negotiations set out to stop, were 
basically financial. A prospective African businessman 
spent all his savings in putting up his business premises.
Then he found himself without cash to buy stock. Consequently 
he acquired goods on credit from White wholesalers on condition 
that he bought his stock from that wholesaler. When he 
failed to do so, or when he defaulted on goods already 
acquired, the wholesaler took over his shop. In these cases 
it was advantageous for the White wholesaler to retain the 
shop so that the African shopkeeper, then wholly at the mercy 
of the wholesaler, continued to sell the wholesalers stock 
and no-one else's.
The Council decided that the only way out of the dilemma 
was to discontinue the policy of allowing Africans to build 
their cwn shops in Soweto. Instead, the Council hinted that 
it might in future build modern shopping centres and lease 
the premises to African businessmen.
Therefore, whereas in the 60s frontmen took advantage of 
the plight of the African businessman's lack of capital, in
i
the 70s African businessmen themselves seemed to be 
prepared to allow frontmen in the townships because of 
the licensing difficulties. In these cases they would 
rather act as a manager than not be in business at all. 
However, in White areas it was a different question.
There, African businessmen were keen to conduct businesses 
and expand into business, such as banks, accounting and 
financial institutions, which were prohibited. Consequently 
the only recourse open to them was a 'front1 while they 
themselves actually owned the business.
nether attempt by White business to infiltrate the Black 
market without Black partnership occurred during 1977, 
when White property developers proposed building a shopping 
complex at Sondelang on the border of Soweto. This scheme 
was vehemently opposed by all Black businessmen in Soweto. 
But, these businessmen realized that if they were to succeed 
in stopping the building of this complex they would have to 
speak with a united voice, through recognised channels of 
communication. However, in Soweto, petty jalousies and 
personal ambitions had tended to hinder the advancement of 
Black business associations and the National African Chamber 
of Commerce, in particular, was not generally accepted by 
Black businessmen.
For several years the National Executive of NAFCOC had not 
enjoyed much co-operation or support from the Johannesburg 
African Chamber of Commerce in Soweto, despite the fact 
that it was a branch of NAFCOC. At no time did reported 
membership exceed 300 in a vast complex having approximately
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two thousand traders. ^ J-10  ^ One of the problems In Soweto 
had been the grim and constant struggle for positions and 
leadership which had raged within Chamber circles since
the days of P.R. Mosaka in the 50s. This struggle for
positions became the prime consideration. In the 70s leading
businessmen like Richard Maponya, who had been President of
the Chamber in the 60s, and E. Tshabalala, found their 
positions usurped by newcomers. In February 19 75, the 
National Executive appointed a Committee to look into 
the difficulties of the Soweto organisation. Because of 
the problems it was found that many traders avoided the 
Chamber or joined other smaller business associations in the 
area.
Sam Motsuenyane, NAFCOC'S President, called for an end to 
the worthless, time-consuming struggle for positions and 
for the beginning of a new era of progressive and competent 
Chamber leadership. The NAFCOC branch in Soweto should 
have been the biggest and best organised branch in the 
Republic, but it was not.^"*"^ Mr. J. Kumalo, President 
of the Soweto branch, warned local businessmen that he could 
not continue to represent them unless they were prepared to 
work together so that the Soweto executive could become an 
effective force, truly representative of local businessme-. 
After these calls for unity, Mr. David Pooe, President of 
the Southern Transvaal Region, reported favourably that 
Soweto had taken to heart the warning and had held several 
well attended traders meetings where support for NAFCOC was 
affirmed. But this support was shortlived when some
JACOC members complained that the rents issue, which arose
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when shopkeepers rents were Increased in April 1975, was 
ignored by NAFCOC.
Then, in 1976 , the new Soweto Traders Association was 
formed, whicn complicated matters further for this region 
of the National Chamber. By 1978, there were three traders 
associations in Soweto. However, at NAFCOC1S 1978 conference 
in Durban, the new leaders cf the Soweto Traders Association, 
by then the largest of the three traders organisations, 
declared its support for NAFCOC and affiliated to the 
organisation.
This affiliation came about largely through the desire for 
unity among Soweto businessmen in order to fight the threat 
of the proposed White Sondelang shopping complex.
Early in September 1977, the fears expressed by some Soweto 
businessmen, about NAFCOC1S Blackhain project faded with 
the announcement of the Klipspruit Sondelang shopping centre 
to be established under White auspices. NAFCOC leapt to 
the defence of Soweto businessmen and led a delegation to 
meet the Johannesburg City Council on 7th September 1977. 
NAFCOC stated that it supported the establishment of a Central 
Business District at Jabulani Civic Centre and was negotiating 
the establishment of a shopping centre and supermarket 
complex to house a branch of its Blackchain company.
NAFCOC asked for Sondelang, which bordered Soweto, to be 
Incorporated into Soweto as a regional shopping area, offering 
business opportunities to Blacks only.
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The City Council expressed surprise at the delegation's 
comments saying that, it had been totally ignorant of the 
attitudes of Black businessmen and their aspirations to 
take the initiative in the establishment of business 
themselves. The City Council promised to review the 
matter, although the White company concerned had already 
secured the necessary permission from the City Council.
NAFCOC stated that Mr. Aron Cohen, the company representative, 
had failed to convince it that his project would not prejudice 
the development of the Blackchain project and the small 
businesses in Soweto.
In the course of a protracted verbal 
battle with this company, which culminated 
with NAFCOC sending a deputation to 
meet the Minister of Plural Relations, 
a great deal of publicity, and consequently 
•.support for the small businesses, was 
generated. (114)
The Minister also stated that he was opposed to the Sondelang 
project.
Although the provision of a wholesale arm for Blackchain 
might have served to allay the fears of Soweto businessmen,
White wholesale operators were very wary of NAFCOC'S 
announcement that it was to go into the wholesale business.
In an effort to stem this possible competition several White 
wholesalers made offers of partnership with NAFCOC during 
19 78. Some companies entered into activities which in 
fact tended to hinder or fragment the attempts at unity, 
taking place in Soweto, among the Black business community. 
Gerstle and Hochstadter, a large White Reef wholesale 
company, sought to establish a joint venture with Black 
traders on the Reef and P r e t o r i a , H e r e ,  again, NAFCOC,
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and the directors of the Blackchain, held consultations 
with the company's directors which did not result in an 
agreement being reached. The proposed scheme was not 
acceptable to its members. Consequently, the company 
contacted traders in the problem area of Soweto, who were 
not connected with the NAFCOC movement and encouraged 
them to join independently in a trading scheme.
In May 1978, Gerstle and Hochstadter announced that it had 
sold forty nine per cent of its shares to Black traders.
The sales were carried out as a private transaction between 
existing shareholders and traders, and involved about 
200 traders.
As part of the deal, the existing shareholders would buy 
back the shares any time up to one year after the purchase 
if the new shareholders were not satisfied. In addition, 
i areholders qualified for special rebates on purchases 
and the company would continue to assist traders with 
merchandising techniques. Four Black directors were 
elected to the company's board in July 1?78.^'*‘‘^ /
Another White wholesaler, who faced the expected strong 
competition from Blackchain was the Spar Group. It too moved 
into Soweto to deal with Black traders outside NAFCOC. The 
group joined these Black trade-s in a 'Spar' type traders 
guild organisation, but no participation, by Blacxs, in 
the wholesale venture was given in return and it remained 
totally White controlled until 19 80 when it was announced 
that a Black had been invited to join the Board,
Rubinstein states that there are basically two types of 
associations of Black retailers in South Africa, (i)
Chambers of Commerce, and (ii) Buying/Supplier Associations117) 
This erroneous assumption further underlines the White view 
of Black bus. ess which divides that business into those 
that deal with Blacks and those that deal with Whites.
Firstly, there are Black Chambers of Commerce which are 
open to all Black businessmen, not just Black retailers. 
Therefore, they are also open to those Black retailers who 
choose to belong to the White controlled wholesale i.e. 
Buying/Supplier Associations. The Chambers operate for the 
sole benefit of their members.
Secondly, there are Buying/Supplier Associations, but these 
are White controlled and White run and are established solely 
for profit on the part of the White groups. Obviously the 
White groups will not profit if their Black members do not 
profit as well. However the portion of profit between Buyer 
and Supplier need not be, and rarely is, the same. Therefore, 
the two 'types' can hardly be put under the same umbrella, 
since the first is a Black service organisation, run solely 
for the benefit of its members, and the second is a White 
business, with /ts main aim to ensure maximum profit for 
its White shareholders.
However, when the Chamber members come together and set 
up a Black business, as they did in the case of the Blackchain 
Supermarket group, and If that business competes in the 
same field as the White business, i.e. the Spar groups
Buying/ Supplier Association, then they can be classed as 
two types of Black retailer 'associations'. Therefore, 
the lack of co-opera.ion between Spar and NAFCOC, through 
its Blaekchain group, stemmed largely from NAFCOC members 
encroaching on Spar's 'territory', and consequently from 
a fear of competition on the part of both groups. Yet they 
were in agreement about their primary aims in the grocery 
business field - to make a profit and to help uplift Black 
retailers.
A closer inspection of the make up and workings of the Spar 
Group over the past ten years explains why it felt that it 
had something to offer Black retailers and, consequently, 
why Blaekchain itself should be part of Spar.
The Spar group which is an international grocery concern, saw 
itself as a wholesale operation. It was a voluntary guild. 
Members joined by 'word of mouth' and could leave in the 
same way. No contracts were signed. Individuals were given 
franchises and there was only one store per locality. (This 
is loosely defined - it may be a small shopping centre or a 
town. If two stores wish to operate under the Spar banner 
they are consulted about competition, if they are in the same 
vicinity. If the incumbant operator states that the competition 
would be excessive then the second applicant is refused).
Spar's main objective was to supply goods (the correct goods) 
to the retailer in the best form (lowest prices to make a 
good turnover and best profit).
After consolidating itself among White retailers, the South
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African arm of Spar launched a group called Save-Mor.
By 1979 the total membership of the Group was 600, 200 of 
whom were members of Save-Mor. The difference between the 
two groups stems from the type of merchandise marketed.
All members of Save-Mor - 100 are Black stores and 100 are 
White stores - must have Black consumers. Consequently, 
most products in the Save-Mor group are aimed at the Black 
market.
Save-Mor, which has been operating for more than ten years, 
started in the Natal and Zululand country districts. Initially 
it was a failure. Spar put this failure down to two main 
reasons:
1. Spar did not understand Black business.
2. Restrictive laws.
Spar felt that because of the low level of education of the 
businessmen, they themselves had failed to see that they 
were dealing with a different 'level1 of people.
Initially, most of the Black store members had turnovers of 
between R5 000-R10 000 per month. They joined Save-Mor.
They were given no training. However, many of them increased 
their turnover to R2C 000-R30 000 per month. As soon as 
the business was built up they neglected it by leaving 
even less experienced and untrustworthy people in control.
Most were failures. Spar then resorted to choosing its 
members more carefully and it trained them in various aspects 
of business e.g. cash books, cash flow, showed them how much 
of the income really belonged to them etc.
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Success came in three ways:
(a) With the training scheme
(b) Blacks saw Whites successfully trading with Black
consumers in Zululand and with Spar's encouragement, 
were keen to be equally successful
(c) Many of the stores increased turnovers to F.50 000 -
R100 COO per month and this provided incentive for
other traders to join the Spar organisation.(120)
After its experience in dealing with African business in 
Natal and Zululand, Spar felt that it was ready to tackle 
the job in the townships. The management chose the late 70s 
as an appropriate time to start since there was 1 a better, 
more conducive businessman involved.' This was put 
down to the relaxation of the laws, larger stores and better 
educated businessmen.
Supermarketing is a high volume business, 
and p .rticularly in the townships the 
area oi the average store was between 
ten square metres and twenty square 
metres. You cannot operate a successful 
supermarket in such a limited space. J
In 1977, the Government lifted the restrictions so that 
Blacks could trade in areas up to 3 50m2 . Also, whereas they 
could formerly handle only twenty four categories of goods 
they could now trade in just about everything.
Although Blacks still lacked business expertise, and Spar 
had a trained team to provide for those who started at the 
beginning and taught them the rudiments of business, the 
relaxation of restrictions in the late 70s saw them keen to 
form companies and enter into partnerships. It was this 
group-minded attitude towards business which the Spar group 
attributed to better educated businessmen and which it
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felt augured well for the expansion of its outlets.
In 1979 there were thirty member stores in Soweto. Spar 
professed a good relationship with these members, dealing 
with them on a person to person basis as well 3C' holding 
local conferences. All the member's turnovers had increased 
and they were making money. However, Spar's Managing Director, 
Mr. S. Matus felt that the prices in Soweto were still too 
high. The reasons for this stemmed from the low value of 
most of the stores, they were too small and the stocks were 
still too small. The smaller the stocks, the higher the 
prices.t1231
The development of new outlets in the homelands e.g. OK Bazaars 
and Checkers, led to the relevant homeland Governments 
insisting that the retail outlets have wholesale outlets 
attached, in order to show the small man that he would not 
be forced out by the big developers and to allow him to purchase 
at reasonable prices . ^
Nevertheless, despite this 'evolution' of wholesaling, it 
remained the contention of the Spar Group officials that 
retail and wholesale ventures could not exist or be run by 
the same company. Consequently, they severely criticised 
Blackchain for its Intention to go ahead as a retail and 
wholesale business. Contrary to its declared opinion Spar 
owned nine retail outlets (purely to get the 'feel' of the 
market). It was also prepared to finance retail outlets 
which it saw as viable propositions (many stores, both Black 
and White, had already been financed in that way).
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Spar officials declared that they were keen to see Blackchain 
get started, but only as a retail outlet and preferably as 
part of the Save-Mor Group. They felt tnat with the large 
capital outlay which was involved with sucn a venture as 
Blackchain that it would be impossible for it to have a 
wholesale business anyway. In addition, the expertise 
was not available amongst the Black community. Majola's 
(Managing Director of Blackchain) plan to train a buyer for 
six months, they saw as ridiculous and unlikely to be 
successful, t-1-26) in fact, Spar's main drawcard should have 
been iLs expertise, expertise in running a wholesale 
business and experience in training its Black retail 
customers. However, unhappily for Spar, as with Pick 'n Pay, 
this proved to be the one thing which the African businessmen, 
involved with Blackchain, claimed they did not require.
They claimed, quite rightly, that grocery retailing was 
the one field in which Africans had some experience because 
for more than fifty years it was about the only field open 
to Black businessmen. The one thing they did not know was 
whether, with the lifting of trading restrictions, they 
could achieve the same heights as the White businessmen.
But they were prepared to try, in their own areas at first 
if that was all they were allowed, and later in White areas . 
Sam Motsuenyane emphasised their feelings on the matter 
when he stated that, as long as 'Blacks are debarred from 
trading in White areas, it is not morally defensible for
(127)
Whites to want to trade unconditionally in Black areas.'
Spar's response to NAFCOC'S view was to bypass NAFCOC and 
deal with the businessmen direct. It reasoned that NAFCOC,
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by not wanting Whites in Black areas except on their terms,
was arresting the development of Black retailers even
further. White partners could provide capital and expertise.
If NAFCOC 1 ran before it could walk1 and continued to
promote Black business in White areas, then it would find
itself competing, with little capital and expertise, against
the experienced White retailers. In the short term this
(12 8)
would slow their development.
Consequent , Spar, in view of NAFCOC 1 £ L' ■ i-ies concerning 
partnerships with Whites, embarked on its scheme for the 
Save-Mor guild in the townships, Soweto in particular, 
without NAFCOC1S blessing, Though it claimed to be dealing 
with individual traders in order to enrol them in the 
guild, it very soon came to NAFCOC'S notice that the Soweto 
Traders Association's members (unaffiliated to NAFCOC at 
that time), were heavily involved in Save-Mor. Spar was 
accused of driving a wedge between the already fragile 
alliance of the two associations. Spar's Managing Director,
Mr. S. Matus, later denied that his company had ever had 
dealings with either NAFCOC or the Soweto Traders Association.
He emphasised that all those in Soweto who had joined Save-Mor 
were happy with their progress and relationship with Spar, 
and they did not want compe ition from Blackchain. Matus 
said that he feit it would be a long time, if ever, before 
Blackchain was in competition with Spar. Nevertheless, he 
added that, if Blackchain opened a store near, or in cc.Tipetition 
with, a Save-Mor outlet, and Blackchain was not itself a 
member of Save”Mor, then Spar would fight Blackchain by 
giving a great deal of promotional publicity to the affected
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store as well as jiving it goods at lower prices and on 
long term credit. In addition, if Blackchain set up as a
wholesaler Spar would also fight it in the same way. This
was not anti-Black, but business.^^9)
This was how things stood between the two groups, when 
in July 1979 , at NAFCOC'S Conference, Spar offered another 
deal to Black township traders. Spar was prepared to move 
into the townships and own and operate stores. It would
PUj.j. out when African businessmen were ready to take over.
However, the conference announcement of 'no strings attached' 
was later altered somewhat. Spar would remain as the 
wholesaler, since i■_ claimed that it was unlikely that there 
would be anyone else to deal with, and it would tie up its 
own brands.
The motivation behind this offer was purely profit. Spar 
was in business to supply stores with g o d s  and make a profit. 
It claimed to be a completely non-racial organisation and 
would deal with anyone whom it felt could give it a profit. 
From figures available, it saw the Black market as its 
growth point, consequently it was interested in making inroads 
into this area as fast as possible.
However, once again, NAFCOC refused to rise to the bait.
It was in the process of acquiring the required capital to 
start Blackchain; it had gained the affiliation of the 
Soweto Traders Association and it was busy allaying any 
fears which Soweto's businessmen might have over competition 
from Blackchain. It continued to view Spar as a White 
competitor.
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Spar was left to deal with traders as individuals in order 
to being them into its group. However during the following 
year it did set out to change its image. In 1979, Spar 
claimed that it had not considered asking Blacks to join 
its Board, since all the Directors were qualified accountants 
and there were no Blacks suitably qualified for a position 
on the Board. There were also no Blacks qualified as buyers 
who could be put in managerial positions at Spar. Spar 
was not prepared to 'window dress to change its image to 
make it more presentable to Blacks - Profit must come first,'
In April 1980, a Black was invited to join Spar's Board of 
Directors.
NAFCOC received two further acceptable offers from White 
companies who wanted co enter the African market. The first 
was from the B & S Kitchen Manufacturing firm in Brits. 1^31^
This proposal was acc pted in principle since it offered 
NAFCOC a fifty one per cent share in s joint venture.
However, since the enterprise involved supplying and fitting 
kitchens into houses, its natural partner was a construction 
company. Therefore, NAFCOC referred the company to the 
holding company of the African Development and Construction 
Group (hereinafter AD & CC) which NAFCOC had already established 
with Roberts Const ■ -ction. If AD & CC became actively involved 
in the construction of houses in the African townships, then 
NAFCOC reasoned that, B & S's offer might prove to be valuable.
The second offer came from the Carden Taylor Corporation.
This overwhelming interest by White companies wishing to 
get Blacks involved in their affairs, led NAFCOC to refer 
this latest offer to two committees the capital raising
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committee and the industrial - to get their opinions on the 
proposal. These committees were in the process of studying the 
feasibility of setting up either a Trust Fund or an Urban 
industrial Development Corporation, or both, from which African 
businessmen could obtain the necessary capital to involve 
themselves in the many offers which were forthcoming.
The committees recommended the acceptance in principle of 
a Trust Fund to permit Blacks to obtain shares in South 
African companies and they saw no conflict between that 
Trust Funi and the proposed Urban Industrial Development 
Corporation. They warned that there was a need to watch 
that they were not overwhelmed by the number of projects 
undertaken and, that any Black involvement in those projects 
should be seen to be creative and not subservient. They 
recommended the pursual of the Cardan Taylor offer 
suggesting that the shares should be acquired through the 
Trust Fund. In addition the qompany should prepare a report 
on its activities which should be submitted to the Graduate 
School of Business at the University of the Witwatersrand. ^^3)
Although, the NAFCOC Executive agreed with the committees' 
recommendation to go ahead with the offer, it decided that 
the deal would be acceptable if money was channelled into 
the Urban Development Corporation where Blacks could borrow 
the money to buy shares. It vetoed the suggestion of 
involving the University Business School. NAFCOC had been 
complaining for many years that there was no Development 
Corporation available to urban Black business, as there was 
for homeland Blacks, and there seemed to be insurmountable 
difficulties surrounding the establishment of a suitable
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Trust Fund. Therefore, this new offer, appeared to present 
the chance that they had been waiting for to press their 
case for the setting up on an Urban Industrial Development
Corporation, especially if it could be backed by the large
Carden Taylor Group. No reasons were given for vetoeing 
the University but presumably they were unwilling at this 
stage to involve a third party of academics, in a purely 
business proposition where they were being offered the
expertise of a large White company.
Another offer came from Cannon Organic Products for NAFCOC 
to act as distributors of its p r o d u c t s b u t ,in keeping 
with its now formed policy, NAFCOC refused the proposal, 
stating that it would only consider those offers where full 
equity participation was extended, rather than as distributors 
or such like relationships.
These business offers to NAFCOC have been placed under the 
heading of NAFCOC1S income because they (those that were 
accepted) were all sources of income, or potentially so, 
either for NAFCOC itself or its associated companies, or 
for its members. Because they all took place in recent 
years no figures are yet available to show to what degree 
this has been successful. However one deal, as yet unmentioned, 
aas concluded by NAFCOC, which gave it an immediate direct 
source of income. This was in the field of insurance.
4. (iii).(e) S.A. Permanent Life Assurance Company
*
The success of NAFCOC1S project, the African Bank in 1975
* This is deilt with later in this Chapter Section(v) (a)
L
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rapidly brought it to the conclusion that the associated 
field of insurance should be tackled ne::i.
The announcement in February 19 79 that Black businessmen 
had entered the big league insurance business, in a deal 
involving the Permanent Life Assurance Company of Johannesburg 
and the giant American Sentry Insurance Comp; y w a s  
the culmination of more than three years of negotiation 
between NAFCOC'S Executive and various insurance companies 
in Southern Africa and America.
During July 19 75, when NAFCOC'S President reported that 
the final stages of the African Bank project had been reached, 
with its opening due in December 1975, the Executive's 
attention was drawn to the importance of Insurance as an 
essential element for success in running a bank.^136'
When a company makes a public issue, it is usually 
necessary to employ agents, particularly banks and stock­
brokers , in order to bring the issue to thj notice of their 
clients by displaying copies of the prospectus. Such 
agents are entitled to brokerage on the shares allotted.
If the issue is handled by a bank, that organisation will 
prepare brokerage 1.1 sts from applications supplied by 
stockbrokers and/or other banks, and will forward these 
I-* sts to the company for the appropriate cheques to be 
drawn.(137)
Companies involved m  share issues usually take out insurance 
against the possibility of loss arising from the issue 
of an incorrect share certificate, and this cover is usually
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included in a comprehensive policy covering all aspects 
of the share transaction. Two officials from the
Prosperity Insurance Company attended the July Executive 
•meeting in order to elaborate on these points. Details 
of the advantages of an insurance company in order to 
keep more money for longer periods to enable the bank to 
advance more loans were outlined, and the case of Sanlam 
and Volkskas, which made impressive progress because each
A
was essential to the economic progress of the other was 
cited.
Mr. Guzana, one of the officials, staced that Prosperity 
had thought it would be a good idea for NAFCOC to 
interest itself in its company rather than start a new 
insurance company and they would appreciate NAFCOC working 
with Prosperity provided thct the latter could retain its 
identity. Prosperity was a company with its headquarters 
in Umtata, rranskei, it had a share capital of R200 000 
shared equally between the BIC and African shareholders.
In fact it was revealed later that the capital structure of 
the Prosperity Insurance
*In 1937, Sanlam, which had been formed twenty years 
earlier by a handful of Afrikaner professional men in Cape 
Town and Stellenbosch, was keen to mobilise Afrikaner
L v S g ^ 9yT o \ w ; 0end?avolk2Lsabank^w“ Ih had originally 
been established as a co-operative bank in 1934, was 
registered as a commercial bank in 1941.
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Company was R200 000 shares, of these R100 000 were 
acquired by the BIC and R70 000 by African shareholders.
A balance of R30 000 unacquired shares was reported. It 
was then suggested that the first priority was for Africans 
to buy the remaining s h a r e s . S e v e n t y  five per cent 
of its policy holders resided outside Transkei in other 
parts of South Africa. NAFCOC was given the assurance 
by, Mr. Guzana, that the Bj.C would eventually withdraw.
It was decided to investigate the offer.
Later discussions in NAFCOC re zealed that several other 
insurance groups were keen to offer brokerage to the 
African Bank. The advantages of establishing a brokerage 
company as well as an insurance company become apparent 
when one looks at the interaction between the insurance 
and brokerage businesses.
A contract of insurance, in which a man seeks to protect 
himself against loss arising from adverse circumstances, 
is a contract of indemnity, to which the general principles 
of the law of contract apply. These contracts are frequently 
negotiated through insurance brokers, whose specialized 
knowledge of Insurance enables the insured to obtain the 
best terms available. In addition, the broker advises his 
clients regarding technical insurance matters, These services 
are available to the insured without the payment of any 
brokerage, since the ^surance companies allow brokers a 
commission which is not passed on to the insured should 
the latter wish to negotiate his insurance business direct 
with the company.
h
/ i
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The Standard Bank Brokerage Company, Glenville Enthoven
International Company and a Black company Octagon Brokerage
all put forward offers of a joint venture with the African Bank.1141
S.A. Mutual insurance Company also offered a Mutual Pension Scheme
working In some way with NAFCOC. A member from Ingaba, Mr. Belu,
felt that 'too many hawks are ready to stoop and prey on
US* As usual, he saw 'White businesses waiting Black
money'( } but he suggested that since they lacked expertise
the Standard Bank, who had long been using their money,
should be called in to do service.
Consequently, NAFCOC had the option cf either forming its 
own brokerage company or taking up one of the offers presented 
to it. it chose the latter course and announced, in November 
1975, that the African Bank had decided to foi the 
Afribank Brokerage Company in which Glenville Enthoven 
would be the managers with a thirty per cent participatory 
equity. However it was unanimously agreed that NAFCOC 
should continue with its desired aim to establish a 
million Rand based insurance group. To this end it formed 
a committee to look into the matter with Prosperity, with 
the object of meeting the BIC in Pretoria and asking them 
to sell their shares to the African public. Negotiations 
also continued with the Old Mutual on a pension fund scheme.
First reports from this insurance committee were favourable.
NAFCOC revealed its intention to expand and develop the 
Prosperity Insurance Company into a hundred per cent Black 
insurance company. The BIC was reported to be willing to 
phase out in favour of Black shareholders and even offered
J
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